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 Abstract 
How to quantify security is a classic question in the security community that until today has had no 
plausible answer. Unfortunately, current security evaluation models are often either quantitative but 
too specific (i.e., applicability is limited), or comprehensive (i.e., system-level) but qualitative. The 
importance of quantifying security cannot be overstated, but doing so is difficult and complex, for 
many reason: the “physics” of the amount of security is ambiguous; the operational state is defined by 
two confronting parties; protecting and breaking systems is a cross-disciplinary mechanism; security 
is achieved by comparable security strength and breakable by the weakest link; and the human factor 
is unavoidable, among others. Thus, security engineers face great challenges in defending the 
principles of information security and privacy. This thesis addresses model-based system-level 
security quantification and argues that properly addressing the quantification problem of security first 
requires a paradigm shift in security modeling, addressing the problem at the abstraction level of what 
defines a computing system and failure model, before any system-level analysis can be established. 
Consequently, we present a candidate computing systems abstraction and failure model, then propose 
two failure-centric model-based quantification approaches, each including a bounding system model, 
performance measures, and evaluation techniques. The first approach addresses the problem 
considering the set of controls. To bound and build the logical network of a security system, we 
extend our original work on the Information Security Maturity Model (ISMM) with Reliability Block 
Diagrams (RBDs), state vectors, and structure functions from reliability engineering. We then present 
two different groups of evaluation methods. The first mainly addresses binary systems, by extending 
minimal path sets, minimal cut sets, and reliability analysis based on both random events and random 
variables. The second group addresses multi-state security systems with multiple performance 
measures, by extending Multi-state Systems (MSSs) representation and the Universal Generating 
Function (UGF) method. The second approach addresses the quantification problem when the two 
sets of a computing system, i.e., assets and controls, are considered. We adopt a graph-theoretic 
approach using Bayesian Networks (BNs) to build an asset-control graph as the candidate bounding 
system model, then demonstrate its application in a novel risk assessment method with various 
diagnosis and prediction inferences. This work, however, is multidisciplinary, involving foundations 
from many fields, including security engineering; maturity models; dependability theory, particularly 
reliability engineering; graph theory, particularly BNs; and probability and stochastic models. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Information security is unavoidable wherever a computing system exists. Information can be in one of 
three states: storage, transmission, or processing. Each state may have different threats, and hence, 
security requirements. The success of the design, development, and operations of computing systems 
to perform their primary functions is coupled with the success of their protection. Therefore, although 
the security function is usually a secondary task to the system [1], it remains a core requirement [2].  
The ever-increasing security failures, especially due to cyber-attacks, threats, and associated loss 
estimates have forced researchers to look into new ways to build secure systems, not only by design 
but also by responding to operational problems [3]. However, a major question has remained without 
a reasonable, widely agreed upon answer until today: how to quantitatively evaluate operational 
security. In our view, addressing this question requires a paradigm shift in security modeling. We 
need to arrive at a unified abstraction of computing systems and a standardised model of security 
failures, before any system-level representations, performance measures, and analysis methods can be 
established.  
The work presented herein explores this direction of research, one that falls into the growing field 
of security engineering. This chapter, first, aims to provide the necessary background of the research 
problem. The research motivation is briefly presented in Section  1.1. This is followed by a description 
of the research problem in Section  1.2 and a summary of research contributions in Section  1.3. 
Section  1.4 depicts the overall structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Motivation 
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link; this proverb, commonly used in the 18th century [4], 
has become a prominent phrase in security studies: the weakest link determines the strength of the 
resultant protection of a system [5]. The sad truth in a nutshell, however, is that while we know (or 
think we know) how to meet the goals of information security, individually building its links, we have 
not been so successful in realizing these goals jointly as a chain in the face of failure while in 
operation, nor have we been able to satisfactorily identify the weakest link in a proactive manner. For 
instance, we protect confidentiality and integrity by means of cryptography and availability by means 
of redundancy. Yet, the amount of control we exercise over security systems in general remains 
disproportionate to the efforts we expend. From the industry point of view, we still lack insight into 
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 the effectiveness of countermeasures and anticipated threats, i.e., what is really going on in 
computing environments, as concluded by CSI survey [6]. On the research side, existing literature in 
the security domain has arrived at a consensus that there is not yet a widely-accepted concept of 
security failure [7], [8], operational measures [7], [8], [9], [10] or metrics [7], [9], [11], [12], system 
boundaries [9], system-level quantitative methodologies [7], [9], [10], and operational datasets [10], 
[11], [13]. Some, such as [14], consider the quantitative evaluation of security the necessary step 
before evolving this field into a “science”. Nevertheless, the ever-increasing number of reported 
security incidents and threats concluded from most security surveys, such as [15], [16], along with the 
continuous growth of security spending and loss estimates, as reported in [17], represent clear 
evidence of a setback in security engineering. 
An important reality, and a challenge at the same time, is that such protection goals may exist in 
many forms, with different specifications and configurations implemented across different security 
controls and boundaries, at various abstraction levels. For instance, they might manifest across 
different layers at the TCP/IP protocol stack in various applications, platforms, communication 
devices, and technologies; in addition there is the unavoidable involvement of the human factor in 
such protection. Alone, neither security in theory nor security at individual controls necessarily leads 
to the security of overall system while in operation. Information about the strength of controls with 
respect to both specifications and operated configuration [18], and deployment of comparable security 
strength across system controls, as stated in NIST SP 800-57 [5], are both especially important to 
building secure, reliable systems. Without a proper measurement of the chain, these requirements, 
among others, will remain profound obstacles in the field. 
This work is indeed motivated by a practical application of the proposed failure-centric approach 
and associated evaluation methods to engineer secure systems. These evaluation methods can be 
employed for various purposes, such as design and configuration of secure systems, certification, and 
auditing exercises. Ultimately, these methods facilitate control over the intended security element of a 
system. 
1.2 Problem Description 
Security and reliability are closely related concepts [7], [9], [19], [20], [21]. Therefore, a secure 
system is one that can be relied on to meet the essential goals of information security: confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. The complexity of the information security problem, however, represents a 
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 key challenging characteristic of today’s computing. In our view, this complexity dilemma is centered 
around four entities: assets, controls, threats, and economics, as depicted in Figure  1-1. Assets such as 
hardware, software, and data have value and need to be well protected. The protection mechanism, 
however, requires a set of controls or countermeasures, commonly classified into prevention, 
determent, deflection, detection, and recovery controls, to remove or reduce vulnerabilities. This 
protection allows the system to fight against a set of predefined threats, which can be interception, 
interruption, modification, or fabrication activities. Threats, when realized, lead to breaching1 the 
perimeter of security goals, i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and then can cause security 
failures. Nevertheless, protection mechanisms cannot be implemented without the investment of some 
resources, ending up with economics as the deciding factor for affordable amounts of the other three 
sets. The unavoidable dependency and dynamic interactions among these elements feed into the 
complex process of information security. 
 
 
Figure  1-1: Key participants in information security complexity 
 
As such, the security notion has some properties that make it uniquely different from other 
engineering problems. For instance, security is about a continuous chase between two confronting and 
competing parties: security defenders on one side and failure sources, whether malicious or 
nonmalicious, on the other side, in a way analogous to games and battlefields [22], [23]. This view 
1 The phrases “security failure” and “security breach” are used interchangeably. 
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 was considered in modeling the attacker behavior in [24], [25], [26], [27] using game-theoretic 
approaches. 
Additionally, we build security through a chain of comparable strength using a range of means 
from completely different disciplines, from pure mathematics such as cryptography to applied 
psychology such as awareness; yet, we break security through any of its links using the same 
spectrum of techniques, ranging from cryptanalysis to phishing attacks. Thus, cross-disciplinary 
expertise is required in both securing and breaking systems. In other words, either way, mathematics 
or psychology alone is not enough anymore, in addition to the fact that it is not a fair game! Operation 
Aurora in mid December 2009, a sophisticated Cyber-attack originating from China targeting Google 
and other high-tech US firms, is a clear example. The attack on Google, for instance, was believed to 
involve combined techniques from reconnaissance missions using social networking sites, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, through social engineering, such as phishing emails, to high technology, such 
as exploiting a security flaw in the MS Internet Explorer browser [28], [29]. 
Furthermore, defining performance measures for operational security is troublesome. To evaluate 
performance in communication networks, we generally rely on physical quantities that can be 
captured. For instance, we often use the number of transmitted and dropped bits/packets over a 
communication channel. Similarly, the performance in circuit theory can be evaluated using the 
amount of voltage and current flow in a circuit. Unfortunately, the case in security engineering is far 
more complex as there is no clear, quantifiable “physics” of security by which performance measures 
of secure systems can be established. Thus, it is hard to quantify the amount of security input fed into 
a system [19], [30], and the amount of threats a system is facing, i.e., threat input, nor can we 
eliminate human behavior [22], [23]. However, the evaluation methods and techniques in 
dependability theory have proved to be useful in evaluating systems’ operational capabilities such as 
reliability and availability, even though such attributes have no direct physical quantities. We build on 
such theory to propose new methods of quantitative evaluation of security systems. 
1.3 Summary of Contributions 
The overall contribution of this thesis is in presenting model-based, quantitative methods for 
evaluating security, as depicted in Figure  1-2. These methods are based on a unified abstraction of 
computing systems and a consistent failure model, employing failure interdependencies among assets 
and security controls in these computing systems. To facilitate this study, first, we critically examine 
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 the problem of quantitative security evaluation, considering various aspects important to model 
development in the security field, such as inductive versus deductive evaluation models, underlying 
mechanisms versus the impact of failure in security studies, inconsistency in the security modeling 
paradigm, the issue of dataset unavailability, and then, we describe what went wrong and the 
suggested measures to overcome current limitations. Following that we present the core research 
contributions, outlined as follows. 
• We introduce the abstraction of a computing system in two sets: assets and controls. We 
also introduce a failure model based on the impact of failures consequent to malicious 
and/or nonmalicious causes, along with a discussion of its importance to security studies. 
Then, we demonstrate the redefined version of the Information Security Maturity Model 
(ISMM), explaining its architecture, propositions, and how to build the logical network of a 
security system using Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs), state vectors, and structure 
functions. Further, we present common properties of model measures and ways to build the 
maturity function quantitatively. 
• We present evaluation methods extended from reliability theory into security evaluation. 
Specifically, we present the extended minimal path method, minimal cut method, and 
reliability analysis based on both random events and random variables. We show how these 
evaluation methods are built onto the ISMM work as their system model. We also show 
how to establish the maturity adequacy function and maturity analysis using the reliability 
measure. 
• We introduce the extension of Multi-State Systems (MSS) representation using the 
Universal Generating Function (UGF) onto the ISMM work. The purpose of this extension 
is to present a universal approach to evaluating security systems, using multiple 
performance measures in a multistate setting. We also illustrate how to establish the 
maturity adequacy function and associated maturity analysis. 
• We introduce an asset-control Bayesian network as a candidate theoretical system model to 
capture interdependencies among the sets of assets and controls. We demonstrate the 
application of this model by proposing a new risk assessment method. We show the 
mathematical formulation necessary to carry out risk assessment and demonstrate its use. 
Furthermore, we provide a mathematical proof on a specific bound of the risk function. We 
also prove that the method resolves the distinction problem between high-frequency low-
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 impact events and low-frequency high-impact ones by employing the casual effect property 
defined by BN topology. 
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Figure  1-2: Summary of contributions 
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 1.4 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 introduces the required background for 
this research. The first part discusses the problem of quantitative security evaluation from different 
aspects, such as inductive versus deductive evaluation models, underlying mechanisms versus the 
impact of failure in security studies and inconsistency therein, the unavailability of failure datasets, 
and dominant limitations of existing work and how to address them. The remaining parts of this 
chapter introduce the necessary background for the proposed evaluation methods. In particular, they 
provide an overview of relevant methods from reliability engineering, then Multi-state System (MSS) 
representation and the Universal Generating Function (UGF), followed by risk assessment and 
Bayesian networks (BNs). 
 Chapter 3 first presents the foundational components of the proposed evaluation methods in this 
thesis: computing system abstraction and failure model. Then the previous work of the ISMM model 
is redefined to facilitate the quantitative evaluation methods illustrated later in  Chapter 4 and  Chapter 
5. To facilitate quantitative maturity, ISMM model propositions and architecture are redefined so that 
the maturity function can be established afterwards. To establish the logical structure of a security 
system and associated performance measures, relevant tools are extended, mostly from reliability 
theory, into the ISMM model, such as RBDs, vectors, and structure functions, as well as necessary 
concepts and definitions. A demonstration on binary systems of these extensions using a simple case 
study is presented. 
 Chapter 4 addresses the evaluation of operational security using techniques extended mainly from 
reliability theory. It presents the extended versions of minimal path set, minimal cut set, and 
reliability analysis in the cases of random events and random variables. In each method, model 
formulation and a brief demonstration on binary systems using the earlier case study are presented. 
The chapter illustrates how the use of these methods can be useful in evaluating operational 
performance measures and in building upon the quantitative maturity analysis of security systems. 
This evaluation primarily uses failure statistics and the corresponding logical network of individual 
controls of the security system. 
 Chapter 5 generalizes the evaluation approach of security systems to multistate systems with 
multiple performance measures, and shows how to achieve this objective by extending the Multi-
State Systems (MSS) representation and the Universal Generating Function (UGF) method. The 
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 model formulation and a brief illustration using the same case study demonstrated earlier are 
presented.   
In  Chapter 6, contrary to preceding evaluation methods, we approach the security evaluation 
problem by examining the relationship of both sets of a computing system together: assets and 
controls. To establish the system model, we employ BNs to capture and bound the failure dependency 
among such entities, establishing the theoretical model of what we call Asset-Control BNs. We then 
show an application of this model by developing a new risk assessment method, including all 
necessary formulation and an illustrative case study. Moreover, we present two mathematical proofs: 
one related to a specific bound on the risk function and the other on the distinction property between 
high-frequency low-impact and low-frequency high-impact events in the proposed risk assessment. 
 Chapter 7 provides a conclusion of the preceding chapters and a summary of side notes describing 
related open problems for each chapter. 
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 Chapter 2 
Background 
This chapter reviews the background upon which this research is built, beginning with a discussion of 
related work and its limitations. Section  2.1 critically examines various aspects important to model 
development endeavours in security studies. It starts with a review of evaluation techniques with 
focus on model-based quantitative methods. After that, it contrasts inductive models to deductive 
models, and underlying failure mechanisms to the impact of failure in evaluation models. A brief 
discussion of inconsistency in security failure models and the issue of failure dataset unavailability is 
then presented. This section concludes with a summary of overall limitations of existing work and 
how to resolve them. 
The remaining sections of this chapter review relevant preliminaries. In particular, Section  2.2 
presents a brief overview of the failure model in reliability engineering, reliability block diagrams 
(RBDs), state vectors, and structure functions. It then reviews the evaluation methods of interest, 
mainly minimal path set, minimal cut set, and reliability analysis. Section  2.3 starts with a review of 
work on Multi-State Systems (MSS) representation, and then describes the Universal Generating 
Function (UGF) as the analysis method. Section  2.4 presents preliminaries for the proposed asset-
control graph. Specifically, it reviews risk assessment in the computing field and Bayesian networks 
(BNs). 
2.1 Various Studies in Security Modelling  
2.1.1 Qualitative Versus Quantitative Models 
Evaluation techniques: Security evaluation represents one of the essential tasks in security 
engineering. Security engineering, however, as defined in [31], is a rapidly growing field that requires 
methods and tools that can be used to build systems that remain dependable in the face of failures, 
whether malicious or nonmalicious. It includes physical security, information security, and associated 
economics, and involves multidisciplinary knowledge domains, such as cryptography, secure coding, 
formal methods, and applied psychology. Evaluation techniques use qualitative and/or quantitative 
methods in order to provide a systematic and representative view of the phenomena under study, 
where analysis exercises can be established, and hence can be significant for many security 
applications. Contrary to measurement-based evaluation, which is more accurate but can be too 
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 expensive, dangerous, or unattainable, model-based evaluation can be less expensive, but less 
accurate. Moreover, model-based evaluation facilitates a wider range of evaluation activities and 
analysis tools, such as reasoning, prediction [32], sensitivity analysis, optimization, bottleneck 
analysis [33], and can be applied flexibly at various stages, including even before the system itself is 
running [33], [34]. Models are assumed to reflect simplified and sensible pictures of reality, and 
therefore represent an essential component for evaluation activities of complex systems [32], [33], 
[35], [36]. Also, the choice of performance metrics is crucial if one is to perform useful analysis, and 
therefore must be relevant to the context of the application domain and problem of interest [34]. 
Security models can be seen as either qualitative or quantitative in nature, although a mix of both is 
common. Qualitative techniques aim to capture certain qualities of the system and hence are mostly 
concerned with the process rather than the outcome itself. In contrast, quantitative techniques seek to 
develop a proper method of measurement. A measure is basically a mathematical abstraction that 
captures some subset of the characteristics for a given object for the purpose of studying its 
performance [37]. 
Security models in a broad sense vary according to their intended scope and objective, and 
therefore, are designed accordingly to capture certain properties relevant to th 
e intended level of abstraction. Security models can be employed for various reasons, generally to 
test if a particular policy coincides with preset requirements, to develop a certain policy, to assist in 
planning a particular implementation, or to verify the adherence of an implementation to predefined 
requirements [19], [38]. Among them are access control models, capability-based models, trust-based 
models, and auditing and evaluation models. There follows a brief description of some of the 
common qualitative and quantitative security models. 
Qualitative models: Common Criteria, initially called The Orange Book, is an international security 
certification standard (ISO/IEC 15408). It originated as a result of three other standards: i) the 
European standard, known as the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), ii) 
the Canadian standard, known as the Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria 
(CTCPEC), and iii) The US standard, known as the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
(TCSEC). CC is widely accepted and used for evaluating general security features of computer 
systems. CC contains a set of security requirements and attributes along with a certification process 
that defines various classes of trust for a security system. If these measures are correctly 
implemented, they are likely to increase the security of a system, but still cannot be used to 
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 continuously evaluate or guarantee operational security [9]. Measures in the Orange Book, however, 
are defined in terms of classes or ranking, representing the qualitative nature of security postures. 
As an example, on models considering the integrated view of dependability and security, the work 
of [12], [21] proposed a high-level conceptual system model that represents a security system as a 
black-box, showing interactions with its environment as system input and output. This approach 
requires system bounds to be clearly defined, and these can be set at various levels, from a single 
platform to a whole organization. A system’s input is mainly regarded as fault introduction, which 
could lead to subsequent errors and failures. A system’s output is considered the system behaviour: 
the service delivery or denial to users. This model also reflects the traditional attributes of security: 
confidentially, integrity, and availability, and maps them into new attributes of security and 
dependability combined: integrity, correctness, and trustability. The measures of the system are 
divided into behavioural and preventive ones. Remedies to failures are classified into three methods: 
threat reduction, boundary protection, and recovery. The model is proposed for reasoning about 
security with regard to the delivery and deniability of service, i.e., unwanted service disruptions, and 
seeking its use as a baseline for assigning security metrics to the suggested attributes. However, the 
quantifiability portions, particularly security metrics or measures, in this model are not defined. 
Another form of model is attack trees, a graphical analysis method developed by Bruce Schneier 
[39], [40]. Although high-level quantitative analysis is possible, attack trees are used primarily to 
provide qualitative failure documentation, particularly attack data, and their countermeasures in 
structured and reusable trees. In a tree structure similar to that of fault trees, attack trees use logic 
gates to encode relationships among tree nodes. Once completed, different values can be assigned to 
each node, such as possible, impossible; expensive, inexpensive; probability of attack success; cost; 
etc. An extended demonstration of attack trees is presented in [13] to refine attack data into reusable 
attack patterns. This work also demonstrated the reusable structure property and referential 
transparency property of attack trees. The reusability of attack trees increases their application. The 
referential transparency property, as described in [41], makes the represented abstraction in attack 
trees scalable, that is, the higher-level description of an entity contains the information of lower-level 
entities. 
With regard to risk assessment, several qualitative methods are described in [30]. Among them is 
the Facilitated Risk Analysis and Assessment Process (FRAAP) and its variations. FRAAP is a 
disciplined process intended to document security-related risks with business operations, conducted 
11 
 for each system, platform, or application at a time. Another technique is the risk assessment matrix, 
which is a simple matrix that combines the three security objectives, i.e., confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability, with the two security classes of risk, i.e., accidental acts and deliberate acts. System 
experts can use this matrix as part of a risk assessment process to qualitatively analyse and identify 
threats and controls. 
Other common qualitative methods are described in earlier work in [23], including the Systems 
Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model CMM (SSE-CMM) [42], which has been accepted 
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as ISO/IEC 21827 standard; the COBIT 
maturity model (short for Control OBjectives for Information and related Technology) [43]; the NIST 
maturity model (developed by the Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC) under the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)) [44]; the OCTAVE risk model (short for 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation, developed at Carnegie Mellon 
University) [45]; and the CRAMM risk model (developed by the Central Computer and 
Telecommunications Agency (CCTA), UK, and named CCTA Risk Analysis and Management 
Method) [46]. Unlike with quantitative models, mapping between various qualitative models is 
common to further augment their analysis processes. Examples for such mapping include mapping 
ISO17799 and HIPAA; ISO 17799 and Sarbanes–Oxley; ISO 17799 and CobiT [30]. 
Regardless of which qualitative method is used, expert judgements are heavily involved in using 
qualitative models and the evaluation results. In addition, such methods evaluate the delivered 
security process, not the security element itself [7], [9], [23]. 
Quantitative models: Quantitative models represent the focus of this work. The quantitative 
modelling process in general should be kept simple enough to avoid complicating the calculations of 
intended system measures, but at the same time, should be descriptive enough to capture the intended 
behaviour of the real-world phenomenon under study [47], [48]. Over-parameterised models have 
always proved to have poor predictive capacity [49]. From this point onward, all discussion is 
assumed to be about quantitative models. 
For decades, statistics and related modeling applications have been used extensively in theory and 
practice to evaluate the dependability and risk metrics of complex systems. In recent times, statistics 
have been widely used in specific security studies such as complexity theory (e.g., algorithms and 
cryptographic complexity measurements), intrusion detection systems, and threat modelling. More 
recently, probabilistic techniques are being increasingly applied in various security-evaluation tasks 
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 and in analyzing underlying attack mechanisms in particular. A wide set of examples can be found in 
[3], [7], [9], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58]. We briefly demonstrate some of these 
examples, noting the overlapping between representation techniques (e.g., graphs, random processes, 
Markov models) and analysis goals (e.g., risk assessment, intrusion detection, trust, attack behaviour). 
The work of [55], for instance, proposed a rule-based intrusion detection system that monitors the 
standard operations on a target system, establishing normal operational patterns. It then uses a 
statistical method to detect whether a new observation is abnormal compared to previous 
observations. A lower level of modeling abstraction can be found in [52], [59], which use state 
transition models to stochastically capture the attacker behaviour in intrusion-tolerant system models.  
In network routing, the work of [60] modeled probabilistically node faults, malicious or 
nonmalicious, and developed accordingly a probabilistic-based route detection and fault-avoidance 
algorithm for dynamic byzantine adversarial environments. A loss in this model can be caused by 
packet drop irrespective of the underlying details of how it was dropped. In [56], a trust model is 
presented defining the levels of security in terms of the probability distribution of the level-of-threat 
required to achieve a penetration involving information of a particular classification.  
Graph-based models in particular are increasingly used in various types of security modeling. For 
instance, the work of [61] presented a formal model to study quantitatively enterprise-level network 
risks using a graph-based approach. Graph arcs represent attacks or stages of attacks. Graph edges 
encode analysis metrics such as probabilities of success, average time to succeed, or costs, 
representing an attacker’s level-of-effort. Probabilistic-based attack analysis can then be performed 
using various graph algorithms such as shortest-path algorithm. This work, [61], computes near-
optimal shortest paths and considers this approach a good measure of security since it models time 
dependencies, multiple attack attempts, and multi-prong attacks. The work of [11] also introduced a 
related model for the probabilistic risk measurement of an enterprise network. To assign cumulative 
probabilities of successful attacks, this model uses attack graphs, described in [61], for model 
representation, and uses Common Vulnerability Scoring Systems (CVSS) for individual component 
metrics, described in [62], [63]. Further, the work of [10] adopted influence diagrams as a tool for 
establishing a decision-driven risk model. The paper uses statistics of the annual frequency of bad 
events and consequences of bad events along with a predefined set of safeguards in the proposed 
model. The modelling approach aims to quantify computer security risk and associated annual losses, 
and derives cumulative distributions of benefits of safeguards and forecast attack rates.  
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 The work of [3], [64] addressed the quantification of system-level security by proposing an 
assessment model that uses a privilege graph to exhibit operational security vulnerabilities. Attacks in 
this work are based on both effort and time estimation. The graph is transformed into a Markov chain 
that represents all possible successful attack scenarios. The Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is then 
used as the quantification measure, representing the mean time for a potential intruder to reach the 
target. Experimental results using this model are presented in [54]. Moreover, a special class of 
graphs, the Bipartite graph, is used in [65] to probabilistically model the dependency of failures 
among end-to-end and host-to-host services in a communication network. 
Other work focussed on the attack behaviour itself. For instance, in a study presented in [66] about 
error and attack tolerance of the World-Wide Web and the Internet, attack behaviour is defined by an 
agent targeting nodes in a preference manner, selecting the most connected ones. Thus, the removal 
of the most connected nodes in decreasing order of their connectivity is used to simulate attacks. 
Conversely, random removal of nodes is used to simulate random failures. The work of [67] 
presented a quantitative model of social behavior of an attack (e.g., skill level, tenacity, financial 
ability) over resources of a network as an accumulation of a sequence of steps represented by an 
attack graph. Possible attack paths are modeled as a sequence of probabilistic steps using Bayesian 
estimates that build the corresponding attack graph. Bayesian networks-based analysis is used to 
perform vulnerability assessment of the targeted network. This method uses a predefined threshold 
value for each resource to define an attack-prone point. Other detailed failure aspects such as 
intentional attacks upon a system containing accidental and nonmalicious intentional vulnerabilities 
with respect to the effort taken by the attacker are modeled in [9], where a breach process is realized 
as a stochastic point process in elapsed effort as opposed to a time variable. However, in modelling 
attacks in particular, nonmalicious faults are more widely accepted to be modelled compared to 
malicious faults. 
Contrary to qualitative models, many software packages for solving various modelling methods 
exist today, such as Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance Evaluator 
(SHARPE) [33], [68]; the Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor (HARP) [69]; and Stochastic Petri 
Net Package (SPNP) [70]. 
Plausibility of statistics in modeling attacks: The debate among members of the security research 
community about the plausibility using statistical techniques to model certain classes of security 
breaches is still not over [7], [8], [9], [10], [21], [71], especially debate on those failures resulting 
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 from intentional malicious faults or vulnerabilities such as Trojan Horses. For example, with respect 
to security vulnerabilities, while the work of [71] argues that past data is not representative of valid 
samples of vulnerabilities and is thus irrelevant to future trends, the work of [10] counters that similar 
arguments could have been made against gathering mortality statistics in the early insurance industry. 
Also, [10] continues to stress that past data is relevant to the future but naturally provides partial 
answers to predicting trends, which can be employed constructively by statistical models. This view 
is also supported by research conducted at the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination 
Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon University [72], which hosts one of the largest publicly 
available security incidents statistics. This research, [72], concluded that new breaches continue to 
use some of the old information about vulnerabilities and associated attack mechanisms. Today’s 
information systems suffer from the same or similar vulnerabilities that existed years ago [13]. 
Nevertheless, recent literature addresses the class of intentional malicious faults in the taxonomy of 
faults [73]. Security modeling approaches also considers both malicious and nonmalicious faults, 
although the attack process itself remains of a non-stochastic nature [21]. 
However, it should be noted that this debate is not central to this work. Suffice it to say that the 
failure definition in the context presented reflects the manifested failure and its impact, as opposed to 
the specifics of the underlying failure mechanisms, i.e., underlying faults or vulnerabilities, which are 
mostly the center of the aforementioned debate. 
2.1.2 Inductive versus Deductive Analysis 
The analysis of systems with respect to failure (or success) can be classified into two common 
approaches: inductive methods and deductive methods. The direction of the analysis represents the 
main difference between these approaches [74]. In the induction approach, reasoning is built from 
specific cases to reach a general result. The analysis starts from an initiating event, and then moves 
forward to find out its effect on the entire system failure (or success). These methods are also termed 
bottom-up approaches, answering questions like “What happens if…? What fails?” Examples of 
inductive analysis methods include Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Reliability Block 
Diagrams (RBD) [74], Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [74], [75], privilege graph-based system security 
assessment [3], and consequence-oriented risk assessment [10], [11], [30], [76], [77].  
In the deductive approach, reasoning starts with the general result, and then it moves backward to 
find out the states that contribute to system failure (or success). These methods are also called top-
down approaches, answering questions in the form “How does a given state occur? How does it fail?” 
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 Examples of deductive methods include Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [74], [75], Success Tree Analysis 
(STA) [74], attack trees [13], [40], and cause-oriented risk assessment methods [67], [78].  
Some methods report the ability to perform both types— inductive and deductive analysis. Among 
those is the work of [61], which uses attack graphs with cycles to quantitatively model enterprise-
level network vulnerabilities. This method is presented to analyze how an attacker might be able to 
compromise a specific asset, or analyze the universe of possible consequences following a successful 
attack. Also, the proposed conceptual system, the qualitative model in [21], addresses failure as 
unwanted system behaviour with respect to the underlying chain of fault (attack)-error (intrusion)-
failure events, and failure consequences as delivery-of-service and denial-of-service to users and non-
users, respectively. In a nutshell, the inductive methods are employed to answer questions on what 
system states are possible; the deductive methods are employed to answer questions on how a system 
state can occur. 
Other classifications, although not that common, include morphological models, meaning analysis 
is mainly based on the structure of the system, and non-system oriented models, such as appeared in 
[79].  
Some literature stresses the importance of studying complex systems from the perspective of both 
success space and failure space [76]. However, the majority of research indicates that studying 
systems from the failure space perspective is usually more attainable and practical than the success 
space perspective [74], [80].  
2.1.3 Underlying Mechanisms versus Impact of Failure 
Some research focuses on underlying mechanisms of the incident of interest (e.g., fault, failure, 
attack). For instance, in [13], [40] attack trees use attack patterns, as a generic representation of 
malicious attacks that occur in common scenarios. These patterns are used to characterise attack 
goals, preconditions, attack steps, and consequences if successful. In [67], underlying mechanisms of 
an attack are used to estimate the risk level of resources that might be compromised based on attacker 
behavior in a given network. The attacker behavior in this work is characterized by a predefined set of 
social attributes such as skill level and tenacity, which are used to create the network topology of an 
attack graph of the network resources. These steps represent a course of action that might be taken by 
an attacker to compromise a particular network resource. In the work of [61], however, both outside 
and inside attacks are used to build attack graphs. Attack graphs represent the cumulative attack steps 
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 that enable an attacker to gain privileges in the network. Attack templates, configuration files, and 
attacker profiles are used as an input for each attack scenario among network nodes. 
Alternatively, other researchers focus on the effects of the incident of interest. For example, the risk 
measurement model presented in [11] aggregates CVSS metrics to encode the cumulative effect of 
vulnerabilities in an enterprise network onto attack graphs. This approach allows cycles in the attack 
graphs. It also considers both specific features of vulnerabilities, such as the skill necessary to exploit 
the weakness, and more generic features, such as exposure of weaknesses. The privilege graph in [3] 
is used to model the effect of an attacker’s privileges, encoded by the attacker’s node, onto a targeted 
node, representing some privileges in the system. The work of [10] in computer security risk 
modeling identified security breaches as bad events with a specific frequency of occurrence and 
consequences. These statistics are utilized in the derivation of various probabilistic analyses such as 
annual loss expectancy, net benefits of safeguards, and forecasted attack rates. Further, in the example 
demonstrated in [78] to model operational risk in financial institutions using Bayesian networks, the 
frequency of failures is used to model various network risk factors, making up the corresponding BN 
random variables. This frequency analysis includes failures from malicious sources, such as hacker 
and virus attack nodes, and nonmalicious sources, such as network failure and power surge nodes. In 
[30] the qualitative security risk assessment method uses the loss of security objectives, i.e., 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, as the bases for defining threat incidents and subsequent 
risk assessment processes. The impact of security breaches, however, is further extended [81] to 
financial terms in an empirical study of economic cost that involves publicly traded US corporations. 
The study took the approach of the impact of security breaches on an overall organization by using 
the stock market return as the indicator of caused economic impact, realising that consequences vary 
according to assets affected by the breach. 
Other models, though not very common, try to capture both underlying mechanisms and impacts of 
failure. For instance, the work of [21], which is conceptual and qualitative, addresses underlying 
failure mechanisms through the chain of fault (attack)-error (intrusion)-failure events and failure 
consequences through user-level delivery. 
2.1.4 Inconsistency in Security Modeling 
The inconsistency in security studies with respect to the quantification problem can be easily seen by 
analogy with other well-founded, related disciplines, such as electrical circuits, communication 
networks, and dependability theory. These fields share common properties with respect to their 
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 quantitative evaluation methods, which merit further examination. In electrical circuits, a system is 
abstracted by a set of electrical elements such as capacitors, inductors, and resistors that make up a 
circuit. Each element takes certain value(s) capturing some physical attribute(s). To study circuits, the 
system model is first represented by a logical structure defining the electrical relationship among 
these elements, using a set of predefined arrangements such as series, parallel, and delta. It can also 
be depicted based on the physical structure of its elements by defining the actual design 
characteristics. Various analysis techniques and quantifiable performance measures are then 
established, such as the use of Ohm’s law for current, voltage, and resistance calculations. Strong 
assumptions are usually made so that the consequent mathematical model can be solvable, yet provide 
informed analysis, such as the linearity assumption to ensure charges and voltages obey the 
superposition rule. As a result of this modeling foundation, various software packages have been 
developed for circuit evaluation, such as the SPICE and CircuitLogix tools. 
In communication networks, a system is abstracted by a set of networking nodes, links, and 
terminals, whether it is a wireless network, wired, or a mix of both. The communication capabilities 
of these components are characterised by well-defined networking attributes such as channel capacity 
and transmission rate. Network topology is used to depict the arrangement of various components 
with respect to the physical arrangement for actual design characteristics or the logical arrangement 
considering the flow of data. Likewise, networks are also evaluated using various widely-accepted 
performance measures such as the bit error rate, network utilization, delay, and throughput. These 
measures are calculated using various techniques, including heuristics. As such, this abstraction 
paradigm of communication networks has facilitated the development of various simulation and 
modeling packages, such as ns2/ns3 and OPNET. 
Similarly, in reliability theory, a system is traditionally abstracted by a set of items that together 
make up the function of the whole system. The reliability of the system is a relative measure, defined 
by the reliability of the logical structure of its constituent items with respect to failure, and bounded 
probabilistically between 0 and 1. Various quantifiable performance measures have been established 
such as MTTF and MTBF. Accordingly, evaluation techniques are built on such a unified abstraction, 
such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs), and Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA). Also, various software packages have been developed for evaluation purposes, such as 
SHARPE, HARP, and SPNP. 
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 Obviously, certain aspects of the evaluation problem remain common among all the above different 
systems: the existence of an abstraction paradigm of constituent components of the system; the 
existence of a bounding system model that defines the logical system structure, i.e., the logical 
arrangement of system components with respect to particular operational attributes; the existence of 
quantifiable performance measures; and the existence of evaluation techniques. Being well-founded, 
not only are these evaluation methods scalable, but they can plausibly be connected with the 
economics of the corresponding systems. For instance, the evaluation of reliability attribute is linked 
with its economics through various repair and maintenance analysis methods to the point where we 
often see metrics such as MTTF and MTBF printed on many electronic components at manufacturing 
stages. 
Unfortunately, this foundational modeling paradigm is not available in security studies. As such, 
while circuit, network, and reliability engineers, for instance, can sensibly quantify the contribution of 
a redundant component in their systems operationally and economically, the security engineer cannot 
perform this kind of task on a redundant firewall. 
In what follows, we briefly demonstrate a few examples of such discrepancies from the work 
reviewed earlier. The work addressing attack modeling in general has neither a unified system model 
nor a consistent notion or modes of attacks. The work presented in [61] defines attacks based on three 
inputs: a set of predefined common attacks, a system’s configuration, and an attacker profile. This 
definition allows cycles in the addressed attack scenarios and excludes human behaviour involved in 
attacks. In [11], the cumulative success probability of an attack in an enterprise network is assigned 
using an attack graph structure and the individual component metrics known as CVSS. A full attack 
graph is then defined by three types of nodes: attack-step nodes, representing individual attack steps; 
privilege nodes, representing a single network privilege; and configuration nodes, representing 
network configuration facts. In [67], attack behaviors, including social attributes (e.g., skill, tenacity, 
and financial ability) are used in building attack graphs, whereby an attack is defined by a sequence 
of actions taken by an attacker against a targeted network. In [3], experts with deep knowledge of the 
system analyze attacks to construct a database of attack breaking rules; and then use these rules to 
derive the respective estimation of time and effort values to build a privilege graph that encodes all 
successful attacks in the system. Other higher-level models tend to use more-generalized definitions 
of failure. In [13], [40], a more generic representation of underlying attack mechanisms is presented 
using attack patterns, consisting of attack goals, success conditions, steps, and consequences. In [21], 
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 the proposed system-level conceptual model of security and dependability defines failure as unwanted 
system behaviour as a result of a previous chain of fault (attack)-error (intrusion)-failure events. 
In risk models, the problem extends to defining failure and its consequence as opposed to defining 
failure alone. For instance, the work of [10] used the notion of a bad event index to encode these 
general security breaches: information theft, information modification, information destruction, 
system outage, employee theft, and system degradation. In the example demonstrated in [78] to model 
operational risk in financial institutions, the frequency of both malicious and nonmalicious failures 
was used beside other qualitative measures (such as network availability level and server hardware 
quality) to model various network risk factors that make up the model. The work of [30] sets the 
notion of failure as events that lead to the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability, including 
both accidental and deliberate acts, which in turn could have severe or catastrophic adverse effects on 
organizational operations, assets, or individuals. 
To summarize this part, the current notion of security failure is diffuse, as it has always been a 
nonstandardized, inconsistent term [10]. While security attributes, i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, have remained consistent in their definitions in research and industry, their use cannot 
extend to consistent, universal quantitative measures to system-level evaluation. Therefore, the 
current metrics/measures are imprecise [12], and satisfactory quantitative security models are not 
available [7], [9], [10], [11]. Table  2-1 provides a generic comparison between dependability 
engineering and security engineering in the light of the above discussion.   
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 Table  2-1: Gap analysis: dependability engineering versus security engineering 
Criteria Dependability engineering Security engineering 
definition/concept:  
success, failure, or both? 
Success and failure are well 
defined 
Success (non-failure) is well defined, 
but failure has no widely accepted 
definition 
 Success: dependability goals  
Failure: deviation from correct 
service 
Success: security goals 
Failure: case-specific definitions 
Goal: Dependability of systems Protection of systems 
Attributes: Reliability, availability, 
maintainability, etc. 
Confidentiality, integrity, availability 
qualitative, quantitative, or both? Both qualitative and quantitative 
use 
Mostly qualitative use 
Quantitative metrics/measures: Reliability, availability, MTTF, 
MTBF, etc. 
No widely accepted quantitative 
measures of CIA attributes 
Implementation tools: 
 
 
FTA, ETA, RBD, FMEA, etc. 
 
 
For access controls: RBAC, MAC, 
DAC, etc. 
For individual protocols or 
technologies: confidentiality by 
cryptography, integrity by hash 
functions; and availability by 
redundancy, etc. 
System-level or case-specific use? System-level use Case-specific use 
Datasets: operational data with 
physical and logical diagrams of 
system configuration 
Available Not available 
Evaluation models: 
 
 
 
 
FTA, ETA, RBD, FMEA, etc. 
Using common system abstraction 
and failure model 
 
 
 
System-level but qualitative (COBIT, 
OCTAVE, etc.) or quantitative but 
specific (attack graphs, privilege 
graphs, attack tress, game-theoretic 
models, risk assessment models, trust 
models, etc.)  
Using different system abstraction and 
failure models; thus, different 
measures and functions 
System-level and quantitative? Yes No 
 
2.1.5 Dataset Unavailability 
Whether the evaluation purpose is for a software component, hardware component, behavioral 
attribute, or any combination of these, the unavailability of appropriate datasets represents one of the 
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 main challenges to validating the accuracy of models. Unfortunately, the security domain as a study 
field lacks representative statistical failure datasets [10], [11], [13], metrics [7], [9], [11], [12] whose 
attributes can be studied and whose quantitative measures can be established and validated, and 
concrete benchmarks to which model insights can be compared [11]. Sharing accurate, complete 
failure datasets is very limited due to various concerns, among them, legal liability, competitive 
advantages or reputation [10]; fear of attackers using such data, or loss of public confidence [13]; or 
privacy issues [82]. As a result, various assumptions such as the use of hypothetical data and 
scenarios or statistical distributions are commonly used to build and validate such evaluation models. 
In a nutshell, validating a security quantification method is an especially difficult issue [7]. 
In what follows, we briefly demonstrate the common practices used in work addressing modeling 
for security evaluation. To demonstrate the risk measurement model presented in [11], hypothetical 
attack graphs and success probabilities are assumed. In [67], Bayesian probability estimates are used 
to demonstrate a proposed vulnerability analysis of network resources based on attacker behavior. 
Threshold risk values are also estimated for network resources to define the points where resources 
are attack prone. The work presented in [61] to perform network vulnerability analysis used 
simulation techniques to model scenario-specific attack templates, system configuration, and attacker 
profiles. As characteristics of intruder’s profiles are not available to the work in [3], scenario 
assumptions are used in the assessment model to exhibit system-level vulnerabilities on a privilege 
graph, bounding all successful attack scenarios. Also, the work of [13] used a hypothetical enterprise 
environment and structure to demonstrate the application of attack trees, showing how attacks can be 
represented in a structured and reusable form. In the security risk methodology proposed in [10], a 
hypothetical example with data estimates that represent a scenario common in many organizations is 
used. In the example demonstrated in [78] to model operational risk in financial institutions using 
Bayesian networks, a hypothetical scenario, including network nodes and their relationships and 
associated datasets, is assumed. 
Some research addresses the dataset generation itself. For instance, the work of [82] presented an 
approach to dynamically create network intrusion datasets as opposed to one-time-use data. The 
approach is based on a set of predefined detailed description of intrusion profiles and guidelines that 
define acceptable datasets. An experimental network setup is used to capture and establish network 
traffic and intrusion behavior in a testbed environment. Regardless of the quality of such data, the 
generated traffic and associated anomaly patterns remain restricted to the scale of the experiment. 
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 However, the work of [10] argues that the challenges facing the development of appropriate risk 
assessment for computing systems are not unique to the IT industry; financial markets and the 
insurance industry have dealt with risk quantification, irrespective of the uncertainty involved, the 
unavailability of appropriate statistics, and the technical challenges. However, some, such as [13], 
argue that attack datasets, although not yet at the preferred level, are becoming more available than 
before as a result of increased public interest in and media coverage of Internet security. The work of 
[10] also identified three forces for pushing towards a new security quantitative framework: security 
insurance needs, avoidance of liability, and market competition. Once insurance claims and 
compensations start rolling, statistics will proportionally develop, including metrics such as frequency 
of incidents, losses, and so forth. Furthermore, we argue that with the recent advances in computing 
paradigms, these forces of change will accelerate significantly. In the cloud paradigm, for instance, 
the change will initiate especially from the Cloud user’s side with respect to the insurance needs and 
exposure liability, pushing the establishment for a sensible quantification ground before risk is 
transferred to the cloud provider. 
Today, there are only a few credible statistical reports and surveys about failures, including cyber-
attacks, such as those compiled by CERT SEI [83]. In our work, however, failure datasets alone 
cannot be meaningful for the proposed evaluation methods if not combined with the corresponding 
system configuration and logical topology with respect to failure. Therefore, to evaluate and validate 
the proposed work, we have extended the literature review, trying to locate a suitable failure field 
dataset with system logical diagrams. We have searched available BSTJ Journal, Bell Labs, and 
NASA historical data; and we have also contacted Google and Cisco with requests for a suitable 
dataset, but we achieved no success in these endeavors. Moreover, we realize that setting up a 
representative experimental environment would be very expensive; and would need to run for quite 
some time in order to establish quality statistics [84], which was not possible either. Nevertheless, 
major parts of the proposed models follow analytically from reliance on well-founded theories and 
modelling techniques, such as reliability theory, Multi-State Systems (MSS) and Universal 
Generating Function (UGF), and Bayesian networks and their inference algorithms. 
If more resources and time were available, to establish parameter values of a failure model, one 
could uses: 1) security auditing tools, as suggested in [7]: vulnerability scanners such as Nessus; 
network scanners such as nmap; security scanners such as Tiger; and a host scanner such as COPS; 
and 2) event logging tools: such as Tripwire and InTrust. 
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 2.1.6 What Went Wrong 
Defining a plausible, quantitative evaluation of the actual behaviour of security systems that one 
expects remains an unavoidable challenge within the security community [7], [9], [10], especially in 
today’s computing where cloud and ubiquitous computing, mobility, and constrained resources are 
becoming normal features for computing devices and platforms. Most current evaluation methods 
suffer from one major limitation: the inability to capture the actual strength of a security system. To 
do so, we need to arrive at a clear abstraction of a computing system and definition of a failure model, 
before any system-level representations and analysis methods can be established. Then, we need to 
develop models that can sensibly capture and bound the effect of security controls and impact of 
associated failures using a common model foundation, facilitating dual, confronting views of security 
systems. Doing so will allow consistent, structural semantics to be defined, so quantifiable 
performance measures of security controls, at any stage, from goal setting through design to 
operational lifetime, can be established. 
We argue that two flaws have led to the above limitation, which is the inability to capture the 
security element itself. First, the inheritance of some irrelevant notions from other modeling 
approaches into security models renders the latter unable to capture confronting parties (i.e., a game-
theoretic paradigm), dynamic progression, and the human factor. Second, the center of focus of model 
development in security studies is extremely misaligned. That is, it is either too specific or too 
general. 
Inheritance issues: In our view, the aspect of inherited issues has appeared as a result of extending 
some modeling semantics from other engineering fields that do not necessary lead to a successful 
application when adopted in security modelling [22], [23]. We present three features that differentiate 
security models from other models. First, capturing two competing parties, i.e., game-theoretic 
paradigm, onto the same model foundation is intrinsic to security modelling to reflect the adversarial 
chase between both the protection system (i.e., security system) from one side and the failure system 
(i.e., failure sources, whether malicious such as attackers or nonmalicious such as accidents) on the 
other side, somehow as a battlefield. In contrast, capturing this paradigm is not common in other 
modelling endeavors. That is, it is either not applicable or simplified and modeled in isolation when 
applicable. 
Second, the progression in a security system is dynamic and multi-directionally evolving in nature 
once the system is operational. This setting makes security start first with continuity and resilience in 
24 
 mind against failures. To deliver security, comparable security strength must be implemented across 
system controls and security boundaries, and security principles must be jointly realised in the face of 
failure as a chain while in operation. Thus, a security system might, for instance, require the redesign 
of certain controls due to a recent technology, auditing, or enhancement, and a recovery of others due 
to a recent attack, all in the same time and in a mixed order, dictated by the current state of the 
security system. In contrast, the progression in other systems usually proceeds in steps or increments 
with a clear start and an end. This setting is much less volatile and more structured than in security. 
Third, the human factor in the security context is the most important element that affects security 
behaviour, representing an intrinsic element for both protecting and breaking security. Thus, its 
inclusion when building models becomes a necessary condition. In contrast, other contexts do not 
normally reflect the human factor as an identifiable element among model components. 
Several examples exist that support these observations. For instance, the noise and interference in 
communication networks, representing the confronting party per se, are commonly modeled in 
isolation by known distributions. That is, the behaviour of the noise and interference does not 
intentionally change to break the flow of packets in an adversarial manner. The delivery of packets is 
also governed by a sequenced layered architecture, such as the TCP/IP protocol stack, without 
actively involving human behavior. Likewise, the semantics used in the software engineering 
capability maturity model, such as defined in [85], particularly maturity sequencing qualitatively, not 
directly capturing confronting parties, and not directly capturing human involvement, are not too 
successful when extended to security maturity models. 
Coverage issues: The second aspect of the limitation above centers around models being too extreme 
in their application scope. To a large extent, security evaluation models we have today are often either 
too specific, especially for quantitative models, or too general, especially for qualitative ones. 
Being too specific is basically due to the limited coverage in the case of the quantitative models, as 
they cover partial areas of the system, and therefore, cannot capture the behaviour of the overall 
system [7]. This limitation applies to many examples, such as the approaches presented in [3], [9], 
[54], [86] to evaluate security controls and model some attack behaviours, and approaches in [24], 
[25], [26], [27] to address the security dilemma from a game-theoretic perspective. Hence, the 
usefulness is limited to the specific cases where assumptions made may hold. 
25 
 On the other side, being too general is basically due to the qualitative nature in the case of the 
comprehensive models, such as [12], [39], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46]. These models can only reflect 
the existence and adherence to a predefined set of controls. Therefore, they reflect a high-level view 
of the system, measuring how well a security process is implemented [7], [9], [23], addressing 
organizational acceptance issues [10]. 
So, the limitation exists mostly with respect to the breadth level for the quantitative models and to 
the depth level for the qualitative models. Consequently, either way, minimal inference can be drawn 
about system-level situational security states. 
2.2 Reliability Engineering 
Reliability at its broadest level is considered a performance measure. It is an attribute of dependability 
analysis and is defined as the ability of an entity to perform a required function under given 
conditions for a given time interval. So, it is basically the continuity of correct service [87]. 
Essentially, the reliability term has a wide spectrum of application. It can be applied to evaluate all 
various types of human activities (a reliable person is dependable and trustworthy) and physical 
systems (a reliable system or functional object is dependable and trustworthy), and it is associated 
with the behaviour of operations [47]. 
Reliability studies cover two main elements: quantitative and qualitative. Historically, it started as a 
qualitative measure when first introduced in the aircraft industry in 1930s after World War I (for 
example, the judgement of two engineers is more reliable than one), and then slowly became 
quantifiable through the 1940s using the theory of probability and statistics (for examples, the average 
number of failures or incidents in a particular time frame of operation under certain conditions, or one 
incident per 1,000,000 hours of flying time for specifying aircraft requirements). Later, reliability 
concepts became well developed, were quantified by the 1950s, and were applied to various 
applications, such as space mission programs, electric power systems, and telephone and 
communication systems [47]. 
In the late 1960s, models for quantitative software reliability started to appear in the literature [88], 
[89], [90], [91], [92], representing a major contribution in the field. The earliest published work 
applied Markov processes to software development [90]. Later, research addressing modeling and 
analysis of systems featuring both hardware and software errors and faults commenced [93].  
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 Later advancements in this field took various directions. For data estimation as an example, the 
works of [94], [95] presented methods for extracting lifetime data of various products from product 
warranty claims. Other work addressed the modeling technique itself, such as the work [96], [97], 
which extended the use of Bayesian Networks to estimate reliability. 
Furthermore, the International Federation for Information Processing Working Group 10.4 (IFIP 
WG10.4, established in 1980, revised in 1988) has proposed the concept of dependability as an 
umbrella term for the attributes availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality, integrity, and 
maintainability [33], when researchers started to dig deeper into the correlation of these attributes [7], 
[9]. This move has led to the realisation of their common aspects and the development of new 
integrated understanding and paradigms, such as the combined security and dependability tree of 
attributes, threats, and means to attain the combination [8], [20].  
Evidently, classical dependability offers a wide range of concepts and analysis methods that can be 
useful in security studies [7], [8], [9], [20], [20], [21], [27], [73], [86], [98], [99], [100]. In this 
section, we review the relevant subjects from reliability engineering upon which some of the 
proposed evaluation methods are built, particularly in  Chapter 3 and  Chapter 4. We first review the 
failure model. Next we review how structure functions and reliability block diagrams are built as a 
representation technique defining logical connectivity between system components. This is followed 
by an introduction about minimal path and cut sets and how reliability analysis is established. These 
tools help to establish the study of components and their dependency effect on overall system 
functionality. 
2.2.1 Failure Model 
The identification and evaluation of failure is central to risk and dependability studies. Therefore, 
defining what failure means is an intrinsic component in studying various operational attributes of 
systems such as reliability, availability, maintainability, and risk [74], [75], [89], [90], [101], [102], 
[103], [104], [105].  
The relationship among faults, errors, and failures is usually represented by a chain, as depicted in 
Figure  2-1. A fault in the system is the assumed cause of an error and is considered active when it 
causes an error. Error is a subsequent state to fault(s) representing the part of the system state that 
could lead to subsequent failures. Failure is defined as the event that causes the delivered service to 
deviate from correct service [8], [33], [87], [100].  
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Figure  2-1: The fundamental chain of dependability and security threats, modified from [8] 
 
The complete failure of an entity or a system is not necessary for it not to perform its intended 
function successfully, as partial failure might still allow operation continuity [47]. The time interval 
does not have to be always in hours or days, as it depends on the system under study, and thus it could 
be, as examples, clock time, operation time, or number of cycles. Operating conditions should include 
information about load and environmental setting. Furthermore, while a failure definition should 
constantly reflect the deviation from correct service [87], failure modes and its specifics are not 
necessary identical among the different components [88]. As such, in traditional reliability, failure 
modes among different hardware components are not necessarily identical; and when reliability study 
was extended to software engineering, software failure modes were defined differently, reflecting the 
failure attributes of software components. For instance, failure of an electronic component might be 
defined as the inability of a thyristor to withstand the nth voltage spike; for a mechanical component 
it might be the event that the strengths of the component are smaller than its stresses [47]; and for 
software components it might be defined as an unacceptable departure of program operation from 
requirements, modeled by the mean time to failure (MTTF) based on execution time, not calendar 
time, such as in the Musa model [89], [106], or it might be modeled based on Bayesian interpretation 
of probability, such as in the Littlewood model [107]. What matters is the establishment of the 
qualitative aspects of failure, particularly the full range of component failure modes and the error 
processes that lead to failure [88]. 
The combined consideration and utilization of dependability and security attributes has facilitated a 
better understanding of the fault-error-failure chain model and analysis of various threats that might 
affect a system [8]. Thus, the traditional definition of failure is increasingly applied to security 
breaches [9], [98], [108] but in an inclusive analogy of both security breaches and traditional system 
causation activation propagation fault error 
- malicious, or 
- nonmalicious 
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- human made 
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 failures. The subjectivity issue of security in general and the requirement to fulfill both dependability 
and security attributes has led to considering their attributes from a probabilistic perspective, as faults 
and subsequent failures can never be totally eliminated from any system [8]. The reliability 
characteristics of security systems can consequently be defined and analyzed using the reliability 
characteristics of its components, i.e., security controls, with the presence of the appropriate system 
abstraction and failure logic. 
However, to analyse failure data, two approaches are generally considered: parametric and 
nonparametric [103], [109]. Parametric analysis involves the choice of probability distribution first 
and then the evaluation of its parameters to fit the data available. The choice of a particular 
distribution is usually made based on similar previous tests or the phenomena basis itself. Probability 
plotting is used to estimate distribution parameters and represent them graphically. On the other hand, 
nonparametric analysis involves various techniques such as constructing histograms and calculating 
sample statistics (e.g., sample mean and variance). In this case, no particular assumptions are made 
about the underlying distribution, although these analysis tools often provide enough information to 
allow selection of a suitable distribution afterwards. 
Reliability can be increased by decreasing the hazard rate, which represents the proportion of 
components in service that fail per unit interval. If the hazard rate increases with time, the cumulative 
distribution of the time to failure is defined as Increasing Failure Rate (IFR) distribution. On the other 
hand, if the hazard rate decreases with time, the cumulative distribution of the time to failure is 
defined as Decreasing Failure Rate (DFR) distribution. Moreover, if the hazard rate function is 
constant of time, then it is called Constant Failure Rate (CFR) distribution, which leads to studying 
the exponential distribution (also known as the negative exponential distribution) [49]. 
Many researches consider Exponential distribution to be the most commonly used distribution in 
reliability theory. The main underlying assumption is that the failure rate at which the system, or 
component, fails is independent of time or use. So, it is suitable for systems that operate, or at least 
intended to operate, continuously with no significant wearout mechanisms and early defect failures. 
Although this analysis is not realistic for all time, the approximation of the constant failure rate is 
sufficiently accepted even though a system, or a component, may experience some early failures or 
aging effects, as long as it provides a good approximation during the useful time. The effect of early 
failures is usually treated by quality control measures, while the magnitude of aging effect is usually 
treated by continuous preventive maintenance and timely replacement policies. For explicit cases 
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 where a system’s failure rate varies over time, a constant failure rate that encompasses the whole 
failure curve might be used to ensure it contains the whole failure variation. So, the use of the 
constant failure rate can actually be extended to apply to many cases where it would not be the correct 
theoretical model [110]. Exponential distribution, however, can be applied on a wide range of systems 
such as aircraft and spacecraft electronics, satellite stations, communications equipment, and 
computer networks [111]. 
Nevertheless, the mathematical properties of the exponential model are unique to its definition and 
important to its wide applications. The failure distribution is completely defined by the knowledge of 
only one parameter, which is the Mean Time To Failure or 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹, often denoted by 𝜃. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 
sufficiently defines the only distribution parameter, that is, failure rate, and is often denoted by 𝜆𝜆. 
These two variables define each other and are used interchangeably as 𝜆𝜆 = 1/𝜃. Another useful 
property of the exponential model is the simple mathematical manipulation of reliability functions, as 
many calculations involve the integration and multiplication of exponential functions that are easy 
operations [104], [111], [112]. This model is demonstrated graphically later in Section  2.2.4 in 
Figure  2-7 and Figure  2-8. 
However, time-dependant failure rate models facilitate the study of failure nature across time, 
whether they are infant mortality failures, random failures, or aging effect failures. These models are 
suitable for situations where different failure stages need to be treated and analysed explicitly. In 
contrast to the exponential model used for random failures, such models need at least two parameters 
to reflect failure behaviour. Normal and lognormal distributions are frequently used in some of these 
situations, but Weibull distribution is considered the most universal and widely accepted one [109], 
[113]. 
Regardless of the failure model in use, a parametric or nonparametric, measured or estimated, 
appropriate definition of failure (and hence, success) represents a building block before any 
operational analysis methods can be made good use of. 
2.2.2 Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) and Structure Functions 
In the mathematical sense, reliability is measured by the probability that a system or a component will 
perform its intended function for a specified period of time under stated conditions [48], [49], [114]. 
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs), as a graphical representation, and structure functions, as a 
mathematical representation, are commonly used in building and analyzing reliability models. 
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 The Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is an inductive, event-based method used to graphically 
depict the logical arrangement of components with respect to failure (or success) of the system under 
consideration. RBDs allow the identification and enumeration of failure (or success) pathways. RBDs 
can also be developed in multiple levels, allowing top-level RBDs to be decomposed into smaller 
ones repeatedly, until reaching the level of abstraction of interest [74], [115].  
We now review the so-called indicator, or Boolean, function 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 for unit or component 𝑖𝑖 
 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  ( 2-1) 
The vector 𝐱 = (𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ) is called the state vector that shows the status of each component of 
being either working or failed. So, for a system of 𝑛𝑛 components, there are 2𝑛𝑛 different states 
determined by the states of individual components. The structure function ∅(𝐱) of the vector 𝐱 for the 
system as a whole is defined as follows. 
 ∅(𝐱) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  ( 2-2) 
The property of systems coherency has facilitated the study of system performance by analyzing its 
components using the structure functions, which dictates that the system is coherent if and only if 
structure function ∅(𝐱) is nondecreasing in each argument 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛 and every component is 
relevant [114]. In this sense, ∅(𝐱) is a Boolean function of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. ∅(𝐱) is also a monotonic increasing 
function of 𝐱, which means if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 ∅(𝐱) ≤ ∅(𝐲).  
A series system will function if and only if all of its components are functioning, whereas a 
parallel system needs only one of its components to function. So, for a series system, we write the 
structure function as 
 
∅(𝐱) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ) = �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-3) 
And, the pure series structure can be represented using the reliability block diagram as shown in 
Figure  2-2. 
 
Figure  2-2: System representation of series structure 
𝑥𝑥1 𝑥𝑥2 𝑥𝑥3 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 
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 For a parallel system, the structure function is written as 
 
∅(𝐱) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ) = 1 −�(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-4) 
And the pure parallel structure can be represented using the reliability block diagram as shown in 
Figure  2-3. 
 
Figure  2-3: System representation of parallel structure 
 
Note that both parallel and series structures are special cases of k-out-of-n structure, sometimes 
referred to as a voting system. This structure functions if and only if at least 𝑘 components are 
functioning. The structure function of k-out-of-n structure is written by 
 ∅(𝐱) = �1, �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
≥ 𝑘0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 ( 2-5) 
where ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  represents the number of working components. 
Using this representation, a pure series structure is n-out-of-n system, whereas a pure parallel is 1-
out-of-n system. However, it is unlikely for systems in practice to consist only of either pure series or 
pure parallel components [48], [113]. Mixed structures are commonly used to represent such systems 
of mixed components. 
Figure  2-4 shows the reliability block diagram of a parallel-series mixed structure in a detailed 
form in (a) and a more aggregated form in (b). The same equations mentioned earlier can be used to 
represent these structures as follows. 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥1 
𝑥𝑥2 
𝑥𝑥3 
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 For all 𝑛𝑛 components in each serial line we first find 
 
𝑂𝑂𝑚𝑚 = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚1,𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 ) = �𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-6) 
Then we calculate system, 𝑺, structure function as 
 
∅(𝐒) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑂𝑂1,𝑂𝑂2, … ,𝑂𝑂𝑚𝑚 ) = 1 −�(1 − 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-7) 
 
 
Figure  2-4: System representation of parallel-series mixed structure 
 
Another form of mixed structures is series-parallel. Figure  2-5 (a) shows its reliability block 
diagram in a detailed form and (b) represents the aggregated form. Again, we first find the structure 
function of a parallel subsystem as 
 
𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛 = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛,𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 ) = 1 −�(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-8) 
Then, we calculate the system 𝑺 structure function as 
 
∅(𝐒) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑂𝑂1,𝑂𝑂2, … ,𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛 ) = �𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-9) 
 
𝑥𝑥12 
𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚2 
𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥11 
𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚1 
𝑥𝑥32 
𝑥𝑥22 
𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥31 
𝑥𝑥21 
 
𝑂𝑂1 
𝑂𝑂𝑚𝑚 
𝑂𝑂3 
𝑂𝑂2 
(a) (b) 
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Figure  2-5: System representation of series-parallel mixed structure 
 
One must note that these structures are reducible structures into smaller units that simplify the 
mathematical calculations of their reliabilities. Also, 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑆𝑆 may not be equal in each row and 
column, respectively, in both mixed structures. Complex structures, however, such as bridge and delta 
structures are addressed using other simplification techniques, which can be found in [47], [115], 
[116], and fall outside the contribution of this thesis. 
Structure functions, however, have been used for various performance measures, other than the 
states of structures or systems, such as processing speed and capacity [117], [118], [119]. 
Nevertheless, it is important to differentiate between the physical and logical arrangements of the 
system when establishing its structure function and reliability block diagram. The physical 
arrangement reflects the actual layout of items, which is important in studying physical attributes such 
as dimension, size, and space. Alternatively, the logical arrangement is drawn with respect to the 
failure process, and hence plays a major role to studying dependability attributes of the system. A 
physical network is translated into a logical network based on a solid understanding of the system’s 
physical arrangement, its functional requirements, and operational behaviour. Thus, the logical 
arrangement does not necessarily match the physical arrangement. For example, the physical 
arrangement could be represented in parallel, while its reliability block diagram, and hence structure 
function, are defined by a series structure, and vice versa [104]. 
2.2.3 Minimal Path and Minimal Cut Sets 
The study of structure functions leads to introducing another combinatorial method, that is, minimal 
sets, which are useful in analysing system functionality and failure states with respect to minimum 
 
𝑥𝑥11 
𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚1 
𝑥𝑥31 
𝑥𝑥21 
(a) (b) 
 
𝑥𝑥12 
𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚2 
𝑥𝑥32 
𝑥𝑥22 
 
𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥3n 
𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛 
𝑂𝑂1 𝑂𝑂2 𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛 
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 components. A minimal path set is the minimum set of components that are required to ensure a 
system is functioning. Further, a minimal cut set is the minimum set of components whose failure 
leads directly to the failure of the whole system. So, minimal path sets and minimal cut sets allow us 
to represent any system as a parallel-series structure and a series-parallel structure, respectively [47], 
[48], [105], [114], [120].  
For a state vector 𝐱 to be called a path vector, it is required to have ∅(𝐱) = 1. However, it is said to 
be a minimal path vector if ∅(𝒚) = 0 for all 𝒚 < 𝒙𝒙 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑛𝑛 and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 < 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖); 
also, the set 𝐴𝐴 = {𝑖𝑖: 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1} is called a minimal path set. Now, for a given system let 𝐴𝐴1,𝐴𝐴2, … ,𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 
denote the minimal path sets. We define a new Boolean function ∝𝑗 (𝐱) of the jth minimal path set as 
follows. 
 
∝𝑗 (𝐱) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒   = �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖∈𝐴𝑗
 
( 2-10) 
To ensure the system is functioning we need to ensure that there exists at least one of its minimal 
path sets where all the components are functioning. This leads to the following relationship. 
 
∅(𝐱) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∝𝑗 (𝐱) = 1 for some 𝑗0, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∝𝑗 (𝐱) = 0 for all 𝑗  = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑗 ∝𝑗 (𝐱) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖∈𝐴𝑗
 
( 2-11) 
Additionally, a state vector 𝐱 is called a cut vector if ∅(𝐱) = 0 and a minimal cut vector if ∅(𝒚) =1 for all 𝒚 > 𝒙𝒙. The set 𝐶𝐶 = {𝑖𝑖: 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0} is then called a minimal cut set. Now, for a given system let 
𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2, … ,𝐶𝐶𝑞 denote the minimal cut sets. We introduce a new Boolean function 𝛽𝑗(𝐱) of the jth 
minimal cut set as follows. 
 
 
𝛽𝑗(𝐱) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝑗 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝐶𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ( 2-12) 
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 To ensure the system is functioning we need to ensure that there exists at least one component from 
each of its minimal cut sets that is functioning. In other words, the system is not functioning if and 
only if all the components of at least one minimal cut set are not functioning. This leads to concluding 
the following relationship. 
 
∅(𝐱) = �𝛽𝑗(𝐱)𝑞
𝑗=1
 
= �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝐶𝑗𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
( 2-13) 
These sets provide significant use in reliability studies as they define qualitatively lower bounds of 
the number of components required to ensure system functionality in the case of minimal path sets 
and system failure in the case of minimal cut sets. The use of this method allows sensitivity analysis 
of existing system configuration and possible alternatives to be carried out in an efficient manner. We 
believe the adaptation of these tools in studying security systems can be useful, as critical and weak 
points in security systems can be identified and addressed proactively. 
2.2.4 Reliability Model 
As stated before, reliability is measured mathematically by the probability of a system functioning 
without encountering a failure for a specified period of time. Hence, the reliability function 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) is 
defined as the probability that the system has operated over the time interval 0 to 𝑡𝑡. In contrast, the 
availability is the fraction of time the system is up, and hence, the availability function 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) is defined 
to be the probability that the system is operating at time 𝑡𝑡. However, 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) has no information on how 
many failure-repair cycles in the interval 0 to 𝑡𝑡. In the case of irreparable systems, 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡), and 
with repairable systems, 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) ≤  𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) [48], [49], [80], [113], [114], [120], [121]. Both reliability and 
availability represent two different but related operational measures of system performance. 
Availability is a combined measure of maintainability and reliability, and it has been widely used as a 
measure of system effectiveness [122]. Yet, availability calculations require more information about 
maintenance and logistical support of the system, and so, it is generally more difficult than reliability 
to attain. For critical applications, however, a reliability measure is the most important and stringent 
measure [115]. Since we are dealing with security, the reliability measure is the measure of choice in 
the proposed extensions from dependability theory. 
36 
 There are two general approaches to studying reliability: i) reliability based on random events and 
ii) reliability based on random variables. For completeness, we show both approaches. 
Reliability modeling based on random events: To demonstrate reliability based on random events, 
let S denote the event that a system of 𝑛𝑛 components will be functioning, and the event that 
component 𝑖𝑖 is working is denoted by 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛}; thus 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 represents the failure of component 𝑖𝑖 
(the event when component 𝑖𝑖 is not working).  
Now, if the system components are logically arranged in series, the system will be working if and 
only if all 𝑛𝑛 components are working. Hence, event S will be the intersection of all 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛, 
events as follows. 
 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑥𝑥1 ∩ 𝑥𝑥2 ∩ …∩ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ( 2-14) 
And the probability of the system working, i.e., reliability of the system, is given by 
 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 ∩ 𝑥𝑥2 ∩ …∩ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)  
If failure events of the system are not independent (all the random events 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, are 
dependent), we write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1)𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2 𝑥𝑥1⁄ )𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3 𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2⁄ ) …𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1⁄ ) ( 2-15) 
And when failure events are independent (all the random events 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, are independent), 
we write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1)𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2)𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3) …𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) ( 2-16) 
So, 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = �𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =  𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) ( 2-17) 
On the other side, if system components are logically arranged in parallel, the system will be 
working if at least one of the 𝑛𝑛 components is working. This arrangement is sometimes called a 
redundant configuration. Consequently, event S will be the union of all 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛, events, 
 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑥𝑥1 ∪ 𝑥𝑥2 ∪ …∪ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ( 2-18) 
And the probability of the system working, i.e., the reliability of the system, is given by 
37 
  𝑅𝑅𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 ∪ 𝑥𝑥2 ∪ …∪ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)  
If failure events of the system are not independent (all the random events 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, are 
dependent), then we write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆) = [𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) +𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) + 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3) + ⋯+ 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)] 
−�𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2) +𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥3) + ⋯+ 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗�𝑖𝑖≠𝑗� +⋯+ (−1)𝑛𝑛−1𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) ( 2-19) 
The formula above can be written in a simpler way if one deals with the probability of system 
failure instead. Parallel system failure occurs if all components fail, yielding the intersection 
operation of all the events of components failures 
 𝑅𝑅𝑝 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) ( 2-20) 
And when failure events are independent (all the random events 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, are independent), 
we write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1)𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2)𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3) …𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) ( 2-21) 
So, 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑝 = 1 −�𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
) = 1 −�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =  𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) ( 2-22) 
Reliability modeling based on random variables: To demonstrate reliability based on random 
variables, we suppose that X𝑖𝑖, the state of the ith component, is a random variable. So, 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃{X𝑖𝑖 = 1} = 1 − 𝑃𝑃{X𝑖𝑖 = 0} = 𝑝𝑖𝑖  ( 2-23) 
and is called the reliability of the ith component. Also, 
 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝐱) = 1} = 1 − 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝐱) = 0},
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐱 = (𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛)  ( 2-24) 
and is called the reliability of the system. Since ∅(𝐱) is a Bernoulli random variable, the reliability of 
the system 𝑅𝑅 can be computed by taking the expectation, that is, 
 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝐱) = 1} = 𝐸𝐸[∅(𝐱)] ( 2-25) 
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 For systems connected in series, when all the random variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, are independent, 
we can write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃{X1 = 1}𝑃𝑃{X2 = 1} …𝑃𝑃{X𝑛𝑛 = 1} = �𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-26) 
And when all the random variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, are dependent we write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋1 = 1}𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋2 = 1/𝑋𝑋1 = 1} …  𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 = 1 𝑋𝑋1⁄ = 1,𝑋𝑋2 = 1, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛−1 = 1} ( 2-27) 
Also, for systems connected in parallel, when all the random variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, are 
independent, we can write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑝 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋1 = 0}𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋2 = 0} …𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 = 0} = 1 −�(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-28) 
And when all the random variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛, are dependent we write 
𝑅𝑅𝑝 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋1 = 0}𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋2 = 0/𝑋𝑋1 = 0} …  𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 = 0 𝑋𝑋1⁄ = 0,𝑋𝑋2 = 0, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛−1 = 0} 
And the same logic applies to mixed structure systems, i.e., systems that contain parallel and series 
components together. 
Above we have considered the reliability of the system in terms of static probabilities, i.e., 
probabilities are considered as constants. Systems, however, operate and hence fail over time. As 
such, it is commonly accepted to model the reliability of systems as a function of time. To show that, 
let 𝑀𝑀 be a random variable that represents the time to failure of the system. The reliability can then be 
defined in terms of probability of failure as a function of time, as illustrated in Figure  2-6, and written 
as 
 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀 > 𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) ( 2-29) 
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Figure  2-6: The failure process in reliability context 
 
This function means the system will function for time 𝑡𝑡 or greater if and only if it is still 
functioning at time 𝑡𝑡. 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) is a monotonic non-increasing function of 𝑡𝑡 with unity at the start of life: 
𝑅𝑅(0) = 1 and 𝑅𝑅(∞) = 0 [49]. 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡), failure distribution, however represents the probability that the 
system will fail before time 𝑡𝑡,  and equals 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀 ≤ 𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) 
Nevertheless, time-dependent reliability is the technique of decomposing the system into a set of 
subsystems, or components, where their reliabilities are known or to be computed with respect to 
time, so 
 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅(𝑃𝑃1(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)) ( 2-30) 
where, 
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃{𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡} = 1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  
As in [123], for a series system with 𝑛𝑛 independent components, we can write 
 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) × … × 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-31) 
And, for a parallel system with 𝑛𝑛 independent components, we can write 
 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − [(1 − 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡)) × … × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡))] = 1 −�(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(t))𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 2-32) 
Yet, one must note that  𝑅𝑅 can be expressed as a function of components’ reliabilities, 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅(𝐩), that 
is, a monotonic increasing function of 𝐩, where 𝐩 = (𝑝1,𝑝2, … ,𝑝𝑛𝑛) [48]. 
time  
t failure 0 time interval t  
time to failure T (r.v.) 
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 Regardless of the modelling approaches above, a common structure in reliability evaluation is a k-
out-of-n system with identical and independent components [47], [48], [104], [113], [115]. 
Considering this system as an application of the binomial distribution, its reliability function is given 
by 
 
𝑅𝑅(𝐩) = ��𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖
�
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑝)𝑛𝑛−𝑖𝑖 
          where 𝑝 = 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = ⋯ = 𝑝𝑛𝑛 ( 2-33) 
Note that calculating the reliability of a k-out-of-n system when its components are not identical 
can be very complicated procedure, as the state enumeration approach is used to sum up all the 
probabilities of possible system realisations with the number of the working components is not less 
than 𝑘. 
In light of the above, two important conclusions stated in [49], [113], [120] must be taken into 
account for series and parallel arrangements. Firstly, for a series arrangement system, the larger 
(lower) the number of components connected in series, the lower (larger) is the reliability of the 
system. Therefore, the reliability of the (𝑛𝑛 + 1) components series system is upper-bounded by the 
reliability of the same system having (𝑛𝑛) components. So, adding an extra component (𝑛𝑛 + 1) for a 
series arrangement of 𝑛𝑛 components, say 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡) < 1, we write 
 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) × … × 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
> 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) × … × 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 2-34) 
Also, the reliability of the system is less than the reliability of its least reliable component; and the 
system’s reliability decreases (increases) if any component’s reliability decreases (increases). 
Therefore, the reliability of the series system is upper-bounded by the reliability of its least reliable 
component. This feature is analogous to the weakest link of a security system, which is considered a 
measure of the security strength as discussed before. Thus, considering a series arrangement of 𝑛𝑛 
components with 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡), where 𝑆𝑆 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛}, denoting the least reliable component, we write 
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𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) × … × 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
< 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) ( 2-35) 
Secondly, for a parallel arrangement system, the larger the number of components in parallel, the 
larger is the reliability of the system. Therefore, the reliability of the (𝑛𝑛 + 1) components parallel 
system is lower-bounded by the reliability of the same system having (𝑛𝑛) components. So, adding an 
extra component (𝑛𝑛 + 1) for a parallel arrangement of 𝑛𝑛 components, say 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡) <1, we write 
 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − [(1 − 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡)) × … × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(t))] = 1 −��1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(t)�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
< 1 − [(1 − 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡)) × … × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(t)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛+1(t))] = 1 −�(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(t))𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 2-36) 
Furthermore, the reliability of the system is larger than the reliability of its most reliable 
component. Therefore, the reliability of the parallel system is lower-bounded by the reliability of its 
most reliable component. Considering a parallel arrangement of 𝑛𝑛 components with 𝑅𝑅𝑙(𝑡𝑡),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑙 ∈{1, … ,𝑛𝑛}, as the most reliable component, we write 
 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − [(1 − 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡)) × … × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(t))] = 1 −�(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(t))𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
> 𝑅𝑅𝑙(𝑡𝑡) ( 2-37) 
We conclude this section by reviewing four important functions related to reliability evaluation: (i) 
the failure density function, which describes how the failure probability is spread over time and 
denoted by 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡). 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) is always non-negative and the total area beneath it is always equal to one as it 
is basically a probability distribution function, so 
 
� 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑡 = 1∞
0
 ( 2-38) 
(ii) The failure distribution function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡), which is the cumulative distribution function of the failure 
density function 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡). As mentioned earlier, 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) represents the probability that the system will fail 
before time 𝑡𝑡  and gives the area beneath the failure density function until time 𝑡𝑡, and equals 
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  𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀 ≤ 𝑡𝑡)= � 𝑓𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝜆𝜆
0
,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑣 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑒 ( 2-39) 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) satisfy the following relation: 
 
𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = − 𝑑
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) ( 2-40) 
(iii) The reliability function 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡), which gives the area beneath the failure density function after time 
𝑡𝑡 and equals, 
 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀 > 𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 1 −� 𝑓𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝜆𝜆
0
= 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝 �−� 𝜆𝜆(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝜆𝜆
0
� 
( 2-41) 
 (iv) The hazard function 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡), sometimes called instantaneous failure rate, which is defined as the 
limit of the failure rate as the interval length approaches zero. It then equals 
 
𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = − 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 [ln𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)] ( 2-42) 
An important parameter to these equations is the Mean Time To Failure (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹). In this context, it 
is the expected value of the continuous random variable 𝑀𝑀 and gives the area beneath the reliability 
function. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 is given by 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 = � 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑡∞
0
= � 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑡∞
0
 ( 2-43) 
Considering the exponential distribution model as an example, the above functions are 
demonstrated in Figure  2-7 and Figure  2-8. Given the constant failure rate property, the hazard rate 
function yields, 
𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆 = 1
𝜃
= 1
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹
, a constant 
The failure density is given by 
𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 
Similarly, the failure distribution becomes 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 
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 The reliability function is obtained by 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 
And the variance is given by 
𝜎2 = 1
𝜆𝜆2
 
 
 
Figure  2-7: The exponential distribution model. (a) Failure density. (b) Failure distribution 
 
 
 
Figure  2-8: The exponential distribution model. (a) Reliability function. (b) Hazard function 
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 2.3 Multi-state System (MSS) Model and Universal Generating Function 
Today, there exist a variety of modeling and evaluation methods, be they graphical, probabilistic, or 
mathematical, or combinations of these, which offer various levels of representation abstracts and 
different types of measures, and can be useful for performance evaluation exercises of complex 
systems. In this section, we briefly review the definition of Multi-state Systems (MSS), followed by 
the Universal Generating Function (UGF) as a mathematical method for studying performance 
measures of multistate systems using multiple measures. This part represents the basis for the work 
introduced in  Chapter 5. 
2.3.1 Multi-state System (MSS) Model 
The term MSS is basically used when a system and its components can take an arbitrary finite number 
of different states of performance levels or rates, ranging from perfect functioning at one side to 
complete failure at the other side. The fundamental concepts of multi-state system MSS, however, 
were introduced in the middle of the 1970s [124], [125], [126]. 
To demonstrate MSS mathematically, consider a system that consists of 𝑛𝑛 units or elements, and 
assume that any system element 𝑖𝑖 can have 𝑘𝑖𝑖 different states, mutually exclusive, to encode the 
discrete scale from complete failure up to perfect functioning. This setting is represented by the set 
𝒈𝒊𝒊 = �𝑔𝑖𝑖1,𝑔𝑖𝑖2, … ,𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑖� with related probability of performance for each state 𝒑𝒊𝒊 = �𝑝𝑖𝑖1,𝑝𝑖𝑖2, … ,𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑖�, 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑗 is the performance rate with associated probability 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗 for element i in the state 𝑗,  𝑗 ∈{1,2, … ,𝑘𝑖𝑖}. In the stochastic domain, let the performance rate at any instance be represented by 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡);  0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑀, i.e., a random variable taking values from 𝒈𝒊𝒊, so 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒈𝒊𝒊 with a probability 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒑𝒊𝒊 where ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑖𝑗=1 = 1, thus making it a stochastic process for the time interval [0,𝑀𝑀] of 
the MSS operation time [116], [117].  
Subsequently, the entire system space can then be seen as having 𝐾 different states, determined by 
the states of its individual elements with a total system performance rate 𝑔𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,𝐾},𝐾 =
∏ 𝑘𝑗
𝑛𝑛
𝑗=1 . Thus, the MSS performance rate 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) at any instance 𝑡𝑡 is a random variable too that takes 
values from the set 𝒈 = {𝑔1,𝑔2, … ,𝑔𝐾}. So, 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒈 with related probability of performance for 
each state 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) ∈  𝒑 = {𝑝1,𝑝2, … ,𝑝𝐾}. 
Also, define 𝑳𝒏𝒏 = �𝑔11,𝑔12, … ,𝑔1𝑘1� × �𝑔21,𝑔22, … ,𝑔2𝑘2� × … × {𝑔𝑛𝑛1,𝑔𝑛𝑛2, … ,𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑛}. 𝑳𝒏𝒏 in this 
case represents the space of all possible combinations of performance rates for all of the system 
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 elements, and 𝑴 = {𝑔1,𝑔2, … ,𝑔𝐾} is the space of all possible values of the performance rate for the 
entire MSS system. The structure function 
 ∅�𝐺𝐺1(𝑡𝑡),𝐺𝐺2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)�:𝑳𝒏𝒏 → 𝑴  ( 2-44) 
performs a mapping function of the performance rates from the space of all individual elements into 
the space of the entire system. As a result, the MSS system output performance distribution (OPD) 
can be defined by the two finite vectors 𝒈 and 𝒑 and the system structure function 
 ∅�𝐺𝐺1(𝑡𝑡),𝐺𝐺2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)�,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝒑 = {𝑝𝑘(𝑡𝑡)} = P{𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑔𝑘} ; 𝑘 ∈ {1, … ,𝐾}  ( 2-45) 
MSS representation offers a baseline for defining various measures. Among them is the 
acceptability function (𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡),𝑊(𝑡𝑡)), which basically evaluates the ability of MSS to perform a 
specific task by establishing a relationship between a system performance rate 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) and some 
specified performance level, called the demand 𝑊. This measure is based on the MSS definition that 
the space of a system’s behaviour is bounded by a set of performance states; thus, one can define two 
disjoint subsets, defining acceptable and unacceptable system functioning. Practically, MSS 
performance must exceed the demand to be functioning, and it fails otherwise. So, the function is 
evaluated as 𝐹𝐹�𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡),𝑊(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) −𝑊(𝑡𝑡). 
The MSS representation provides a generalization of the binary structure function [113], [118], 
[126]. Various MSS representations and measures for traditional binary-state reliability topologies 
(such as series, parallel, series-parallel, bridge, etc.) and analysis methods (such as block diagrams, 
minimal path and cut sets, fault trees, etc.) can be found in [116], [117], [127]. 
2.3.2 Universal Generating Function (UGF) 
UGF is a mathematical technique that allows one to define and solve multi-state system (MSS) output 
performance distribution using the distributions of its constituting elements. The UGF method was 
introduced by Ushakov [128], described further in [113], [118], [129], and its applications to 
reliability analysis can be found in [119], [130]. UGF method is mainly based on using: 1) z-
transform of discrete random variables, and 2) composition operators, in which the resulting function 
is called the u-function. The method is considered an extension of the widely known moment 
generating function and thus sometimes called the method of generalised generating sequences [113]. 
Recall the definition for a discrete random variable 𝑋𝑋 represented by the following probability mass 
function, 
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  𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋 = 𝑘} = 𝑝𝑘 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑘 = 0,1,2, … 
�𝑝𝑘 = 1∞
𝑘=0
 
 
The generating function of the random variable 𝑋𝑋 denoted by 𝜑𝑋(𝑧𝑧), as found in [131], can be 
defined as 
 
𝜑𝑋(𝑧𝑧) = �𝑝𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘∞
𝑘=0
 ( 2-46) 
The coefficients of 𝑧𝑧𝑘 represent 𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋 = 𝑘}, and 𝑋𝑋 is a discrete r.v. that can only take integer values 
𝑘 = 0,1,2, …, which represent a central restriction to this definition. However, the generating function 
has the following properties. 
To find the distribution of the summation of independent discrete random variables, say 𝑍 = 𝑋𝑋 +
𝑌,  one can simply compute the product of the two generating functions as follows. 
 
𝜑𝑍(𝑧𝑧) = 𝜑𝑋(𝑧𝑧).𝜑𝑌(𝑧𝑧) = � 𝑝𝑘𝑥𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑥∞
𝑘𝑥=0
� 𝑝𝑘𝑦𝑧𝑧
𝑘𝑦
∞
𝑘𝑦=0
 
= � � 𝑝𝑘𝑥𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑥∞
𝑘𝑦=0
∞
𝑘𝑥=0
𝑝𝑘𝑦𝑧𝑧
𝑘𝑦 
= � � 𝑧𝑧(𝑘𝑥+𝑘𝑦) 𝑝𝑘𝑥∞
𝑘𝑦=0
∞
𝑘𝑥=0
𝑝𝑘𝑦 
( 2-47) 
This product basically uses the property of polynomials by simply adding the exponents of 𝑍 
during multiplication procedures, and thus finding 𝑍 = 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌. To find the expectation of the r.v. 𝑋𝑋, 
we write 
 
𝜑𝑋
′ (𝑧𝑧)|𝑧=1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝜑𝑋(𝑧𝑧)|𝑧=1 = � 𝑘𝑝𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘−1∞
𝑘=1
�
𝑧=1
 
= �𝑘𝑝𝑘∞
𝑘=1
= 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋] 
( 2-48) 
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 Furthermore, for the second derivative of 𝜑𝑋(𝑧𝑧) at 𝑧𝑧 = 1 we write 
 
𝜑𝑋
′′(𝑧𝑧)|𝑧=1 = � 𝑘(𝑘 − 1)𝑝𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘−2∞
𝑘=1
�
𝑧=1
 
= �𝑘2𝑝𝑘∞
𝑘=1
−�𝑘𝑝𝑘
∞
𝑘=1
 
( 2-49) 
where the first term is the second moment and the second term is the expectation of r.v. 𝑋𝑋. 
The introduction of moment generating function 𝜓(𝑡𝑡) [48] removed the restriction of the integer 
values 𝑘 of the r.v. 𝑋𝑋 on the generating function definition above. Rather, the random variable 𝑋𝑋 is 
allowed to take all values of 𝑡𝑡, and can be represented by 
 
𝜓𝑋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑒𝑒𝜆𝜆𝑋] =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�𝑒𝑒𝜆𝜆𝑥
𝑥
𝑝𝑥 ,                    𝑋𝑋 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
� 𝑒𝑒𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑥,     𝑋𝑋 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆∞
−∞
 ( 2-50) 
It also allows higher moments of the random variable to be calculated by successive derivatives of 
the function 𝜓(𝑡𝑡) and evaluation at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. For example, to find 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋], we write 
 
𝜓𝑋
′ (𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝜓𝑋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸[𝑒𝑒𝜆𝜆𝑋] = 𝐸𝐸 � 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 [𝑒𝑒𝜆𝜆𝑋]� = 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋𝑒𝑒𝜆𝜆𝑋]  
Hence, 
 𝑑
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝜓𝑋(0) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋] ( 2-51) 
And the generalisation leads to finding 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛] by computing the nth derivative of 𝜓𝑋(𝑡𝑡) evaluated at 
𝑡𝑡 = 0, that is, 
 𝑑
𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝜓𝑋(0) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛],𝑛𝑛 ≥ 1 ( 2-52) 
Similarly, the moment generating function of the summation of independent discrete random 
variables is the product of individual moment generating functions, 
 𝜓∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 (𝑡𝑡) = �𝜓𝑋𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-53) 
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 Subsequently, the z-transform function 𝜓𝑥(𝑧𝑧) of discrete random variable 𝑋𝑋 is defined by 
substituting 𝑒𝑒𝜆𝜆 = 𝑧𝑧, which can take arbitrary real values in this case for all values of 𝑧𝑧 [116], [117]. It 
is represented by 
 𝜓𝑋(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑧𝑧𝑋] = �𝑝𝑥𝑧𝑧𝑥
𝑥
 ( 2-54) 
Note that 𝜓𝑋(𝑧𝑧) inherits the basic properties of the generating function above, particularly,  
 𝜓𝑋′ (𝑧𝑧)|𝑧=1 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋] ( 2-55) 
and 
 𝜓∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 (𝑧𝑧) = �𝜓𝑋𝑖(𝑧𝑧)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-56) 
Now, for complex MSS systems where a large number of components can be connected in different 
ways, u-function is introduced, facilitating the application of more composition operators, i.e., other 
than the addition of exponents in polynomials, to capture the performance measure of interest. This 
function represents a subsystem or system as a polynomial, 𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧), of a group of smaller components 
using simple algebraic operations over their individual u-functions, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧), that take the following 
form 
 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧) = �𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗  𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑖
𝑗=1
 ( 2-57) 
Note that in this representation of u-function the coefficients of the terms represent the probabilistic 
value of some object or state encoded by the exponent of the terms. 
For two different components, say 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 with random performance rates 
𝑔1 ∈ �𝑔11,  𝑔12, … ,𝑔1𝑘1� and 𝑔2 ∈ �𝑔21,  𝑔22, … ,𝑔2𝑘2�, their combined 𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) function takes the 
following form [118], [128], [129], 
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𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧)� = Ω𝜔  � 𝑝1𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑔1𝑖𝑘1
𝑖𝑖=1
,�𝑝2𝑗 𝑧𝑧𝑔2𝑗𝑘2
𝑗=1
� 
= ��𝑝1𝑖𝑖 𝑝2𝑗𝑘2
𝑗=1
𝑧𝑧𝜔(𝑔1𝑖,𝑔2𝑗)𝑘1
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 2-58) 
Observe that 𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧) and 𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧) represent individual u-functions of the components 𝑔1 and 𝑔2, 
respectively, and 𝜔(. ) function represents the composition operator that reflects the MSS 
performance measure of interest and relationship between these components. For example, 𝜔(. ) 
function when defined for capacity measure of an MSS system, 𝜔(. ) of two components equals the 
sum of the components’ capacities when connected in parallel and the minimum when connected in 
series, denoted by 𝜔𝑝(. ) and 𝜔𝑠𝑠(. ), respectively, and thus defined by 
 𝜔𝑝(𝑔1,𝑔2) = 𝑔1 + 𝑔2 ( 2-59) 
and 
 𝜔𝑠𝑠(𝑔1,𝑔2) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑔1,𝑔2) ( 2-60) 
Other examples can be found in [118]. In a more general form this representation can be written by 
 
𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑧𝑧)�
= Ω𝜔  � 𝑝1𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑔1𝑖𝑘1
𝑖𝑖=1
,�𝑝2𝑗 𝑧𝑧𝑔2𝑗𝑘2
𝑗=1
, … , � 𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑛𝑚𝑘𝑛
𝑚𝑚=1
�
= ��… � (𝑝1𝑖𝑖 𝑝2𝑗𝑘𝑛
𝑚𝑚=1
…𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝜔�𝑔1𝑖,𝑔2𝑗,…,𝑔𝑛𝑚�)𝑘2
𝑗=1
𝑘1
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 2-61) 
Also when 𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) represents the p.m.f. of the r.v. 𝑋𝑋, 
 𝑈𝑈𝑥′ (𝑧𝑧)|𝑧=1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑥(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋] ( 2-62) 
In the case of a k-out-of-n binary structure, when identical and independent components are 
considered, one can readily obtain the reliability using the binomial distribution equation in ( 2-33). 
When components are not identical, the probabilities of the possible realizations of the structure 
where the number of functioning components is at least k must be summed up. This procedure means 
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 a significant computational cost using the simple enumeration approach of possible states of the 
structure. Using the UGF method, a straightforward, efficient algorithm, described in [116], [128], 
[132], can be used as follows. 
1. Determine 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧)’s for the elements of the structure 
2. Initialize 𝑅𝑅 = 0,𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧) 
3. For 𝑗 = 2 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 do 
a. Obtain 𝑈𝑈𝑗(𝑧𝑧) = Ω+(𝑈𝑈𝑗−1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆𝑗(𝑧𝑧)) 
b. If 𝑈𝑈𝑗(𝑧𝑧) contains a term with 𝑧𝑧𝑘, remove this term from 𝑈𝑈𝑗(𝑧𝑧) and add its coefficient 
to 𝑅𝑅 
Upon completion of this algorithm, 𝑅𝑅 equals the system’s reliability. Note that the function Ω+ is 
simply the addition of exponents, i.e., found by the composition operator using 𝜔+(𝑔1,𝑔2) = 𝑔1 +
𝑔2. Also, the elimination of 𝑧𝑧𝑘 terms occurs because it does not matter how many components are 
functioning as long as the number is not less than 𝑘. 
As stated in [116], [117], determining the u-function for a system is basically based on a state 
enumeration approach of its elements, which can be extremely costly in terms of the resources and 
computations required. To reduce such a cost, first, the like terms for many types of MSS in the u-
function can be collected as the u-function inherits the essential property of the regular polynomial. 
So, if a u-function representing the distribution of a 𝑟𝑟. 𝑣.𝑋𝑋 contains terms 𝑝𝑖𝑖  𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖 and 𝑝𝑗  𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑗 where 
𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑗, the two terms can be combined into one term (𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑗) 𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖. 
Second, the u-function of a higher-level system can be obtained recursively using the u-functions of 
its constituting lower-level subsystems or elements. The recursive determination of the u-functions is 
facilitated by the associative property of the composition operator, which in turn, strictly depends on 
the structure function having the associative property too in reliability engineering. Further, if the 
structure function has the commutative property, the composition operator inherits this property, 
allowing the recursive procedure to contain an arbitrary set of elements with no sense to the order. So, 
 
Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑘(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆𝑘+1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑧𝑧)�= Ω𝜔�Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑘(𝑧𝑧)�,  Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆𝑘+1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑧𝑧)�� ( 2-63) 
and 
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Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑘(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆𝑘+1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑧𝑧)�= Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑘+1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆𝑘(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑧𝑧)� ( 2-64) 
These two techniques together use the fact that some elements or subsystems have the same 
performance rates and therefore reduce the length and number of terms of the intermediate elements’ 
u-functions. Consequently, they provide a more convenient approach and significant reduction in the 
computational cost of u-functions as opposed to direct calculations of all combinations individually.  
Note that the u-function differs from regular polynomials in the way that its exponents can be any 
mathematical objects, as opposed to using scalar variables in polynomials. Furthermore, the u-
function allows a wider range of 𝜔(. ) operators to be defined over such exponent objects (i.e., not 
only the product of polynomials used with the ordinary moment generating function or conventional 
Boolean operators in reliability analysis) [116], [117]. 
To conclude this section, the UGF method allows one to define performance distribution for a 
system consisting of multiple levels of smaller components, perform multi-state system performance 
analysis, and reasonably implement fast optimization procedures. In addition, performance values can 
be based on various measures such as reliability, availability, speed, or capacity, along with a much 
more flexible use of composition operators over u-functions. Thus, it allows one to capture different 
topologies, the physical nature of performance, and interactions among system elements [117], [118], 
[119], [129], [130]. 
2.4 Asset-Control Graph Evaluation 
In this section, we briefly review risk assessment in computing systems, followed by an overview of 
Bayesian networks. These two subjects represent preliminaries for the proposed evaluation method 
using the failure relationships among asset and controls in computing systems, which is presented 
in  Chapter 6. 
2.4.1 Risk Assessment 
Reliability and risk coexist as closely related branches of applied science with a significant 
overlapping between them. While the first is centered on the analysis of failure and operability, the 
latter adds to that the study of failure consequences and damage estimates [105]. 
Risk management methodologies in principle are represented by a series of processes and steps that 
need to be followed to control risk. These steps are generally centered on risk assessment, risk 
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 mitigation, and evaluation [133]. Risk management methods are, more or less, based on defining the 
risk as the product of likelihood times impact. In Information Technology (IT), risk assessment 
methods analyze the combination of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities to calculate the risk level an 
asset is exposed to. The result of this assessment is fed into the risk mitigation process, in which the 
most rational, appropriate mitigation measure is selected [133].  
Computing paradigms are evolving by nature, leading to what are known today as service-oriented 
architectures, utility computing, grid computing, virtualization, and cloud computing, among others, 
representing various types of parallel and distributed systems. While they generally share common 
conceptual and technological components, they have their own differences too. Whether the change 
resides mostly at the abstraction level, technological level, service level, or in between, new forms of 
capabilities and challenges mutate. As such, consistent risk assessment represents one of the main 
challenges for such evolving paradigms.  
Cloud computing, an example on most recent paradigms, has introduced unique sets of computing 
capabilities and risks at the same time. The “user-centric” perspective of the cloud has redefined how 
users can control their assets. This paradigm has created a cloud-specific provider-user relationship 
whereby the provider's computing resources are offered as services to the user based on an on-
demand business model. 
There exists a wide set of security and privacy issues, not necessarily new, but certainly pertinent to 
cloud computing. These issues include accountability and auditability boundaries, legal compliance, 
resource availability and integrity, and data confidentiality and segregation, to name a few [134], 
[135], [136], [137], [138]. However, we argue that the development of appropriate risk analysis and 
management methodologies represents one of the areas that necessitate immediate advancement. 
The implementation of the cloud paradigm pushes forward the option of risk transference over all 
other risk mitigation measures: reduction, acceptance, and avoidance. Traditionally, the option of risk 
transference was set for situations in which the risk has a very high impact and is not easily reduced 
[139]. However, with regard to the risk transference in the cloud paradigm, we think the transition is 
heavily influenced by the attractiveness of the economies of scale rather than concerns about the risk 
manageability. Regardless of whether this observation holds true (or not), appropriate risk assessment 
methods are much more needed than ever, to manage the anticipated risk of this computing twist. 
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 In light of risk transference, one would want to answer the following questions: how much risk 
exists in the system? How much risk is being transferred to the cloud? And at what cost or saving to 
the user? How can we determine the likelihood and impact of risk quantities of resources residing on 
the cloud provider’s side? How can we determine the acceptable probability of failure and its 
economics between the cloud provider and user? 
Most recent work addressing cloud risks and mitigation strategies in particular focuses on mutual 
regulatory actions between the cloud providers and users, such as those in [134], [135], [136], [137], 
[140], which are undoubtedly essential and constructive. However, there is still a shortage of 
literature addressing current risk assessment methods in light of their applicability to various 
computing paradigms, such as the cloud. For example, the work of [140] recommends stipulating the 
acceptable risk of failure in the SLA as a predefined threshold for the probability of failure that the 
cloud provider and user agree on. Yet, finding how to calculate this quantity appropriately remains a 
research gap. 
Earlier, we provided a general review of some work in risk assessment. Several qualitative risk 
assessment methods, however, are described in [30]. Among them are the Facilitated Risk Analysis 
and Assessment Process (FRAAP), its variations, and risk assessment matrix. FRAAP is a disciplined 
process intended to document security-related risks with business operations, conducted for each 
system, platform, or application at a time. The risk assessment matrix combines the three security 
objectives, i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability, with the two security classes of risk, i.e., 
accidental acts and deliberate acts. While those methods can be useful in the risk assessment process, 
they remain qualitative. 
The quantitative risk assessment methods, on the other hand, have limitations in common too. For 
example, the work of [11] presents a model for the probabilistic risk measurement of an enterprise 
network. To assign cumulative probabilities of successful attacks, it uses attack graphs for model 
representation and Common Vulnerability Scoring Systems (CVSS) for individual component 
metrics. The work of [67] also presents a model for quantifying social behavior of an attacker (e.g., 
skill level, tenacity, financial ability) over the resources of a network as an accumulation of a 
sequence of steps represented by attack graphs. It then uses Bayesian network (BN)-based analysis to 
perform vulnerability assessment of the targeted resource. CVSS, however, requires scoring all 
vulnerabilities in the system to generate the corresponding scores of the impact [62]. In addition, 
attack graphs require attack templates, configuration files, and attacker profiles as input for each 
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 attack scenario among network nodes [3], [61]. While such models and methods can be useful to the 
assessment of risk, the enumeration of all possible scenarios with the corresponding likelihood 
quantities in each configuration remains a complex and too-specific task, or even unattainable, as in 
the case of a cloud computing setting. 
In an attempt to address the aforementioned questions and issues, we propose a quantitative risk 
assessment method intended to facilitate a better ground for decision makers choosing among 
alternative risk transference options, and for mitigation measures overall. This method employs 
Bayesian networks (BNs) to capture and bound the failure dependency among the distinct entities of a 
computing system. We use a case study involving a cloud computing setting to demonstrate the 
applicability of the method to various computing paradigms. 
2.4.2 Overview of Bayesian Networks 
A Bayesian network (BN) is a probabilistic graphical model that represents conditional dependencies 
among a set of random variables using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). It is a complete model for the 
variables and their probabilistic relationships; thus, it can be used for performing various probabilistic 
inferences that can be very useful to the design and evaluation of a system. The representation of BNs 
consists of two components. The first component, 𝑮 = (𝑽,𝑬), is a directed acyclic graph whose set of 
vertices2, 𝑽, corresponds to the random variables 𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛, which can be discrete or continuous. 
Graph edges, 𝑬, represent the casual dependency relationships among these variables, defining 
conditional probability statements. The second component, 𝑷, is the probability distribution over 𝑽, 
defining a conditional distribution for each variable, given its parents in 𝑮 [141]. 
Consider a BN represented by the finite set 𝑿 = {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛} of random variables with respect to 
𝑮. Each variable 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 may take value 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 from its domain 𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)3P. The graph 𝑮 encodes 
conditional independence assumptions, which allow the decomposition of any joint distribution into 
the product form using the chain rule [142], i.e., 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛) = �𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖))𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-65) 
2 Vertices and nodes are used interchangeably. 
3 We use capital letters, such as 𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, for variable names and lowercase letters, such as 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, to denote 
specific values taken by those variables. 
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 𝑿 also satisfies the local Markov property, meaning that each variable is conditionally independent 
of its non-descendants, given its parent variables [142], i.e., 
 𝑿𝑣  ⊥  𝑿𝑽\𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑣)/ 𝑿𝑝𝑎(𝑣), 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣 ∈  𝑽 ( 2-66) 
Furthermore, BN facilitates many inference forms that are used in the proposed modeling approach, 
for example, joint distribution queries, which involve calculating the joint probability table between a 
set of variables. A task of this type is solved by using the chain rule and Markov property, and takes 
the form, 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) = �𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖/𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖))𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 2-67) 
Evidence-based queries are used to determine the distribution of non-evidence variables, given 
some evidence of failure (or non-failure). Inference can be done from children to parents or vice 
versa. This type takes the form, 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑿𝑣1/ 𝑿𝑣2), 𝑣1  ≠  𝑣2;  𝑣1,𝑣2  ∈ 𝑽 ( 2-68) 
In addition, independence check queries are used to discover independency statements among 
different network nodes. This procedure usually involves adding conditions on some variables to 
build such independence statements, taking the form, 
 𝑿𝑣1 ⊥  𝑿𝑣2/𝑿𝑣3, 𝑣1 ≠ 𝑣2 ≠ 𝑣3;  𝑣1,𝑣2, 𝑣3 ∈ 𝑽 ( 2-69) 
The choice of graph theory in security evaluation is supported by its abilities to capture complex 
entity relations and interactions in a simple form [143], [144], along with the availability of well-
founded algorithms for the analysis of the model. The choice of BNs approach in particular is 
supported by its abilities to provide a robust probabilistic method of reasoning under uncertainty and 
a plausible method for capturing failure dependency relationships in complex systems [65], [142], 
[145], [146]. To name a few benefits of such an approach, various statistical analysis methods can be 
engaged on the same system, for example, we can perform different directions of inference (e.g., 
backward and forward); we can compute the most likely joint distribution of a particular scenario, 
causal queries, and optimal decisions under uncertainty [32]. Such a direction of research on BNs has 
even led to their extension to dependability theory, the central field for failure studies. The works of 
[96], [97] are considered among the earliest studies for estimating reliability using BNs.  
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 BNs have been used to model network vulnerabilities and measure quantitatively network security. 
The method presented in [58] introduced the idea of using BNs to build attack graphs in a compact 
form, where nodes represent the state of individual security violations and edges represent the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities. The goal is to map all underlying potential atomic attack steps 
exploiting vulnerabilities in a given network. The resultant model is called a Bayesian attack graph. 
Another work addressing a similar problem was [57], which introduced a quantitative model for 
network vulnerability assessment, modeling attack graphs as special Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
(DBNs), and employing CVSS scores for measuring individual vulnerabilities. The overall goal is to 
derive a measurement of security based on combining various temporal aspects of vulnerabilities such 
as the availability of exploit codes or patches.  
Examples using Bayesian networks in the risk management field, not necessarily in the computing 
one, can be found in [78], [147], [148]. In [78] in particular, although the goal is to model operational 
risk in financial institutions using Bayesian networks, a demonstration example of an online business 
network is presented. The example models various risk factors leading to overall financial loss 
distribution of the network using random variables, such as application failure, data loss, hacker 
attack, network failure, server hardware quality, and virus attack. In [147], expert elicitation 
techniques were used to probabilistically model and forecast nanomaterial risk, as an appropriate 
dataset including network structure and nodes relationships were not available. Similarly, expert data 
were used in [148] to build the corresponding BN to model various strategic and legal risks in 
building important structures.  
  
57 
 Chapter 3 
The Information Security Maturity Model (ISMM) Extended 
3.1 Introduction 
This work adopts a system-level approach to address the security quantification problem. To do so, 
we first introduce a candidate paradigm shift for security modeling that can serves as the foundation 
for various system-level representations and evaluation techniques. This shift basically starts with 
what defines a computing system and failure model before any system-level analysis can be 
established. Using this foundation, we propose two failure-centric model-based quantification 
approaches, capturing different system characteristics for different evaluation purposes. The first 
approach addresses the quantification problem considering the set of controls; and the second 
addresses the problem considering the sets of both assets and controls. Each approach includes a 
bounding system model, performance measures, and evaluation techniques. To achieve this, we adopt 
various network and system modelling, reduction, and evaluation techniques available today to 
represent, quantify, and analyze system-level security. The presented system models, however, are 
independent from the presented performance measures and evaluation techniques, facilitating a wider 
range of applications in security evaluation studies. 
This chapter covers two main components: 1) the candidate unified abstraction of computing 
systems and the associated failure model, which represent the foundation upon which the subsequent 
work throughout this thesis is built; particularly, system models, performance measures, and analysis 
methods. As such, this part, which is presented in Section  3.4 and Section  3.5, is used throughout the 
remaining chapters. 2) The proposal of the first system model, which represents a modified version of 
the original ISMM work. This model is redefined to fit system-level quantitative modeling. The 
modification covers two main parts: model architecture and maturity propositions so that quantitative 
maturity can be established, and model structures so that a system-level representation and 
operational performance measures, mostly from dependability theory, can be established. Using this 
model, two different groups of evaluation methods are individually presented later in  Chapter 4 
and  Chapter 5. 
The overall organization of this chapter is as follows. We start with a brief overview of ISMM-
based modeling approach in Section  3.2. We then set out some necessary definitions pertinent to 
ISMM model extensions in Section  3.3. This is followed by the proposed computing system 
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 abstraction and failure model in Section  3.4 and Section  3.5, respectively. Then the ISMM model 
architecture is revised accordingly in Section  3.6 and its propositions in Section  3.7 to facilitate the 
presented quantification approach. This is followed by ISMM-based RBDs, vectors, and structure 
functions in Section  3.8, along with the properties of quantitative measures and maturity functions in 
Section  3.9 and Section  3.10, respectively. In Section  3.11, we briefly present a case study 
demonstrating the contribution to this end, which will then be used to demonstrate analysis using the 
reliability approach and the Multi-state System (MSS) representation approach using Universal 
Generating Function (UGF) method in  Chapter 4 and  Chapter 5, respectively. 
3.2 Approach 
Security systems today are characterised by their structural complexity. The security element of a 
computing system is defined by the collective strength of its lower-level constituent controls that are 
intended to work together in the face of failure. These controls can be in any physical arrangement, 
such as parallel, series, or meshed, separated sometimes, or even without any systematic aggregation 
to a particular relevance. Yet, operationally they are interconnected in a particular arrangement with 
respect to failure, controlling the state and degree of functionality of the overall system. This setting 
leads to building structural relationships among these controls, which can be identified and analysed; 
and therefore, can be useful in building more reliable, secure systems. It is remarkable, however, that 
the relationships between the states of individual controls and the overall system are not black and 
white. That is, the functionality of a control does not guarantee the functionality of the overall system; 
failure of a control does not necessary lead to complete system failure either; also, individual controls, 
and hence the system as a whole, might still continue to perform its intended functions with certain 
failures at some decreased level of ability, in a way similar to some found in reliability engineering 
[47]. 
This work employs these structural relationships among security controls and demonstrates how the 
original work of the ISMM model can be used to establish a quantitative system-level model. This 
chapter, however, required the extension and integration of various studies, leading to the steps 
depicted in Figure  3-1: system-level abstraction4 into assets and controls, introduced in Section  3.4; 
the failure model from dependability theory, presented in Section  3.5; the bounding system model 
4 In [151], a system is abstracted into assets and access controls for the purpose of modeling failure 
interdependency in access control models. In this work, the abstraction is set into assets and controls of all 
types. Thus, it is a generalisation of the earlier work. 
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 using the redefined work of ISMM, presented in Section  3.6 through Section  3.10; and reliability- and 
MSS UGF-based evaluation techniques, presented separately later in  Chapter 4 and  Chapter 5. The 
first two components of this approach, i.e., system abstraction and failure model, have been published 
in [149], [150], [151] to introduce an asset-control graph and evaluate failure dependency in access 
control models. 
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Figure  3-1: Approach of ISMM-based analysis 
 
3.3 Notation and Definitions 
This section introduces the extended ISMM notation and definition necessary to this study. A 
summary of the notation used mainly in  Chapters 3, 4, and 5 is outlined in Appendix A. 
Assets and controls: these two computer security terms are especially necessary to the abstraction 
paradigm of a computing system and subsequent evaluation methods [23], [149], [150], [151]. Assets 
can be anything that has value to the organization, its business operations, and their continuity; and 
controls are technical or administrative safeguards or countermeasures to avoid, counteract, or 
minimize security risks [152]. In short, controls are the protection mechanisms of assets, noting that 
controls themselves are also part of the total system assets. 
Effect and impact: the notion effect when used with security controls reflects input to operational 
security that increases the security strength or level, whereas impact is usually used with failures to 
reflect input that decreases security. These notions are important to distinctly depict the game-
theoretic behavior of the security dilemma between defenders and challengers (e.g., attackers or 
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 adversaries, unintentional failures) [22], [23], [149], [151]. These notions are employed to capture the 
contribution of individual security controls to the state of the security system from both confronting 
worlds onto the same model foundation. 
ISMM-based System: the set of five ordered security layers or subsystems that map the structures of 
all of the system controls. These layers are structurally connected in a pure series arrangement, 
defining the conceptual boundaries of the overall security system. 
𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖: the set of security controls that are logically interconnected in series, parallel, 
series-parallel, parallel-series, or mesh structures, or any combination of these, within the logical 
boundary of layer 𝑖𝑖. 
ISMM structure: any set of controls having a particular logical arrangement with respect to failure. 
Structures may represent higher-order abstraction such as system- and subsystem-levels or lower-
order abstraction such as a collection of constituent components that form a control. 
Simple structure: a structure for which a reliability block diagram exists and is reducible to 
series/parallel form with independent items. 
Reliability: the probability that an item will perform its intended function under given conditions 
for a specified interval of time. 
Binary system: a system and its components that are only allowed to take two possible states: either 
working or failed. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹: mean time to failure, which is the expected value of a control’s failure-free operation time. 
Its unbiased (empirical) estimate can be found by 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 = (𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑡𝑡2 + ⋯+ 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛)/𝑛𝑛, where 𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 
are observed failure-free operating times of statistically identical items. For constant failure rate 𝜆𝜆, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 = 1/𝜆𝜆.  
Mission time:  the stated working time of a component, control, or subsystem. 
Failure: deviation of a component, control, subsystem, or system from its correct service, not 
necessary the specification. Failures are events that are considered with respect to their impact (actual 
occurrences), not the underlying mechanisms (such as faults and errors, which are states), thus always 
appearing in time although other variables such as effort can be used. 
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 Item: any component, control, subsystem, or system that can be represented as a structural unit. It 
may consist of hardware, software, policies, procedures, human resources, or any combination of 
these. 
Redundancy: existence of more than one means for performing a required function in an item. 
Active (hot, parallel) redundancy is considered in this work, not warm (partially loaded) or standby 
redundancy. 
Multi-state system: a system and its components that are allowed to take more than two possible 
states, e.g., completely working, partially working (or failed), and completely failed. 
Measures: ways to quantitatively represent important performance facets of the actual security state 
or behaviour using a mathematical abstraction of the problem. A measure, however, cannot capture 
all the properties of interest. Therefore, the art is to define a suitable subset of those properties in such 
a way that is simple, focused and yet large enough. As such, many researchers consider that 
performance evaluation, to a large extent, is an art [36]. 
Similarities can be found between a number of terminologies used in conventional reliability and 
security [7], [8], [9], [12], [21], [100]. In this work, however, the following concepts are used 
analogously: security breach and failure; and control or security control and component.  
3.4 System Abstraction 
As described in [153], computing systems are, per design, built based on multiple levels of 
abstraction, a property that is essential for their dependability while in operation. When descending 
recursively down the components of a computer, components enlarge themselves to another level of 
abstraction with a lower-order set of constituting components until reaching the lowest level, perhaps 
individual transistors. In this sense, failures can usually be tracked down to a single component at 
some level, which might just represent an error at a higher-level of abstraction.  
The essence of the presented modeling and evaluation approach is centered on analyzing the failure 
relationship between assets and controls when both are seen as the distinct abstractions of the system 
under study. This level of abstraction represents the infrastructural paradigm facilitating the bounding 
of system model, and the establishment of their structural relationships with respect to failure, 
performance measures, and associated functions. 
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 Thus, components of a computing system are abstracted into two main classes: components whose 
primary purpose is to perform system functions or tasks, denoted as assets; and components whose 
primary purpose is to implement system countermeasures, denoted as controls [149], [150], [151]. 
The controls themselves are also part of the total system assets as per their primary definitions in 
Section  3.3. Assets can be low-level objects such as data files or high-level ones such as database and 
application platforms. Similarly, controls can be low-level (i.e., integrated) mechanisms such as 
authorization modules or high-level (i.e., standalone) ones such as firewalls. Figure  3-2 demonstrates 
this relationship. 
The relationship between assets and controls is unavoidable for any system, and its importance 
cannot be overstated. In principle, security controls define the domain and nature of countermeasures 
in the system. The failure of such controls, however, leads to the exposure of system assets 
consequent to the unavoidable dependency between system assets and controls, and thus could lead to 
catastrophic system damages. Furthermore, the failure behaviour itself can be very complicated. 
Controls may fail separately or jointly in various forms due to malicious or nonmalicious causes. For 
example, an authorization module (perhaps as an access control) on a particular database platform (as 
an asset) may fail through design flaws (as a nonmalicious failure) or brute force attacks (as a 
malicious failure), with or without corrupting the database itself, and may be detected or remain 
undetected. 
Nevertheless, the failure of any system component, or a set of components, could extend to affect 
other components as a result of the interdependencies involved with those components. Therefore, the 
identification and examination of these interactions (i.e., control-control and asset-control 
relationships) are crucial to understanding and controlling the security behaviour of a system. 
Observe that we employ the same long-used classical taxonomy of these security terms but from a 
different perspective, thus only changing the paradigm of their use. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is still a shortage of literature addressing such relationships 
quantitatively. The failure definition, however, must be refined more appropriately so that this 
relationship can be captured and analyzed. 
 
63 
  
Figure  3-2: Typical entity abstracts in computing systems 
 
3.5 Failure Model 
Following system abstraction, the definition of failure (or breach) becomes imperative. The 
identification and evaluation of failure is a key component in all security-related studies, including 
risk and extensions from dependability studies [7], [8], [9], [19], [47], [75], [98], [108], [143], [154], 
[155]. The definition is usually based on either the impact of security failure or the underlying failure 
mechanisms. The tendency, however, in most of the current quantitative security models is toward 
addressing underlying failure mechanisms (such as those surveyed in [7]), thus failing to generalise to 
wider system-level analysis. Regardless of that, appropriate failure models lead to building 
appropriate security measures, including technical-based and economics-based ones, which in turn, 
lead to building appropriate quantification and evaluation methods. 
The failure definition adopted in this work, which first appeared in [149], [151], is a representation 
analogous to failure in conventional reliability: the deviation from correct service [8], [98]. Two key 
aspects, however, are added to this definition: first, it includes failures from normal operational use 
and malicious activities on security systems [9], [98], [108]; and second, the level of abstraction of 
failure is based on the impact, not on the underlying failure details [7], [23]. The correct service is 
delimited by meeting the principle goals of security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This 
64 
 definition is central to the evaluation methods of this research. It is inclusive in terms of its failure 
domain, and it reflects the consequence or impact in terms of its failure level of abstraction. 
Studying failure impact as opposed to the underlying details adds great benefits to many system-
level security analysis exercises and to this direction of research in particular (see Figure  3-3). It 
allows us first to shift the problem domain from modeling failure details at the failure source (e.g., an 
attacker's mechanisms, accidental fault scenarios; corresponding probabilities of threats, 
vulnerabilities, exploits, and associated risks; etc.) to the domain of failure consequences or impacts 
as seen by the system owner or protector (e.g., frequencies and classes of failure, corresponding risk 
paths and associated impact on assets and controls, etc.). This shift leads to a more plausible, less- 
complex statistical problem as a result of the bounded view of failure. Second, modeling attack effect 
as opposed to attack details themselves allows us to incorporate more failures into the model, 
covering larger classes of attacks, including zero-day attacks [7]. Third, modeling actual 
consequences of failures, including attacks, facilitates a direct linkage of actual impact of risks with 
associated economics of security [19], [98], whereby both protection incentives and the failure suffer 
(i.e., incentives to protecting a system and the suffering from its failure [143]) can be aligned more 
efficiently and effectively. This facilitation occurs because risks are risks regardless, whether caused 
by malicious activities or traditional failures. In the end, a failure will have an impact on operational 
security, and that impact is what needs to be controlled [154]. Thus, attacks could, arguably, arrive at 
a random point in time from the system owner's perspective, and be manifest as traditional failures 
[155]. Fourth, in practice, with the current transition toward cloud computing, attaining knowledge or 
control of the underlying failure dynamics, including failure topology and threat models, will become 
far more difficult than assessing the impact of failure (e.g., failure statistics). This transition makes it 
imperative to have models that analyze and evaluate security using this level of abstraction, that is, 
the impact of failure. Fifth, adopting impact of failure allows us to depart from the ongoing debate in 
the security community, described in [7], [8], [9], about the plausibility of modeling the class of 
intentional attacks using probability theory. 
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 system owner’s world:
impact
how controls, assets fail?
= f(faults, errors, failures)
= f(threats, vulnerabilities, exploits; risks)
modeling this side requires knowledge 
of underlying mechanisms!
modeling this side requires knowledge of 
exploited impact across effort or time!
reduces to how often controls, assets fail?
= g(frequencies & classes of failures)
= g(risk paths; impact on assets and 
controls)
adversary’s world:
underlying mechanisms
 
Figure  3-3: The transformation of failure space from underlying mechanisms into impact 
 
While system failure in conventional reliability is commonly modelled as a function of time, as 
components operate and fail over time, reliability in the security context can be more complicated. 
When addressing security problems by applying probabilistic techniques to underlying mechanisms 
of malicious scenarios, beside the direct use of the variable time, the variable effort is sometimes used 
to represent the amount of effort expended to breach the system [3], [9], [10], [54], [64], which 
eventually leads to constructing the analysis model over the variable time. This approach, however, is 
because the notion of effort is seen to be more inclusive of malicious characteristics such as the 
required attack tools, time, and computational power [3], [9], [54]. On the other hand, when impact of 
failure is considered, defining failure events over the variable time becomes a more rational choice 
because that impact of failure implies the manifestation of failure events, as opposed to underlying 
failure mechanisms, which implies failure behavioural characteristics. For convenience, we will use 
the variable time to define the failure process, i.e., time taken for a failure event to occur. However, 
this is not a restriction to the application of this work as effort-dependent random variables can be 
used in a similar manner. Figure  3-4 illustrates this failure process. 
 
 
Figure  3-4: The failure process in security context 
 
t  or  e Failure event 0 unit interval 
unit amount to failure, T or E (r.v.) variable:  
- e.g,. time (t) or effort (e)  
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 3.6 ISMM Model Architecture 
Maturity as a notion is connected to staged growth with respect to a particular reference of interest. 
The concept of the maturity model was first developed in 1943 by Maslow in his theory of human 
motivation [156]. In the computing field, the pervasive use of computers and information systems 
started in the 1960s made the software development process a real challenge for many IT projects to 
succeed. Subsequently, the concept of the maturity model was applied in IT by the development of 
the stages-of-growth model in [157], quality management maturity grid in [158], followed by the 
software development process in [159]. The concept was later adopted more extensively by the 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI), funded by the U.S. Department of defense, at Carnegie Mellon 
University through the development of the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [85], [160]. Many 
derivatives then found their way into other processes of various engineering fields and application 
domains, including the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model CMM (SSE-CMM/ 
ISO/IEC 21827). 
The connection, however, between the original maturity model of Maslow and subsequent maturity 
models we have today lies in the context of the primitives used in these maturity models, making 
them a sort of a mutation from the original work of Maslow’s theory. In particular, these primitives 
include the boundedness of the needs or requirements of the subject, the conceptual layers, the order 
of needs, maturity promotion and demotion, and self-actualisation.  
It is remarkable that the maturity models we have today have always been of a subjective nature, 
using qualitative measures along the evaluation process. They measure how good a process of interest 
is [157], [160], as opposed to the actual delivery of that process. In this work, we address maturity 
both qualitatively and quantitatively all together, showing how maturity concepts and principles can 
be further extended and formulated mathematically. Thus they can become useful to provide a 
consistent and integrated approach of quantitative evaluation, through application in information 
security. 
ISMM model semantics: The original work of ISMM was first published in 2003 [161], when the 
maturity model as a qualitative one was developed and validated. This work was then summarised in 
[2] and reprinted in [22]. Later, the work was revised in [23] to model structures of security controls, 
map controls into a sort of layered security architecture, and facilitate the quantification approach 
afterwards. The work of ISMM herein is further extended to make it a system-level quantification 
model suitable for establishing various performance measures of the security element. This extension 
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 is mostly connected with the application of dependability theory in security studies. The connection 
manifests in many ISMM components such as model notation, definitions, and assumptions, and 
reliability analysis methods and techniques such as structure functions, reliability block diagrams 
(RBDs), and minimal path and cut sets. 
ISMM is a security-centric model, primarily developed to classify and evaluate the maturity levels 
of information security from a qualitative perspective, which is affected by people, process, and 
technology, in any computing environment [2], [22], [23], [161]. It provides a means to analyze at 
which layers and to what extent the integrity of the three main protection processes of security— 
prevention, detection, and recovery—are realized, and what functions of information security—
confidentiality, integrity, and availability—are implemented. Figure  3-5 demonstrates the five layers 
of the model, indicating their precedence and relative visibility and sophistication of controls across 
the hierarchy. In this work, we extend the model to quantitatively bound security systems and 
measure performance using well-founded analysis techniques mostly adopted from reliability theory. 
The resultant work makes the model a formal, systematic, and comprehensive approach to 
qualitatively study a system’s behavior, strengths, and vulnerabilities and to quantitatively measure 
the system’s operational performance. 
 
 
Figure  3-5: The Information Security Maturity Model (ISMM) [2], [161]. Source: 2006, 
Information Systems Control Journal, vol. 3, p36. All rights reserved. Used by permission. 
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 The benefits and uses of the model can be better described from three different perspectives, or 
dimensions, as follows 
The layering dimension: A layer is basically a conceptual security boundary, or domain, which 
consists of a collection of controls that preserve a particular structure of failure relationships, serving 
common layer-level security functions and sharing common layer-level security goals. The layering 
dimension is demonstrated on the model by five consecutive layers that capture the conceptual 
boundaries of security systems, including social and technological aspects. Together the five 
different, yet interrelated, security layers form a particular hierarchy of system-level security 
functions and goals, starting from Physical and Environmental Security at the bottom to Definite 
Security at the top, as summarised in Table  3-1. Accordingly, a closed form representation of a 
security system can be established based on these ordered layers of interrelated controls. These layers 
are further described as follows. 
Layer 1: Physical and Environmental Security. This layer represents physical controls that aim to 
prevent unauthorized access or interference with the organization or ICT equipment and information 
assets (e.g., physical access controls and CCTV systems). The maturity at this layer is measured by 
the extent to which its physical and environmental boundary is protected. These controls generally 
require less technical knowledge and sophistication and tend to be more visible compared to the other 
higher layers. Therefore, the sophistication index is considered the lowest, and the visibility index is 
the highest at this layer. 
Layer 2: Front-end System Security. This layer bounds the application-level system functions and 
integrity requirements between the application component itself and end-user interface. Controls here 
aim to protect application data from any potential threats that might cause loss, damage, or 
unauthorized access by either internal or external users (e.g., application access controls). The 
maturity at this layer is measured by the extent to which front-end information is protected. The 
visibility index decreases here compared to level-1, as the number of people who can be exposed to 
this boundary is less. In addition, the control complexity is more, and thus its index is higher. 
Layer 3: Back-end System Security. Layer 3 delimits any resource (e.g., hardware, software, or 
process) that is beyond application-level components. The underlying network infrastructure and 
internal and external communication devices constitute the major components at this boundary. 
Controls aim to provide adequate protection of such resources (e.g., data and communication 
cryptographic mechanisms). The layer maturity is measured by the extent to which back-end 
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 information is protected. This setting suggests that the visibility and exposure element of such 
controls decreases compared to the lower levels, as equipment is presumably placed in less accessible 
areas. The required depth of knowledge is also usually more than the requirement at the lower layers, 
Therefore, the sophistication index increases. 
Layer 4: Comprehensive Security Awareness. This layer captures the awareness element of people, 
which is basically manifested in their practices and behaviours. It includes all technical and 
nontechnical controls that persuade the organization to operate in a security-conscious culture in all 
technologies deployed across all lower layers, as the right awareness leads to the right practice. The 
maturity of this layer is measured by the extent to which security behaviour is protected. Since the 
awareness of people is an unseen element (it is being demonstrated by their behaviours), ISMM 
suggests that the visibility index is the lowest compared to the lower layers. Moreover, as this level is 
solely about people and people alone, the knowledge and management requirements are greater; 
therefore, the sophistication index is higher than that of the lower layers. 
Layer 5: Definite Security. This layer captures the subjectivity issue of information security and its 
total and continuous resilience, optimization, and improvement against threats across all the lower 
layers. As is known, there is no such system that is absolutely secure (i.e., 100 percent secure). 
Therefore, this layer is about convergence of lower-layer controls, which is realised through the depth 
of applied security knowledge, manifested culture of accountability, and confidence in the 
organization. Its maturity is measured by the extent to which reliable cross-layer, integrity-specific 
controls are sustained. As a result, it is never fulfilled completely and works as a ceiling for any 
security system. Example controls are risk management, business continuity planning (BCP), and 
disaster recovery planning (DRP) processes. The risk management process, for instance, is not a 
single function of level-1 only; ideally, it is rather required to be deployed to cover the other levels in 
the hierarchy. Such proposition helps to define exactly the relevance and scope of applicability of 
such a requirement at individual layers and collectively, avoiding the false impression of its 
completeness when that is not the case. Obviously, the sophistication index is the highest and the 
visibility index is the lowest among all the other layers. 
The idea of this layering concept in studying security systems is significant for many reasons:  
1) It is used to define an overall boundary of a security system in a hierarchy, reflecting the effect of 
controls and impact of failures (contribution) at every level of abstraction we examine, i.e., 
control level, subsystem level, and system level. A key advantage to introducing the notions of 
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 effect of security controls and impact of failures is to further augment the boundary drawn on the 
operating environment of the security system, as in conventional reliability theory. This addition 
allows all possible inputs of control effects, i.e., a control’s input space, and all possible inputs of 
variable failure classes, i.e., failures input space, to be captured on the same model foundation, 
regardless of their underlying details. Thus, it allows conceivable structural relationships of 
controls to be constructed, transforming the complex statistical domain of underlying protection 
and failure mechanisms into the less complex domain of caused effect and impact, respectively. 
2) It is employed to build the notion of precedence among controls, reflecting a rational order of 
protection and failure of the system from both defenders and challengers.  
3) The layers are used to build accordingly logical structures of controls, in which quantifier 
functions for performance measures of interest and the consequent maturity function can be 
defined. 
4) The systematic aggregation of controls allows us to study consistency and adequacy requirements 
of comparable strengths in security implementations and to detect their deficiencies, covering 
both theoretical specification and operated configuration. This is important because information 
about how security controls might fail in both theory and practice is essential to security 
designers [18]. NIST, for instance, has published a series of Special Publications that give 
guidance for the strength of various cryptographic algorithms and key sizes when implementing 
cryptographic primitives. SP 800-57 guidelines give recommendations for a select set of 
applications, among them, PKI, IPsec, TLS and S/MIME, which are implemented at various 
layers on the TCP/IP protocol stack and can be used by many platforms and applications. The 
guidelines state that algorithm suites that use non-comparable strength algorithms are not 
recommended. The weakest link, i.e., weakest algorithm and used key size, determines the 
strength of the resultant protection of the system [5]. Clearly, this emphasis for comparable 
security strengths by NIST SP800-57 extends the requirements set for such cryptographic 
algorithms beyond their design to operational configuration among individual crypto primitives, 
that is, strength while in operation. A key question that arises is how to meet such a requirement 
for such algorithms that might be running on different TCP/IP layers, platforms, or applications 
of the security system? A more generic question would be how to meet the requirement of 
comparable security strengths across all controls in the security system? These questions lead to 
realising the importance of system-level, layered security architecture that captures the logical 
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 dynamics among controls with respect to both their strengths and failures, and for both designed 
and operational security.  
5) Furthermore, this work facilitates the segregation of expertise and analysis methods and tools 
required for each security boundary. That is, physical security engineers and attackers need 
knowledge and analysis tools mostly focused on the physical-specific domain to address issues 
such as hardware architectures and side-channel and differential attacks. The front-end boundary 
requires more expertise and tools in software architectures. The back-end boundary requires more 
knowledge of cross-layer messages in communication protocols. The comprehensive-security 
awareness boundary requires more tools and knowledge in analyzing the behavior of people and 
social engineering, and finally the Definite layer suggests that more exploitation is required into 
integrity elements among all types/classes of controls, including physical, technical, and 
administrative, and involving software, hardware, or people. 
The process dimension: This dimension is used to reflect the three fundamental security protection 
processes, i.e., prevention, detection, and recovery, on every abstraction of the system. In other 
words, controls can be classified according to these three processes and are assumed to be adequate 
on all relevant layers before a particular maturity level can be reached. This perspective is useful 
when examining the adequacy and deficiency of controls during security assessment exercises.  
The human dimension: This dimension is employed to reflect people’s interactions across security 
boundaries with respect to sophistication and visibility indices. The visibility index is used to depict 
the scope of exposure of such security controls on people, which generally increases as one moves 
down the hierarchy. The sophistication index represents the depth of knowledge, total cost of 
ownership (TCO), and management requirements, which increase moving up the hierarchy. Both the 
process and people dimensions are used to further explain the insights of the qualitative part of the 
model.  
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 Table  3-1: The ISMM model security boundaries and protection goals 
Conceptual boundary Layer Subsystem Protection goal 
definite Definite security 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5  convergence 
awareness Comprehensive security awareness 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4  Behaviour 
logical/technical 
Back-end security 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3  back-end information 
Front-end security 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2  front-end information 
physical Physical and environmental security 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1  physical assets 
 
3.7 ISMM Model Propositions 
In light of previous work and as part of our revision of the ISMM model, we revisit the model 
propositions so that maturity qualification can be represented by a mathematical figure in agreement 
with maturity concepts and common security principles. Doing so allows us, as shown later, to 
establish measurement methods extended from well-founded theories. The revised propositions are 
summarized in the following points. 
• There is an implicit layer at the bottom of the hierarchy, called ad-hoc security or level 0, 
meaning lack of any recognition of security issues and respective controls. This layer works as 
the floor for any security system. 
• Reachability (promotion) criteria: maturity at a given layer is reached by implementing adequate 
and quality prevention, detection, and recovery controls on that layer and its preceding layers, if 
they exist (principle of effectiveness). As a result, skipping levels violates maturity promotion 
criteria. 
• Diminishability (demotion) criteria: maturity at a given layer is compromised by any failure at its 
perimeter of information security, i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability, on that layer or its 
preceding layers (principle of easiest penetration). 
• If a lower-level security subsystem failure occurs for a given scenario, the maturity score 
immediately decreases to that level, or lower, according to its new measurement qualification 
(principle of weakest link). For instance, if the Layer-1 subsystem fails (perhaps because of 
failure of a non-redundant physical access control) in a system with level-3 maturity, then its 
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 maturity is immediately set to level-1 or lower (based on its new eligibility) until recovery 
processes complete and appropriate countermeasures are implemented. 
• Maturity promotion and demotion are based on the performance measures of choice and 
underlying maturity function, and defined mathematically accordingly. 
• The provided logical order does not necessarily mean a certain level requirement must be met 
fully before a subsequent level requirement arises. 
• Definite security is a continuous process, and therefore, can never be achieved completely. 
• Investment of resources on each security control, layer, and the system overall is optimized when 
balanced with the harm likely to result from relevant failure classes (principle of adequate 
protection). 
3.8 ISMM Mapping: Reliability Block Diagrams, Vectors, and Structures 
Functions 
In order to exploit the relationships between a security system and its individual constituents, i.e., 
security controls, the security system is first mapped into the context of the ISMM model. This 
mapping makes a transformation from the physical arrangement of the security system, represented 
by its set of controls, into the logical arrangement of the system with respect to failure, represented by 
five sets of controls, corresponding to the five ISMM subsystems. The output of this process leads to 
building ISMM reliability block diagrams, vectors, and structure functions, adopted from reliability 
theory. This transformation process represents a necessary step before subsequent mathematical 
representations and evaluation techniques, demonstrated in  Chapter 4 and  Chapter 5, can take place. 
The representation methods in particular are extended into our work for two main purposes: first, as 
applied in conventional reliability, these methods are used to show and analyse the effects of failure, 
and success, of any component in any ISMM structure. They can show how different controls’ 
failures (or successes) combine to cause ISMM-based structures, subsystems, and system failures (or 
successes). Thereby, they can be used for establishing reliability and availability measures of security 
systems. Second, they provide compact visual and mathematical representation suitable to reflect the 
ISMM-based logical hierarchy of a security system, including the arrangement of its controls with 
respect to the reference of interest, allowing the identification and enumeration of all possible states’ 
pathways. This representation is a multiple-level one that allows top-level RBDs, vectors, and 
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 structure functions to be decomposed into smaller items repeatedly, until they reach the level of 
abstraction of interest. Using this representation, various quantifier functions of other performance 
measures, beyond conventional reliability, can be defined, as explained later. 
The distinction between physical and logical arrangements of a system is important in deriving the 
proper mathematical representation used in the analysis. The physical arrangement is meant to reflect 
the actual arrangement between different security controls or components, whereby the logical 
arrangement is drawn with respect to the behaviour of the failure process of controls. This distinction 
results in cases where the logical arrangement of a system is not necessary the exact match to its 
physical arrangement. Translating the physical arrangement of security controls into logical network, 
however, requires a solid understanding of the system’s physical arrangement, its security functional 
requirements, and operational behaviour among its controls. For a given set of security controls, 
𝑪 = {𝐶𝐶𝑘,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛}, the actual functionality of each control 𝐶𝐶𝑘 determines its logical 
boundary domain, i.e., the corresponding layer on the ISMM model. Further technical details on each 
control, such as the kind of protection mechanism (prevention, detection, and/or recovery) along with 
the type of that control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, determines its logical arrangement within that layer. Analogical to defining 
logical arrangement in reliability theory, the security system is modelled as an interconnection of 
smaller parts, or controls, in series and parallel based on the failure model defined earlier. The 
following rules are used to define the logical arrangement between a structure of two controls, and 
consequently to build up the structures of individual subsystems and the overall system along the 
ISMM hierarchy: 
1. If failure of one control leads to the failure of the functions of the combination, the two 
controls are considered to be operating in a series arrangement. 
2. If failure of one control leads to the other control taking over the functions of the failed 
control, that is, the combination of functions continues, the two controls are considered to 
be operating in a parallel arrangement. 
Implementing this procedure on all controls of the security system, we obtain 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑘,𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛      𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑠 𝜆𝜆𝑜     ����������  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
                           𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 1, … ,5 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 
                               𝑗 = 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑆𝑆 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖, ( 3-1) 
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                               𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑆𝑆, 
                              𝑛𝑛 = ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖5𝑖𝑖=1 , 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑆𝑆. 
 
This step leads to building the ISMM model as depicted in Figure  3-6.  
 
Figure  3-6: Mapping security controls on ISMM Model 
 
Observe that the abstraction of a structure is employed to capture the logical interconnectivity 
between a set of controls at any level. At system-level, the security system is seen as a structure of 
order five, containing all 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆 structures, each of which is another structure of order 
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5; 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 denotes the number of security controls at 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. Further, the security 
controls can themselves be structures of smaller components and so forth until the smallest 
identifiable component level. This multiple-level decomposition is represented by 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = {𝑪𝒊𝒊 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5}  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖�  
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 ,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑗� ,  
and so on as moving into smaller levels of abstraction. 
{𝐶𝐶5,1,𝐶𝐶5,2,𝐶𝐶5,3, … ,𝐶𝐶5,𝑛𝑛5} Definite Security 
 {𝐶𝐶4,1,𝐶𝐶4,2,𝐶𝐶4,3, … ,𝐶𝐶4,𝑛𝑛4} Comprehensive Security Awareness 
 {𝐶𝐶3,1,𝐶𝐶3,2,𝐶𝐶3,3, … ,𝐶𝐶3,𝑛𝑛3} Back-end System Security 
 {𝐶𝐶2,1,𝐶𝐶2,2,𝐶𝐶2,3, … ,𝐶𝐶2,𝑛𝑛2} Front-end System Security 
 {𝐶𝐶1,1,𝐶𝐶1,2,𝐶𝐶1,3, … ,𝐶𝐶1,𝑛𝑛1} Physical and Environmental Security 
 
Layer 5 
Layer 4 
Layer 3 
Layer 2 
Layer 1 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 
  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 
  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 
  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 
  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 
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 To study the relationships between individual controls and subsystems, and their effect on the 
whole ISMM-based security system, one has to know how performance or failure of smaller 
components affects performance or failure of larger ones along the hierarchy of all structures of the 
system. To show this, we use binary state representation, where the component state equals 1 when it 
is functioning and 0 when it is non-functioning, allowing state vectors and structure functions to be 
constructed. 
We first introduce the so-called indicator, or Boolean, function 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 for control 𝑗 at layer 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 =1, … ,5 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, as used in reliability theory [48], [49], [104], [105], [113], [114], according 
to the following definition 
 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  ( 3-2) 
The vector 𝐱𝐢 = �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖  � is called the state vector with 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 coordinates for layer 𝑖𝑖 or 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. It shows the status of each security control at layer 𝑖𝑖 as either working or failed. So, 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 has 2𝑛𝑛𝑖 different states determined by the status of individual controls at layer 𝑖𝑖. Some 
of these 2𝑛𝑛𝑖 vectors will place the structure 𝐱𝐢 into a functioning state, and others will make it fail. To 
denote the states of structures, we further introduce the structure function ∅(𝐱𝐢) of the vector 𝐱𝐢 for 
the structure or 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as a whole, 
 ∅(𝐱𝐢) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  ( 3-3) 
Similar to the features of ( 2-1) and ( 2-2), ∅(𝐱𝐢) is a Boolean function of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗. In addition, ∅(𝐱𝐢) is a 
monotonic increasing function of the vector 𝐱𝐢, which means if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑 𝑗 =1, … , 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 ∅(𝐱𝐢) ≤ ∅(𝐲𝐢). 
A series system, or structure, will function if and only if all of its controls are functioning, whereas 
a parallel system needs only one of its controls to be functioning. For a pure series structure of 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, the structure function is written as 
 ∅(𝐱𝐢) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖  � = �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 ( 3-4) 
The pure series structure can be represented using the reliability block diagram as shown in 
Figure  3-7. 
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Figure  3-7: Subsystemi  representation of a series structure 
 
On the other hand, for a pure parallel structure for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, the structure function is written as 
 ∅(𝐱𝐢) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖  � = 1 −��1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗�𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 ( 3-5) 
And, the structure can be represented using a reliability block diagram, shown in Figure  3-8. 
 
 
Figure  3-8: Subsystemi  representation of a parallel structure 
 
Observe that both parallel and series structures are special cases of k-out-of-n structures (or voting 
systems). Such a structure functions if and only if at least k controls are functioning. Since ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗=1  
equals the number of functioning controls in 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, the structure function of the k-out-of-n 
structure is written by 
 ∅(𝐱𝐢) = �1, �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
≥ 𝑘0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 𝐼 ��𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗
𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
≥ 𝑘� ( 3-6) 
However, mixed structures are used to represent systems of mixed security controls as it is unlikely 
for systems in practice to consist only of either purely series or purely parallel structures. As 
𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊,𝟏𝟏 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊,𝟐𝟐 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊,𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊,𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,3 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1 
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 explained before, parallel-series structures are solved first for series structures, and then results are 
plugged into a parallel structure (Figure  3-9). For all 𝑛𝑛 components in each serial line, we first find 
 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑚 ,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2𝑚 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑚  � = �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗=1
 ( 3-7) 
Then we calculate higher-order subsystem structure function, 𝑺𝒊𝒊, as 
 ∅(𝐒𝒊𝒊) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,1,𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 � = 1 −��1 − 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗�𝑚𝑚
𝑗=1
 ( 3-8) 
 
 
Figure  3-9: Subsystemi  representation of a parallel-series mixed structure 
 
Series-parallel structures are solved first for parallel structures, and then results are plugged into a 
series structure (Figure  3-10). For all 𝑆𝑆 components in each parallel line we first find 
 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛 = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑛 ,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2𝑛 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑛  � = 1 −�(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛)𝑚𝑚
𝑗=1
 ( 3-9) 
Then we calculate higher-order subsystem structure function, 𝑺𝒊𝒊, as 
 ∅(𝐒𝒊𝒊) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,1,𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛 � = �𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑗=1
 ( 3-10) 
So, the general rule is that structures are reducible to smaller entities based on the same techniques 
used in reliability theory in order to make mathematical computations more compact and easier. 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑆𝑆 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2𝑆𝑆 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,3𝑆𝑆 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,13 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,23 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,33 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛3  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,12 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,22 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,32 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛2  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,11 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,21 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,31 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛1  
 
𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,1 
𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,2 
𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,3 
𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆 
(a) (b) 
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Figure  3-10: Subsystemi  representation of a series-parallel mixed structure 
 
While the above equations are presented for subsystem structures, they can be similarly used to 
encode smaller levels of structural abstractions. Also, 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑆𝑆 need not to always be equal in each 
row and column, respectively, in both mixed structures. However, the structure function ∅(𝐱𝐢) for 
each ISMM subsystem is required to be equal to 1 in order for that subsystem to be functioning.  
Additionally, following the logical connectivity rules mentioned earlier, the ISMM-based system-
level structure is defined by a series arrangement among its individual subsystems. In order for the 
security system, 𝑺, to be functioning, all subsystems 𝑺𝒊𝒊′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 5, need to be functioning. This 
arrangement makes a suitable relationship as security is measured by its weakest link. We call the 
vector 𝐱 = �∅(𝐱𝟏𝟏),∅(𝐱𝟐𝟐),∅(𝐱𝟑𝟑),∅(𝐱𝟒𝟒),∅(𝐱𝟓𝟓)� the state vector of ISMM-based security system 𝑺, 
representing the individual structure functions of the subsystems, showing the status of each 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as either working or failed. All possible states of the 5-tuple 𝐱 are determined by the 
individual values of its vertices. So, if we let ∅(𝐱) represent the structure of the whole security 
system, then 
 ∅(𝐱) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  ( 3-11) 
Moreover, since the structure of the whole system is represented by a pure series arrangement of 
individual subsystems, as illustrated in Figure  3-11, ∅(𝐱) is written as follows: 
 ∅(𝐱) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�∅(𝐱𝟏𝟏),∅(𝐱𝟐𝟐),∅(𝐱𝟑𝟑),∅(𝐱𝟒𝟒),∅(𝐱𝟓𝟓)� = �∅(𝐱𝐢)5
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 3-12) 
 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,11  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,21 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,31 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆1 
(a) (b) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,12  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,22 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,32 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆2 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,13  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,23 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,33 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆3 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,3𝑛𝑛 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 
𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,1 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,2 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,3 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛 
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Figure  3-11: ISMM-based security system logical representation 
 
Observe that the use of structure functions is not limited to defining the state of ISMM structures, 
subsystems, or system, but rather can be the basis for defining quantifier functions of ISMM-based 
performance measures. 
3.9 ISMM Measures 
The structure function ∅(. ) is central to the ISMM approach as it defines the relationships among 
controls that constitute every subsystem and consequent system overall. All quantifier functions for 
each performance measure of interest are defined subsequently based on this structure. Recall that 
structure functions deal with the study of the state of a control, subsystem, and system overall (e.g., 
functioning or non-functioning in binary systems), whereas quantifier functions deal with 
performance measures such as reliability and availability. We present specific properties of the 
structure function that are based on common properties found in traditional reliability engineering 
[48], [113], [114], [115] and multi-state systems analysis [118], [119], [125], [128], [129]. These 
properties are conditions necessary to ensure proper definition and application of ISMM quantifier 
functions, and are summarised into the following: 
1. ∅(. ) is commutative, that is, 
∅�x𝑖𝑖,1, … , x𝑖𝑖,𝑗, x𝑖𝑖,𝑗+1, … , x𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖� = ∅�x𝑖𝑖,1, … , x𝑖𝑖,𝑗+1, x𝑖𝑖,𝑗, … , x𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖� 
2. ∅(. ) is associative, that is, 
∅�x𝑖𝑖,1, … , x𝑖𝑖,𝑗, x𝑖𝑖,𝑗+1, … , x𝑛𝑛𝑖� = ∅�∅�x𝑖𝑖,1, … , x𝑖𝑖,𝑗�,∅�x𝑖𝑖,𝑗+1, … , x𝑛𝑛𝑖�� 
Note that commutativity and associativity are necessary to guarantee that changing 
the order or grouping of operands does not change the end product. ∅(. ) is commutative and 
associative across all abstraction levels. 
3. ∅(. ) is coherent [114], which is translated in our work by stating that the security system is 
coherent if and only if 1) the structure function ∅(. ) is nondecreasing in each argument 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 for 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏) ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐) ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑) ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒) ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓) 
81 
 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖; and 2) every control is relevant. This property can be further 
decomposed into the following conditions. At the subsystem’s abstraction level, 
a. ∅(𝟎𝒊𝒊) = 0, meaning 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is in a failure state when all controls fail 
b. ∅(𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊) = 1, meaning 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 works when all controls work 
c. If 𝐱𝒊𝒊 ≤ 𝐲𝒊𝒊 then ∅(𝐱𝒊𝒊) ≤ ∅(𝐲𝒊𝒊), meaning ∅(𝐱𝒊𝒊) in nondecreasing in each argument 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
d. There exists a vector 𝐱𝒊𝒊 such that 0 = ∅(0𝑖𝑖,𝑗, 𝐱𝒊𝒊) < ∅(1𝑖𝑖,𝑗, 𝐱𝒊𝒊) = 1. This means that for 
every control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 in 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, there exists a control state vector such that the state 
of the control dictates the state of the subsystem 𝑪𝒊𝒊,  
Note that the same conditions above apply across the hierarchy, e.g., 𝑪𝒊𝒊′𝑆𝑆 are relevant to 𝑪 and its 
structure function ∅(. ) is nondecreasing in each argument 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. 
4. The system controls are logically homogenous, meaning that all controls and the overall system 
itself have the same number of distinguished states with respect to the measure of interest. This 
is important to ensure that the same quantifier functions can be applied to all controls. 
5. System configuration is based on simple structures, which are structures that can be reduced to 
any combination of series and parallel models with independent controls.  
The properties (1) to (3) above are based on common properties assumed in most of studies on 
structure functions in reliability theory and the generalization in MSS and UGF [117], [119], 
[130]. The assumptions (4) and (5) are necessary to unify the demonstrated models and 
simplify calculations, and so ensure that the mathematical representation demonstrated here 
applies directly without the need for any additional transformation steps. Thus, the examples 
demonstrate binary systems in addition to providing model representation for multi-state 
systems. Analysis of complex structures, however, such as bridge and delta structures, can be 
found in [47], [115], [116] using more complicated techniques, which fall outside the 
contribution of this work. Observe that such techniques used in reliability theory in general can 
be readily adoptable to this work.  
As used in reliability and MSS analysis, a proper quantifier function must unambiguously define 
the rules for estimating the performance of the measure of interest. The definition of such a function 
strictly depends on the logical arrangement between controls in the system and the physical nature of 
the performance measure of interest. 
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 3.10 Maturity Function  
The maturity notion is extended in this work at many levels; in particular, 1) it allows the integrated 
quantification of both qualitative aspects and quantitative measures to be captured on the same model 
foundation. 2) The precedence introduced is different than the order used in traditional maturity 
models: in the latter, layers are used to define the order of fulfillment in an abstract way; while in our 
work it is more of a precedence defined by the effect of existence of controls and impact of their 
absence or failure. This property pictures the security phenomena into a game-theoretic behavior 
between defenders and opponents, thus signifying the priority of fulfillment with respect to the two 
worlds. 3) Structures are introduced to add another dimension of scalability and application, 
representing logical relationships among the set of items or objects in every layer. 4) The 
boundedness property applies to controls, subsystems, and the overall system individually and 
collectively. 
The qualification of maturity to a certain ISMM-based security level, as mentioned in the main 
propositions of the ISMM model, is determined by the consecutive adequacy from the lowest layer in 
the hierarchy of precedence to the layer of maturity. Adequacy means security controls are resilient 
and effective at the qualified maturity level and all its preceding layers, so that the logical precedence 
and aggregation of security boundaries is preserved. The subjectivity aspect of the notion adequate is 
modeled quantitatively according to the performance measure(s) of interest, so it can be well 
identified, evaluated, and measured in a consistent manner.  
This setup mathematically means that the performance measures need to be equal or higher than the 
predefined adequacy lower bounds. Examples of such measures include, but are not limited to, 
reliability and availability measures. In the case of maturity based on multiple measures, however, 
various adequacy functions can be applied; for instance, the acceptance test method, where the 
maturity test is defined based on whether every measure is equal or more than its minimum bound; 
the weighted average method, where the average of measures is checked against a combined average 
minimum bound; the voting method, where the number of successful checks is compared to a 
minimum bound on successful votes; or the geometric mean, where the central tendency among the 
set of measures is computed, thus making a good measure for finding a single outcome out of several 
heterogeneous sources, which is commonly applied in various evaluation exercises in the computing 
field [153].  
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 In either case, maturity is a composite value determined by the results of the performance measures 
in use, taking the general form 
 ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ℱ(ℳ1,ℳ2, … ,ℳ𝑙) ( 3-13) 
where each maturity measure ℳ𝑘 satisfies 
 
ℳ𝑘 = max(𝑆𝑆) 𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡. M𝑖𝑖𝑘 ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑�M𝑖𝑖𝑘�,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑆𝑆; 
𝑆𝑆 = 1, … ,5;𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑙. ( 3-14) 
Alternatively, using the acceptability function, 
 ℳ𝑘 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧max (𝑆𝑆), �� 𝐼 �M𝑖𝑖𝑘 ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑�M𝑖𝑖𝑘��𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖𝑘=1
� = 1 0,                      𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒                                                    ( 3-15) 
The following algorithm can be used to find the maturity ℳ𝑘 for every measure 𝑘 
1. Input: M𝑖𝑖𝑘 for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 
2. Output: ℳ𝑘 
3. Initialization: ℳ𝑘 = 0 
4. for m=1 to 5 do 
5. if  ∏ 𝐼�M𝑖𝑖𝑘 ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑�M𝑖𝑖𝑘��𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑘=1  
6. then ℳ𝑘 ← 𝑆𝑆 
7. else return ℳ𝑘 
8. end for 
9. return ℳ𝑘 
The condition in the maturity test above is necessary to fulfill the logic of the essential layering 
principle of the ISMM model, which basically reflects the precedence of logical security boundaries 
and associated dimensions and propositions. Observe that the merit in mentioning multiple adequacy 
functions is to indicate that the ISMM approach facilitates different kinds of measures so that the 
most suitable yet consistent one is applied, especially in the case of multiple performance measures, 
as they are meant to reflect different performance capabilities of the system. 
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 The essence of this work, however, is based on the reliability measure due to its realised 
significance in reliability engineering for decades as a key performance measure for evaluating 
systems’ operational capability and its useful applications in the security field. Therefore, to 
demonstrate maturity quantification and its application in security engineering, we approach the 
reliability measure through common methods and techniques found in reliability engineering and 
MSS evaluation using the UGF method. We restrict ourselves to the reliability measure in the 
definition of maturity function. 
The use of the reliability measure means, regardless of the approach used, the computed reliability 
of security controls at every qualified layer, i.e., subsystem’s reliability 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, is required to be equal or 
higher than the predefined adequacy or lower bound 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 to meet the maturity condition for that layer. 
In mathematical form, 
 
ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ℳ𝑅 = max(𝑆𝑆) 𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡.𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑆𝑆;𝑆𝑆 = 1, … ,5. ( 3-16) 
We believe maturity for a given system is a relative aspect that defines the relationship between a 
particular capability of the system and its respective demand (i.e., the intended performance goal). 
For a reliability measure as an example, we define maturity as the relative distance between the actual 
reliability value and the expected reliability demand of the system, representing the intended goal we 
are willing to accept (i.e., minimum acceptable bound of reliability). This view applies analogically to 
other performance measures. 
3.11 Case Study 
3.11.1 Evaluation Process 
To demonstrate the ISMM modeling approach, including the application of reliability engineering 
presented in  Chapter 4 and the Multi-state System (MSS) representation and Universal Generating 
Function (UGF) presented in  Chapter 5, we set up a case study that represents a common scenario of 
security systems protecting enterprise-level computing environments. The selected controls in this 
example, however, are mostly compiled from best practices and recommendations for security 
controls, such as those published by the SANS institute [162] and NIST SP 800-53 publication [163].  
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 The evaluation process follows the general procedure used in reliability engineering, such as the 
one described in [47], besides the addition to accommodate the ISMM approach. It can be broken into 
three main steps: 
1. Construction phase. Three main tasks are performed here: i) the problem of interest is described 
including the failure profile. ii) The ISMM-based system model is built, mapping a system’s 
physical arrangement into its logical arrangement, including state vectors, reliability block 
diagrams, and structure functions. iii) The corresponding maturity bounds are established. Task 
(i) is presented in Section  3.11.2, and (ii) and (iii) are presented in Section  3.11.3. 
2. Processing or analysis phase. The values of the selected performance measures are calculated, 
which might involve some solution tools or approximations, particularly for complicated 
scenarios. This step is an approach-specific one. Thus, in  Chapter 4 the following combinatorial 
methods are presented: minimal path set, minimal cut set, modeling based on random events, 
modeling based on time-independent random variables, and modeling based on time-dependent 
random variables. In  Chapter 5, MSS representation and the corresponding UGF method are 
presented. 
3. Evaluation and interpretation phase. The results of the analysis phase are validated using 
statistical techniques and comparisons with previous states of the system or other similar systems, 
allowing possible improvements of the system to be concluded. The analysis, based on the 
reliability approach and MSS UGF method, is presented in  Chapter 4 and  Chapter 5, respectively. 
3.11.2 System Description 
Consider a computing environment that is based on a web-based application model, consisting of 
multiple web servers, applications, and database platforms secured in one premise. The protection of 
this computing environment requires the implementation of a security system that consists of multiple 
types of security controls, including physical, technical, and administrative controls, totalling thirty- 
three controls. The physical layout of this security system is depicted in Figure  3-12.  
For computer security of application-level access, a redundant control is implemented for 
application software, a dedicated control for protecting access from wireless devices, and 2-out-of-3 
redundant controls to protect web servers and meet their demand threshold before they can be 
considered in a failure state. For computer security of underlying networking infrastructure (i.e., 
back-end resources), two external firewalls and one internal firewall are used to set up the DMZ zone 
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 over the web servers. A redundant database-level security control is implemented over the database 
platforms. Two administrative workstations are dedicated to monitoring and controlling access 
privileges of the system resources working in active redundancy mode. In addition, the underlying 
network traffic is protected by a control for malware defences and Intrusion Prevention/Detection 
Systems (IPS/IDS) for the protection of inbound and outbound network traffic. For physical security 
of the overall system, assume redundant controls in the form of surveillance systems (i.e., CCTVs), 
redundant locks, redundant mantraps, and redundant fences to protect the physical boundary of the 
entire premises. For security of the human-factor, the organization implements a consolidated social 
engineering awareness program, continuous training for users, and a dedicated personnel security 
control (i.e., screening, termination, third-party access agreement, etc.), in addition to the governance 
of organization-wide security policies and procedures. For other organization-wide governance and 
assurance controls, the organization performs vulnerability assessment and penetration testing across 
all controls of all types, in addition to sustaining risk assessment controls, compliance procedures, 
incident response and management controls, and accounting and auditing controls. 
Assume independence among all the controls and the active redundancy mode for redundant 
controls. The complete set of controls classified according to their type is outlined in Table  3-2. 
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Figure  3-12: Physical layout of the ISMM case study5 
 
Table  3-2: Security controls of the ISMM case study 
Control 
No. 
Name Type Redundancy ISMM Security boundary 
𝐶𝐶1  CCTVs Physical double Physical and environmental 
𝐶𝐶2  Locks Physical double Physical and environmental 
5 Note that the physical layout reflects technical controls inside the inner dotted box, physical controls 
surrounding the technical controls, and administrative controls surrounding the whole computing environment 
in the outer dotted box. There is no particular arrangement for both types of physical and administrative controls 
in the physical sense.  
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 𝐶𝐶3  Mantraps Physical double Physical and environmental 
𝐶𝐶4  Fences Physical double Physical and environmental 
𝐶𝐶5  Application software Technical Double Front-end 
𝐶𝐶6  Web servers Technical 2-out-of-3 Front-end 
𝐶𝐶7  Wireless client access Technical None Front-end 
𝐶𝐶8  External firewalls Technical Double Back-end 
𝐶𝐶9  Administrative workstations Technical Double Back-end 
𝐶𝐶10  Database platforms access Technical Double Back-end 
𝐶𝐶11  Malware defences Technical Double Back-end 
𝐶𝐶12  Internal firewall Technical None Back-end 
𝐶𝐶13  Network Technical None Back-end 
𝐶𝐶14  IPS/IDS Technical None Back-end 
𝐶𝐶15  Social engineering Administrative None Comprehensive awareness 
𝐶𝐶16  Training Administrative None Comprehensive awareness 
𝐶𝐶17  Policies & procedures Administrative None Comprehensive awareness 
𝐶𝐶18  Personnel security Administrative None Comprehensive awareness 
𝐶𝐶19  Penetration testing & vulnerability 
assessment (VA) 
Administrative None Definite security 
𝐶𝐶20  Risk assessment Administrative None Definite security 
𝐶𝐶21  Compliance procedures Administrative None Definite security 
𝐶𝐶22  Incident response & management Administrative None Definite security 
𝐶𝐶23  Auditing & accountability Administrative None Definite security 
 
3.11.3 ISMM Mapping: RBDs, Vectors, and Structure Functions 
Before proceeding to any mathematical modeling, we need to establish some definitions, 
assumptions, and bounds as common grounds for subsequent reliability and maturity analysis. First, 
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 the failure definition is central to building reliability function regardless of the application. Recall that 
complete failure is not a necessary condition for considering a control in failure state; rather, not 
performing the intended function is what determines the failure state. Similarly, this applies to the 
context of security controls using impact of failure statistics explained in Section  3.5. For instance, 
the probability of failure for CCTVs control 𝐶𝐶1 can be defined by 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶1)  = 𝑃𝑃("inability of CCTVs to perform the intended surveillance function") 
And as an example of technical controls, say web servers 𝐶𝐶6 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶6)  = 𝑃𝑃("failure of web servers access controls") 
And as an example of administrative control, say incident response and management 𝐶𝐶21 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶21)  
𝑃𝑃("failure of IR procedures to control attacks within the scope of the organization threats and 
vulnerabilities") 
A common method, however, that is widely used in reliability statistics to find the mean time to 
failure 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 of an item is the sample mean (empirical mean), which can be calculated as  MTTF = (𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑡𝑡2 + ⋯+ 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛)/𝑛𝑛, where 𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 are observed failure-free operating times of 
statistically identical items. Observe that for constant failure rate 𝜆𝜆, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 = 1/𝜆𝜆.  
Traditionally, when the failure model is being built, failure datasets are estimated in different ways: 
i) statistical data about historical failures of components, ii) government and commercial data, iii) 
field datasets, iv) experimental data, or v) expert knowledge and reasonable assumptions. In this 
work, for the reasons explained in Section  2.1.5, we consider expert knowledge compiled from best 
practices and reasonable assumptions in outlining controls and building the case study. 
Second, the specification of a time interval for this scenario is assumed to be one week. Thus, the 
probability functions and physical interpretations are based on this period. Third, the environmental 
conditions of the system under consideration such as humidity and temperatures are not specified as 
we do not have failure datasets of individual controls, which are commonly available in traditional 
reliability analysis of electronic systems. Fourth, the ISMM-specific bounds are established to reflect 
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 the performance measure of interest: reliability. Observe that these bounds can be design parameters 
of the system under study, and hence may differ accordingly. They can be used in a way similar to 
that of nines in engineering; for instance, the term “three nines” means reliability figure of 0.999 and 
“five nines” means 0.99999. The use of such terms, however, has progressed to establish commonly-
accepted benchmark figures for various systems. In this case study, we assume that the individual 
subsystems have the minimum reliability bounds outlined in Table  3-3. 
 
Table  3-3: ISMM-based reliability minimum bounds 
Performance measure 
at 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒊 
Minimum bound 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅1 𝑟𝑟1 = 0.97 
𝑅𝑅2 𝑟𝑟2 = 0.93 
𝑅𝑅3 𝑟𝑟3 = 0.90 
𝑅𝑅4 𝑟𝑟4 = 0.86 
𝑅𝑅5 𝑟𝑟5 = 0.80 
 
The information presented above, i.e., the case study description and associated conditions and 
bounds, can be compiled during security assessment tasks of the system under study, perhaps as part 
of a risk assessment exercise. This information, however, facilitates the mapping of the problem from 
its physical arrangement into the ISMM-based logical arrangement. Such mapping facilitates defining 
state vectors, reliability block diagrams, and structure functions, as follows. 
A total of eight controls, represented by four different classes of controls exhibiting double active 
redundancy in a binary system, are mapped to Layer-1, which is the physical and environmental 
security boundary. As such, Subsystem1 can have up to 28 different permutations of control-level 
states. 
The corresponding reliability block diagram is depicted in Figure  3-13. Thus, Subsystem1 is 
represented directly by the state vector 𝐱𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7,𝑥𝑥1,8�, and the 
structure function is written as 
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 ∅(𝐱𝟏𝟏) = max�𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,2�max�𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,4�max�𝑥𝑥1,5, 𝑥𝑥1,6�max�𝑥𝑥1,7,𝑥𝑥1,8� = �1 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥1,1��1 − 𝑥𝑥1,2���1 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥1,3��1 − 𝑥𝑥1,4���1 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥1,5��1 − 𝑥𝑥1,6���1
− �1 − 𝑥𝑥1,7��1 − 𝑥𝑥1,8�� = (𝑥𝑥1,1 + 𝑥𝑥1,2 − 𝑥𝑥1,1𝑥𝑥1,2) (𝑥𝑥1,3 + 𝑥𝑥1,4 − 𝑥𝑥1,3𝑥𝑥1,4)(𝑥𝑥1,5 + 𝑥𝑥1,6 − 𝑥𝑥1,5𝑥𝑥1,6)(𝑥𝑥1,7 + 𝑥𝑥1,8
− 𝑥𝑥1,7𝑥𝑥1,8) 
 
x1,1 
x1,2 
x1,3
x1,4
x1,5
x1,6
x1,7
x1,8CCTVs locks mantraps fences
 
Figure  3-13: RBD for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 
 
Similarly, the reliability block diagram for Subsystem2 is established in Figure  3-14 and 
represented by the vector 𝐱𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,2,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,4, 𝑥𝑥2,5 ,𝑥𝑥2,6�. The corresponding structure function 
is written as 
∅(𝐱𝟐𝟐) = max�𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,2�max�𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,4, 𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,4𝑥𝑥2,5� 𝑥𝑥2,6  = �1 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥2,1��1 − 𝑥𝑥2,2���1 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,4��1 − 𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,5��1 − 𝑥𝑥2,4𝑥𝑥2,5��𝑥𝑥2,6  = �𝑥𝑥2,1 + 𝑥𝑥2,2 − 𝑥𝑥2,1𝑥𝑥2,2��𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,4 + 𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,5 + 𝑥𝑥2,4𝑥𝑥2,5 − 2𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,4𝑥𝑥2,5� 𝑥𝑥2,6  
 
x2,3 x2,6x2,4x2,2 x2,5 wirelessclientsapplication sw 2-out-of-3web servers
x2,1
 
Figure  3-14: RBD for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 
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 The reliability block diagram for Subsystem3 is depicted in Figure  3-15, and represented by the 
vector 𝐱𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,2,𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,5,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10�. Its structure function is written as 
∅(𝐱𝟑𝟑) = max�𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,2�max�𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,4�max�𝑥𝑥3,5,𝑥𝑥3,6� 𝑥𝑥3,7𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9𝑥𝑥3,10  = �1 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥3,1��1 − 𝑥𝑥3,2���1 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥3,3��1 − 𝑥𝑥3,4���1 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥3,5��1 − 𝑥𝑥3,6�� 𝑥𝑥3,7 𝑥𝑥3,8𝑥𝑥3,9𝑥𝑥3,10 = �𝑥𝑥3,1 + 𝑥𝑥3,2 − 𝑥𝑥3,1𝑥𝑥3,2��𝑥𝑥3,3 + 𝑥𝑥3,4 − 𝑥𝑥3,3𝑥𝑥3,4��𝑥𝑥3,5 + 𝑥𝑥3,6 − 𝑥𝑥3,5𝑥𝑥3,6�𝑥𝑥3,7𝑥𝑥3,8𝑥𝑥3,9𝑥𝑥3,10  
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Figure  3-15: RBD for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 
 
The reliability block diagram for Subsystem4 is shown in Figure  3-16, and is represented by the 
vector 𝐱𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥4,1,𝑥𝑥4,2�, where its structure function is written as 
∅(𝐱𝟒𝟒) = min�𝑥𝑥4,1,𝑥𝑥4,2,𝑥𝑥4,3,𝑥𝑥4,4� = 𝑥𝑥4,1𝑥𝑥4,2𝑥𝑥4,3𝑥𝑥4,4  
 
x4,2 x4,3 x4,4x4,1 training policies & procedures personnelsecuritysocialengineering  
Figure  3-16: RBD for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 
 
And finally the reliability block diagram for Subsystem5 is shown in Figure  3-17, and is 
represented by the vector 𝐱𝟓𝟓 = �𝑥𝑥5,1,𝑥𝑥5,2,𝑥𝑥5,3,𝑥𝑥5,4, 𝑥𝑥5,5�. The corresponding structure function is 
written as 
∅(𝐱𝟓𝟓) = 𝑥𝑥5,1𝑥𝑥5,2𝑥𝑥5,3𝑥𝑥5,4𝑥𝑥5,5  
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 x5,2 x5,3 x5,4 x5,5x5,1 risk assessment compliance procedures incident response auditing & accountabilitypenetration testing & VA  
Figure  3-17: RBD for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 
 
Now, to reflect these functions at the ISMM-based system level, recall the vector 𝐱 =
�∅(𝐱𝟏𝟏),∅(𝐱𝟐𝟐),∅(𝐱𝟑𝟑),∅(𝐱𝟒𝟒),∅(𝐱𝟓𝟓)�, which represents the state vector of the ISMM model for the 
whole security system and is formulated by 
∅(𝐱) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�∅(𝐱𝟏𝟏),∅(𝐱𝟐𝟐),∅(𝐱𝟑𝟑),∅(𝐱𝟒𝟒),∅(𝐱𝟓𝟓)�  
 = ∏ ∅(𝐱𝐢)5𝑖𝑖=1 = �𝑥𝑥1,1 + 𝑥𝑥1,2 − 𝑥𝑥1,1𝑥𝑥1,2��𝑥𝑥1,3 + 𝑥𝑥1,4 − 𝑥𝑥1,3𝑥𝑥1,4� �𝑥𝑥1,5 + 𝑥𝑥1,6 − 𝑥𝑥1,5𝑥𝑥1,6��𝑥𝑥1,7 +
𝑥𝑥1,8 − 𝑥𝑥1,7𝑥𝑥1,8� �𝑥𝑥2,1 + 𝑥𝑥2,2 − 𝑥𝑥2,1𝑥𝑥2,2��𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,4 + 𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,5 + 𝑥𝑥2,4𝑥𝑥2,5 − 2𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,4𝑥𝑥2,5� 𝑥𝑥2,6�𝑥𝑥3,1 +
𝑥𝑥3,2 − 𝑥𝑥3,1𝑥𝑥3,2��𝑥𝑥3,3 + 𝑥𝑥3,4 − 𝑥𝑥3,3𝑥𝑥3,4��𝑥𝑥3,5 + 𝑥𝑥3,6 −
𝑥𝑥3,5𝑥𝑥3,6�𝑥𝑥3,7𝑥𝑥3,8𝑥𝑥3,9𝑥𝑥3,10𝑥𝑥4,1𝑥𝑥4,2𝑥𝑥4,3𝑥𝑥4,4𝑥𝑥5,1𝑥𝑥5,2𝑥𝑥5,3𝑥𝑥5,4𝑥𝑥5,5  
Mapping all subsystems onto the ISMM model leads to building the overall system structure as 
depicted in Figure  3-18. Observe that the system structure can have up to 25 different permutations of 
subsystem-level states, consisting of another lower-level abstraction of 233 different permutations of 
control-level states. 
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Figure  3-18: ISMM-based system-level RBD of the case study 
 
3.12 Summary 
In this chapter, we have introduced the abstraction of a computing system into assets and controls, a 
conceptual perspective that can be employed for various studies involving the interaction between 
these two classes. The abstraction is useful in examining the security element from both economical 
and operational perspectives. Second, we have introduced a failure model based on the impact of 
failures consequent to malicious and/or nonmalicious causes. We have also discussed the importance 
of addressing the impact of failure in defining failure models for security studies, which can lead to 
building a plausible statistical domain of the security failure problem. Third, we have presented the 
revised version of the ISMM model, explaining its architecture, propositions, and mapping process 
into RBDs, vectors, and structure functions. We have then presented common properties of model 
measures and how to build the maturity function quantitatively. The model allows us to identify and 
capture conceivable structural relationships of security controls, and so build the logical network of 
the security system.  
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 Chapter 4 
Reliability-theoretic ISMM-based Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade or so, new research has extended concepts and models from dependability 
theory into security studies [7], [8], [9], [20], [20], [21], [27], [73], [86], [98], [99], [100]. Following 
the representation approach of the security system presented in the previous chapter, we present 
herein several reliability-theoretic analysis methods to study dependability and maturity of security 
systems. In particular, we extend the application of minimal path method, minimal cut method, and 
reliability analysis, and then show how to establish the maturity function accordingly. 
The adoption of such methods is mainly based on earlier reliability studies, such as those in [48], 
[49], [80], [104], [105], [113], [114], [120]. We use SHARPE tool [68] to build and compute the 
resulting numerical values. More complicated techniques, however, such as reliability heuristics and 
approximation methods [47], [104], [113], [115], [120], and simulation (such as those explained in 
[34], [36]) can be used for complex scenarios. Such methods should be applied naturally, observing 
that the purpose is not to advance reliability analysis methods themselves, but rather to advance 
security analysis by adopting such methods. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section  4.2 analyzes the security system 
using minimal path and cut methods, showing which sets lead to the functioning and failure states of 
the security system. For completeness, reliability modeling starts in Section  4.3 based on basic 
random events of controls failures. Section  4.4 then presents reliability analysis based on random 
variables, considering cases of both static probabilities of failure and dynamic, i.e., time-dependent, 
probabilities of failure along with maturity analysis. In each method, the model formulations and 
demonstrative examples use the case study in Section  3.11. 
4.2 Minimal Path and Minimal Cut Sets 
4.2.1 Model Formulation 
In a similar manner to their use in traditional reliability analysis, minimal path and minimal cut sets 
are adopted in ISMM-based reliability analysis. We define a minimal path set for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as the 
minimum set of security controls required to ensure the functioning state of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. 
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 Consequently, a minimal cut set for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the minimum set of security controls whose 
failure leads directly to the failure of the whole 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. Minimal path sets and minimal cut sets 
allow us to represent a security system as a parallel-series structure and a series-parallel structure, 
respectively. In this part, we demonstrate the extended mathematical representation at the subsystem 
level first, noting that it is applicable to encoding smaller levels of structural abstraction. Then we 
demonstrate the representation at the ISMM-system level. 
For a state vector 𝐱𝐢 to be called a path vector for layer 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,5, it is required to have ∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) =1. It is also said to be a minimal path vector if ∅(𝒚𝒊𝒊) = 0 for all 𝒚𝒊𝒊 < 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘 ,𝑘 =1, …𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑘 < 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘  𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘�. The set 𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒌 = �𝑘: 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘 = 1�  is also called a minimal path set. 
Now, for a given 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, let 𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝟏𝟏,𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝟐𝟐, … ,𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒔 denote the minimal path sets. We define a new 
Boolean function ∝𝑖𝑖,𝑗 (𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) of the jth minimal path set for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as follows, 
 
∝𝑖𝑖,𝑗 (𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑆𝑆 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒋 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒   = � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘
𝑘∈𝑨𝑖,𝑗  
( 4-1) 
Thus, to ensure that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is functioning, we need at least one of its minimal path sets where 
all the controls are functioning. This leads to conclude the following relationship. 
 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∝𝑖𝑖,𝑗 (𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = 1 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑗0, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∝𝑖𝑖.𝑗 (𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = 0 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗  = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 ∝𝑖𝑖,𝑗 (𝐱𝐢) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘
𝑘∈𝑨𝑖,𝑗  
( 4-2) 
Furthermore, a state vector 𝐱𝐢 is called a cut vector for layer 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,5, if ∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = 0 and a 
minimal cut vector if ∅(𝒚𝒊𝒊) = 1 for all 𝒚𝒊𝒊 > 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊. The set 𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒌 = �𝑘: 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘 = 0� is then called a minimal 
cut set. Now, for a given 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 let 𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝟏𝟏,𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝟐𝟐, … ,𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒒 denote the minimal cut sets. We introduce 
a new Boolean function 𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝐱𝐢) of the jth minimal cut set for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as follows, 
 
𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒋 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔0, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑘∈𝑪𝑖,𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘 ( 4-3) 
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 As a result, to ensure that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is functioning using cut sets, we need at least one control 
from each of its minimal cut sets to be in a functioning state. In other words, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is not 
functioning if and only if all the controls of at least one minimal cut set are not functioning. This 
leads us to the following relationship. 
 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = �𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊)𝑞
𝑗=1
 
= �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑘∈𝑪𝑖,𝑗𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘 ( 4-4) 
Applying the above definitions at ISMM-system level, we conclude that the set of individual layer 
subsystems together represents the only existing minimal path set, whereas each individual subsystem 
represents a minimal cut set, consisting of one element. This conclusion is because of the pure series 
arrangement assumption among these subsystems (subsystems 1 to 5) to ensure the overall security 
system in a functioning state. In other words, the security system is not functioning in the case of 
failure of any of its subsystems. The minimal path set is represented by 
 𝑨𝟏𝟏 = {∅(𝐱𝟏𝟏),∅(𝐱𝟐𝟐),∅(𝐱𝟑𝟑),∅(𝐱𝟒𝟒),∅(𝐱𝟓𝟓)} ( 4-5) 
And the five single-element minimal cut sets are 
 𝑪𝟏𝟏 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏)},𝑪𝟐𝟐 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐)},𝑪𝟑𝟑 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑)},𝑪𝟒𝟒 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒)},𝑪𝟓𝟓 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓)} ( 4-6) 
As a result, ∅(𝐱) for system-level in terms of minimal path set representation is given by 
 
∅(𝒙𝒙) = ��𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 ∝𝑖𝑖,𝑗 (𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊)�5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
= ��𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘
𝑘∈𝑨𝑖,𝑗 �
5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 4-7) 
or 
 
∅(𝒙𝒙) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑨𝟏𝟏)} = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓)} ( 4-8) 
Also, ∅(𝐱) in terms of minimal cut set representation is given by 
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∅(𝒙𝒙) = ���𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊)𝑞
𝑗=1
�
5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
= ���𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑘∈𝑪𝑖,𝑗𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘�5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 4-9) 
This also leads to 
 
∅(𝒙𝒙) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 {𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑪𝟏𝟏) ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑪𝟐𝟐) ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑪𝟑𝟑) ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑪𝟒𝟒) ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑪𝟓𝟓) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓)} ( 4-10) 
Minimal path and cut sets are useful tools for analyzing the critical security controls in the overall 
system structure where sensitivity analysis can be performed more efficiently. Minimal path sets and 
minimal cut sets representations can provide information about the lower bounds of controls required 
to ensure ISMM structures’ functionality state and failure state, respectively. Both minimal sets can 
also be useful in constructing the system structure backward, as they provide an easy way to describe 
the behaviour of the system. Therefore, the adoption of such sets is deemed beneficial to studying 
security systems in that they help in identifying the weakest link in the chain more efficiently. 
4.2.2 Example 
Recall that a minimal path set for subsystemi is defined as the minimum set of security controls 
required to ensure the functionality state of subsystemi. A minimal cut set for subsystemi is the 
minimum set of security controls whose failure directly causes the failure of the whole subsystemi. 
These sets are applied to individual ISMM subsystems and the system as a whole. We use the case 
study presented in Section  3.11 to demonstrate this method. We first present a subsystem-level 
minimal path and cut sets and associated structure functions, followed by the consequent system-level 
representation. Subsystem1 has sixteen minimal path sets, namely,  
𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,7�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,8�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7�, 
𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,8�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟓𝟓 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,7�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟔 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,8�, 
𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟕 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟖 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,8�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟗 = �𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,7�, 
𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏𝟎 = �𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,8�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,8�, 
𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,7�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,8�,𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏𝟓𝟓 = �𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7�, 
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 𝑨𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏𝟔 = �𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7�. 
These are combined with four minimal cut sets, namely,  
𝑪𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,2�,𝑪𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,4�,𝑪𝟏𝟏,𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,6�,𝑪𝟏𝟏,𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥1,7,𝑥𝑥1,8�.  
Recall that the above representation of minimal path sets and minimal cut sets allows one to 
represent individual subsystems as a parallel-series structure and a series-parallel structure, 
respectively. As such, subsystem1, as a parallel-series structure of its minimal path sets, is 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥1,𝑗 ∝1,𝑗 (𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥1,𝑗 � 𝑥𝑥1,𝑘
𝑘∈𝑨1,𝑗  = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 {𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥1,1, 𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,7),𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥1,1, 𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,5, 𝑥𝑥1,8),𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,6, 𝑥𝑥1,7), 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,8� ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,7� ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,8� , 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7� ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,8� ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,7� , 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,8� ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7� ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,8� , 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,7� ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,8� ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,6,𝑥𝑥1,7� , 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥1,2,𝑥𝑥1,4,𝑥𝑥1,6, 𝑥𝑥1,7) } 
and when represented as a series-parallel structure of its minimal cut sets leads to 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏) = �𝛽1,𝑗(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏)𝑞
𝑗=1
= �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑘∈𝑪1,𝑗𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑥1,𝑘 = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥1,1,𝑥𝑥1,2),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥1,3,𝑥𝑥1,4),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥1,5,𝑥𝑥1,6),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥1,7,𝑥𝑥1,8)} 
This technique applies similarly to the remaining ISMM subsystems. Doing so, subsystem2 has 
six minimal path sets. These are 
𝑨𝟐𝟐,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,4, 𝑥𝑥2,6�,𝑨𝟐𝟐,𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,6�,𝑨𝟐𝟐,𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,4,𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,6� 
𝑨𝟐𝟐,𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥2,2,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,4, 𝑥𝑥2,6�,𝑨𝟐𝟐,𝟓𝟓 = �𝑥𝑥2,2,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,6�,𝑨𝟐𝟐,𝟔 = �𝑥𝑥2,2,𝑥𝑥2,4,𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,6�. 
and three minimal cut sets,  
 𝑪𝟐𝟐,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,2�,𝑪𝟐𝟐,𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,4, 𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,4𝑥𝑥2,5�,𝑪𝟐𝟐,𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥2,6�. 
These results lead to defining ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐) in terms of minimal sets, 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 {𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,4,𝑥𝑥2,6) ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,6),𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,4,𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,6), 
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 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥2,2,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,4,𝑥𝑥2,6) ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥2,2,𝑥𝑥2,3,𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,6) ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥2,2,𝑥𝑥2,4,𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,6)} 
and in terms of minimal cut sets, 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥2,1,𝑥𝑥2,2),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,4, 𝑥𝑥2,3𝑥𝑥2,5,𝑥𝑥2,4𝑥𝑥2,5),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥2,6)} Subsystem3 has eight minimal path sets. These are 
𝑨𝟑𝟑,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,5, 𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9, 𝑥𝑥3,10�,𝑨𝟑𝟑,𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥3,1, 𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10�, 
𝑨𝟑𝟑,𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,5, 𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9, 𝑥𝑥3,10�,𝑨𝟑𝟑,𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥3,1, 𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10�, 
𝑨𝟑𝟑,𝟓𝟓 = �𝑥𝑥3,2,𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,5, 𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9, 𝑥𝑥3,10�,𝑨𝟑𝟑,𝟔 = �𝑥𝑥3,2, 𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10�, 
𝑨𝟑𝟑,𝟕 = �𝑥𝑥3,2,𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,5, 𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9, 𝑥𝑥3,10�,𝑨𝟑𝟑,𝟖 = �𝑥𝑥3,2, 𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10�. 
These are combined with seven minimal cut sets, namely, 
𝑪𝟑𝟑,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,2�,𝑪𝟑𝟑,𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥3,3, 𝑥𝑥3,4�,𝑪𝟑𝟑,𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥3,5,𝑥𝑥3,6�,𝑪𝟑𝟑,𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥3,7�,𝑪𝟑𝟑,𝟓𝟓 = �𝑥𝑥3,8�, 
𝑪𝟑𝟑,𝟔 = �𝑥𝑥3,9�,𝑪𝟑𝟑,𝟕 = �𝑥𝑥3,10�. 
leading to ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑) in terms of minimal path sets, 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑)= 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 {𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,5,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10),𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10), 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,5,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10) ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10) , 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥3,2,𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,5,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10) ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥3,2,𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10) , 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥3,2,𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,5,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10) ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥3,2,𝑥𝑥3,4,𝑥𝑥3,6,𝑥𝑥3,7,𝑥𝑥3,8,𝑥𝑥3,9,𝑥𝑥3,10)} 
and in terms of minimal cut sets, 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 {𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥3,1,𝑥𝑥3,2),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥3,3,𝑥𝑥3,4),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥3,5,𝑥𝑥3,6),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥3,7), 
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥3,8),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥3,9),𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥3,10)} Subsystem4 has only one minimal path set: 
𝑨𝟒𝟒,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥4,1,𝑥𝑥4,2,𝑥𝑥4,3, 𝑥𝑥4,4� 
This is combined with four single-element minimal cut sets, which are 
𝑪𝟒𝟒,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥4,1�,𝑪𝟒𝟒,𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥4,2�,𝑪𝟒𝟒,𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥4,3�,𝑪𝟒𝟒,𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥4,4�. 
Since the vector 𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒 is a pure series arrangement, its structure function ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒) in terms of minimal 
path sets is similar to the representation in terms of minimal cut sets, and written as 
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 ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒) = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥4,1,𝑥𝑥4,2,𝑥𝑥4,3,𝑥𝑥4,4�� = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥4,1� ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥4,2� ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥4,3� ,𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥4,4�� = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥4,1,𝑥𝑥4,2,𝑥𝑥4,3,𝑥𝑥4,4) 
Similarly, in order for subsystem5 to be in a functioning state, there is only one minimal path set, 
namely,  
𝑨𝟓𝟓,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥5,1,𝑥𝑥5,2,𝑥𝑥5,3, 𝑥𝑥5,4,𝑥𝑥5,5� 
and five single-element minimal cut sets, namely, 
𝑪𝟓𝟓,𝟏𝟏 = �𝑥𝑥5,1�,𝑪𝟓𝟓,𝟐𝟐 = �𝑥𝑥5,2�,𝑪𝟓𝟓,𝟑𝟑 = �𝑥𝑥5,3�,𝑪𝟓𝟓,𝟒𝟒 = �𝑥𝑥5,4�,𝑪𝟓𝟓,𝟓𝟓 = �𝑥𝑥5,5� 
Therefore, the structure function ∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓) in terms of both minimal path and cut sets is written as 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥5,1,𝑥𝑥5,2,𝑥𝑥5,3,𝑥𝑥5,4,𝑥𝑥5,5) 
At system-level, there is one minimal path set: 
𝑨𝟏𝟏 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓)} 
and five single-element minimal cut sets: 
𝑪𝟏𝟏 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏)},𝑪𝟐𝟐 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐)},𝑪𝟑𝟑 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑)},𝑪𝟒𝟒 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒)},𝑪𝟓𝟓 = {∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓)} 
The consequent ISMM system-level structure function is found by 
∅(𝒙𝒙) = ��𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘
𝑘∈𝑨𝑖,𝑗 �
5
𝑖𝑖=1
= ���𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑘∈𝑪𝑖,𝑗𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘�5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
= 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓)} 
4.3 Reliability Based on Random Events 
4.3.1 Model Formulation  
In contrast to structure functions where the goal is to determine the functioning (or non-functioning) 
state of each security control, subsystem, and overall security system, the goal here is to provide a 
measure, using random events, of the degree of continuity of correct security service for a given 
control, subsystem, and the overall security system. 
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 To demonstrate reliability based on random events, we first introduce the mathematical modelling 
within the subsystem of every ISMM layer, noting that the representation can be similarly used to 
encode lower levels of structural abstraction. Then, we demonstrate the modeling of the overall 
system-level reliability. 
Let 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 denote the event that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 security controls is functioning, and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 
and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, denote the event that control 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗 is working; thus 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 denotes the failure of control 
𝑖𝑖, 𝑗 (the event of control 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗 not working). 
Now, if subsystem𝑖𝑖 controls are arranged logically in series, then, subsystem𝑖𝑖will be working if 
and only if all 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 controls are working. Hence, event 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 will be the intersection of all 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗′𝑆𝑆 events as 
follows. 
 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1 ∩ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 ∩ …∩ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 ( 4-11) 
and the probability that subsystem𝑖𝑖 is working, i.e., the reliability of subsystem𝑖𝑖, is given by 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1 ∩ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 ∩ …∩ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 … 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖) ( 4-12) 
If failure events of subsystem𝑖𝑖 are not independent (the random events 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 interact), 
then we write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1)𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1⁄ �𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,3 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2⁄ �…𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 … 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖−1⁄ ) ( 4-13) 
and when failure events are independent (the random events 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 are independent), we 
write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,3�…𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖� ( 4-14) 
So,  
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = �𝑃𝑃 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
) 
= �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗 =  𝑃𝑃 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗) ( 4-15) 
On the other side, if subsystem𝑖𝑖 controls are arranged logically in parallel, then subsystem𝑖𝑖 will 
be working if at least one of its 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 security controls is working, making it a so-called redundant 
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 configuration. Therefore, event 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 will be the union of all 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, events as 
follows: 
 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1 ∪ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 ∪ …∪ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 ( 4-16) 
And the probability that subsystem𝑖𝑖 is working, i.e., the reliability of subsystem𝑖𝑖, is written by 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1 ∪ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 ∪ …∪ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 + ⋯+ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖� ( 4-17) 
If failure events of subsystem𝑖𝑖 are not independent (the random events 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 are 
dependent), then we write 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) = �𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1�+𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2� + 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,3�+ ⋯+ 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖�� 
−�𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2�+𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,3� + ⋯+ 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑘�𝑗≠𝑘� +⋯+ (−1)𝑛𝑛𝑖−1𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2 … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑖� ( 4-18) 
The formula can be written using the probability of failure for subsystem𝑖𝑖 instead. Parallel subsystem𝑖𝑖 failure occurs if all security controls at layer 𝑖𝑖 fail, in which case 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2, … 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖) ( 4-19) 
and when failure events are independent (the random events 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 are independent) we 
write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,1�𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,2� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,3�…𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖� ( 4-20) 
So, 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 1 −�𝑃𝑃 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
) 
= 1 −�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗 =  𝑃𝑃 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗) ( 4-21) 
Next, to define reliability based on random events at system level, let 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 denote the event that 
the security system will be functioning; consequently, 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 denotes the reliability of the security 
system. Because ISMM assumes independence and a series logical arrangement among individual 
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 subsystems, the overall security system will be working if and only if all subsystems are working. 
Hence, event 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 will be the intersection of all 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,5, events 
 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑆𝑆1 ∩ 𝑆𝑆2 ∩ 𝑆𝑆3 ∩ 𝑆𝑆4 ∩ 𝑆𝑆5 ( 4-22) 
and the probability of the overall system security working, i.e., the reliability of the ISMM-based 
security system, is then given by 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆1 ∩ 𝑆𝑆2 ∩ 𝑆𝑆3 ∩ 𝑆𝑆4 ∩ 𝑆𝑆5)   𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆1𝑆𝑆2𝑆𝑆3𝑆𝑆4𝑆𝑆5)                                = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆1)𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆2)𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆3)𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆4)𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆5)  𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 ( 4-23) 
So,  
 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = �𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
) 
= �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =  𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) ( 4-24) 
Figure  4-1 shows how random events denoting security controls can be modelled on corresponding 
ISMM layers. 
 
 
Figure  4-1: ISMM-based random events modelling 
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 4.3.2 Example 
Recall the case study and associated structure functions in Section  3.11. The reliability functions for 
individual ISMM subsystems, assuming independence of failure events, are written by 
 𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆1)  = �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥1,1� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥1,2���1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥1,3� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥1,4���1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥1,5� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥1,6���1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥1,7� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥1,8�� = �1 − 𝑅𝑅1,1𝑅𝑅1,2��1 − 𝑅𝑅1,3𝑅𝑅1,4��1 − 𝑅𝑅1,5𝑅𝑅1,6��1 − 𝑅𝑅1,7𝑅𝑅1,8�. 
𝑅𝑅2 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆2) = �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,1� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,2���𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,3�𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,4�𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,5� + 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,3� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,4� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,5�+
𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,3�𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,4�𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,5� + 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,3� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,4�𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,5�� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥2,6�  = �1 − 𝑅𝑅2,1𝑅𝑅2,2��𝑅𝑅2,3𝑅𝑅2,4 + 𝑅𝑅2,3𝑅𝑅2,5 + 𝑅𝑅2,4𝑅𝑅2,5 − 2𝑅𝑅2,3𝑅𝑅2,4𝑅𝑅2,5�𝑅𝑅2,6.  
𝑅𝑅3 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆3) = �1 − 𝑅𝑅3,1𝑅𝑅3,2��1 − 𝑅𝑅3,3𝑅𝑅3,4��1 − 𝑅𝑅3,5𝑅𝑅3,6�𝑅𝑅3,7𝑅𝑅3,8𝑅𝑅3,9𝑅𝑅3,10.  
𝑅𝑅4 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆4) = 𝑅𝑅4,1𝑅𝑅4,2𝑅𝑅4,3𝑅𝑅4,4.  
 𝑅𝑅5 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆5) = 𝑅𝑅5,1𝑅𝑅5,2𝑅𝑅5,3𝑅𝑅5,4𝑅𝑅5,5. 
As the overall security system will be working if and only if all of its subsystems are working, 
event 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 will be the intersection of all 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,5, events, as follows 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑆𝑆1 ∩ 𝑆𝑆2 ∩ 𝑆𝑆3 ∩ 𝑆𝑆4 ∩ 𝑆𝑆5 
So, the reliability is derived as 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = �𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =  𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) 
This leads to writing ISMM-based reliability in the form 
 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼= �1 − 𝑅𝑅1,1𝑅𝑅1,2��1 − 𝑅𝑅1,3𝑅𝑅1,4��1 − 𝑅𝑅1,5𝑅𝑅1,6��1 − 𝑅𝑅1,7𝑅𝑅1,8��1 − 𝑅𝑅2,1𝑅𝑅2,2��𝑅𝑅2,3𝑅𝑅2,4+ 𝑅𝑅2,3𝑅𝑅2,5 + 𝑅𝑅2,4𝑅𝑅2,5 − 2𝑅𝑅2,3𝑅𝑅2,4𝑅𝑅2,5�𝑅𝑅2,6�1 − 𝑅𝑅3,1𝑅𝑅3,2��1 − 𝑅𝑅3,3𝑅𝑅3,4��1
− 𝑅𝑅3,5𝑅𝑅3,6�𝑅𝑅3,7𝑅𝑅3,8𝑅𝑅3,9𝑅𝑅3,10𝑅𝑅4,1𝑅𝑅4,2𝑅𝑅4,3𝑅𝑅4,4𝑅𝑅5,1𝑅𝑅5,2𝑅𝑅5,3𝑅𝑅5,4𝑅𝑅5,5 
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 4.4 Reliability Based on Random Variables 
4.4.1 Model Formulation 
Reliability is obtained from the probability of violating a limit (threshold state). The limit in the 
security context herein is defined to be the functional state of security controls and system, 
demonstrated by the three essential information security functions or goals: confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. In this section, we present first reliability analysis based on static probabilities, then 
we present the case when system life is modelled as a function of controls’ lives, using time-
dependent random variables. 
Time-independent reliabilities: In a way similar to the modeling approach using random events, the 
reliability measure, i.e., the degree of continuity of correct security service, is defined and evaluated 
based on random variables. 
Let X𝑖𝑖,𝑗 be a random variable representing the state of the jth security control at the ith layer or 
subsystem, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖. The value 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 1� = 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗, the probability that control 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
is functioning, is called the reliability of control 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗, and can be defined as 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑃𝑃�X𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 1� = 1 − 𝑃𝑃�X𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 0� = 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗 ( 4-25) 
and similarly, 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = 1} = 1 − 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = 0}      
where 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊 = (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖) ( 4-26) 
is called the reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5. Since ∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) is a Bernoulli random 
variable, the reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, can be computed by taking the expectation, that is 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = 1} = 𝐸𝐸[∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊)] ( 4-27) 
For subsystems that consist of security controls connected in series, when the random variables 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 are independent (i.e., controls do not interact with respect to a functioning state) we 
can write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2 = 1�…𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 = 1� = �𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 ( 4-28) 
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 And when the random variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 are dependent we write 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2 = 1/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1 = 1�… 
𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 = 1 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1⁄ = 1,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2 = 1, …𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖−1 = 1� ( 4-29) 
Also, for subsystems that consist of security controls connected in parallel, when the random 
variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 are independent, with 𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗, we can write 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2 = 0�…𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 = 0� = 1 −�(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
= 1 −�𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 
( 4-30) 
And when the random variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 are dependent we write 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2 = 0/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1 = 0�… 
𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 = 0 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,1⁄ = 0,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2 = 0, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖−1 = 0� ( 4-31) 
The same logic applies to mixed structure subsystems (subsystems that contain both parallel and 
series security controls at the same time). Accordingly, the probability of the overall system security 
working, i.e., the reliability of the ISMM-based security system, is then given by 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙) = 1} = 1 − 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙) = 0}               𝑤𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝒙𝒙 = (∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒),∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓)) ( 4-32) 
As a result of series logical arrangement and independence among ISMM layers, 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏) = 1}𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐) = 1}𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑) = 1}𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝟒𝟒) = 1}𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝟓𝟓) = 1} = �𝑃𝑃{∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊) = 1}𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 4-33) 
So, 
 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑅𝑅1 × 𝑅𝑅2 × 𝑅𝑅3 × 𝑅𝑅4 × 𝑅𝑅5 = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
 ( 4-34) 
Time-dependent reliabilities: Variable probabilities are more commonly used in reliability analysis, 
as mentioned in Section  2.2. In this modeling, reliability functions are defined over time. 
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 To do so, let us assume that 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑗 is a random variable that represents time taken for a failure event 
of control 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 to occur, whether the failure is due to malicious or nonmalicious causes. We can 
informally think of the input space to this variable as the set of all possible events that cause a 
particular security control to fail, including both those involved in normal operational use and 
intentional attacks. The reliability of control 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 is then defined by 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃{𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙 𝑗 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡}= 1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) ( 4-35) 
The reliability for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5, is also defined in terms of the probability of security 
failure as a function of time and written as 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ( 4-36) 
This function means subsystemi will function for time 𝑡𝑡 or greater if and only if it is still 
functioning at time 𝑡𝑡. Analogical to the definition in conventional reliability, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is a monotonic 
non-increasing function of 𝑡𝑡 with unity at the start of life: 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(0) = 1 and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(∞) = 0; 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), failure 
distribution, however, represents the probability that subsystemi will fail before time 𝑡𝑡, and equals  
 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 ( 4-37) 
In order to compute reliability at every ISMM layer subsystem, we follow the same technique used 
in reliability analysis of decomposing the subsystem at every layer into a set of controls, or 
components, where their reliabilities are known or to be computed with respect to time, so 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅 �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡)� ,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ( 4-38) 
For series subsystemi with independent 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 controls we can write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡) × … × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 ( 4-39) 
Also, for parallel subsystemi with independent 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 controls we can write 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − �(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡)) × … × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡))� = 1 −��1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(t)�𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 ( 4-40) 
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 = 1 −�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 
Accordingly, the probability that the overall system security is working at time 𝑡𝑡, i.e., the reliability 
of the ISMM-based security system, is given by 
 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅�𝑃𝑃1(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃2(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃3(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃4(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃5(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 ( 4-41) 
where 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃{𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡} = 1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖= 1, … ,5 ( 4-42) 
Similarly, the fact that ISMM layers are assumed to be independent and follow the series logical 
arrangement results in 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡)= �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 4-43) 
also, 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑃𝑃2(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑃𝑃3(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑃𝑃4(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑃𝑃5(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
( 4-44) 
However, one must note that both 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 can be expressed as functions of subsystems and 
controls’ reliabilities, respectively; that is, 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑅𝑅(𝑷𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑴) and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅(𝑷𝒊𝒊). These functions are 
also monotonic increasing functions of the vectors 𝑷𝒊𝒊 and 𝑷𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑴, respectively, where 𝑷𝒊𝒊 =
�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡)� and 𝑷𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑴 = (𝑃𝑃1(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃2(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃3(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃4(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃5(𝑡𝑡)). 
As mentioned earlier in Section  2.2.4, a k-out-of-n structure with identical and independent controls 
is represented using the binomial distribution, allowing its reliability function to be written for subsystemi, as an example, in the form 
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𝑅𝑅(𝒑𝒊𝒊) = ��𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗 �𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑖−𝑗 
          where 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖𝑖,1 = 𝑝𝑖𝑖,2 = ⋯ = 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖 ( 4-45) 
Note that the same complexity found in traditional reliability associated with calculating the 
reliability of a k-out-of-n system when its components are not identical is inherited here too, as 
calculating the reliability requires the state enumeration approach to sum up all the probabilities of 
possible system permutations with the number of the working controls is not less than 𝑘. 
Moreover, the same key observations about pure series and parallel arrangements are applicable at 
any ISMM structure. We demonstrate those observations first at subsystem level and then show the 
extension to system level. 
Firstly, for a series arrangement subsystem, the larger the number of controls connected in series, 
the lower the reliability of the subsystem. Therefore, the reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 having (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 1) 
controls in a series arrangement is upper-bounded by the reliability of the same subsystem having (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖) controls. Considering 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑖+1(𝑡𝑡) < 1, we write 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡) × … × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡)> 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡) × … × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑖+1(𝑡𝑡) ( 4-46) 
and in its compact form 
 �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
> �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑖+1
𝑗=1
 ( 4-47) 
Also, the reliability of the subsystem in series arrangement is smaller than the reliability of its least 
reliable control, and the subsystem reliability decreases if any of its controls reliability decreases. 
Therefore, the reliability of the series subsystem is upper-bounded by its weakest link. Let 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) 
denote the least reliable control in the 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 series arrangement of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 controls, where 𝑆𝑆 ∈{1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖} and 𝑅𝑅i,s(𝑡𝑡) < 1; we write 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡) × … × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
< 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) ( 4-48) 
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 This observation also applies to the system-level structure due to the assumption of independence 
and logical series arrangement among individual ISMM layers. Thus, the reliability of the ISMM-
based security system is smaller than the reliability of its least reliable subsystem. Additionally, 
overall system security reliability decreases if any subsystem’s reliability decreases. In a nutshell, the 
reliability of the overall security system is upper-bounded by its weakest link, or subsystem. Let 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) denote the least reliable subsystem, where 𝑆𝑆 ∈ {1, … ,5} and 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) < 1; we can write 
 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
< 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) ( 4-49) 
Secondly, for a parallel arrangement subsystem, the larger the number of controls in parallel, the 
larger the reliability of the subsystem. Therefore, the reliability of the (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 1) controls parallel 
subsystem is lower-bounded by the reliability of the same subsystem having (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖) controls. Adding an 
extra control (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 1) for a parallel arrangement of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 controls, 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑖+1(𝑡𝑡) < 1, we write 
 
1 − �(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡)) × … × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(t))� < 1 − �(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡)) × … × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(t)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑖+1(t))� ( 4-50) 
and in its compact form 
 1 −�(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(t)) < 1 −��1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(t)�𝑛𝑛𝑖+1
𝑗=1
𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 ( 4-51) 
Also, the reliability of the parallel subsystem is larger than the reliability of its most reliable 
control, and hence, lower-bounded by this amount. Let 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑙(𝑡𝑡), 𝑙 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖} denote the most reliable 
control in a parallel arrangement of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 controls; we write 
 
1 − �(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡)) × … × (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(t))� = 1 −�(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(t))𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
> 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑙(𝑡𝑡) ( 4-52) 
As explained in [47], in the case of a system or subsystem with 𝑛𝑛 components where individual 
control reliabilities are known but no or little information on their logical structure is available, one 
might use their series arrangement as the lower reliability bound and parallel arrangement at their 
upper reliability bound of the system. Another useful relationship in the case of identical controls can 
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 be established if the number of controls, say 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑗, to reach a known reliability goal, say 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑔 , is to be 
found. For a series structure, 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑗 can be found according to the relation 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑔 (𝑡𝑡) = (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡))𝑛𝑛𝑖,𝑗 ( 4-53) 
and for a parallel structure, 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑗 can be found by 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑔 (𝑡𝑡) = 1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡))𝑛𝑛𝑖,𝑗 ( 4-54) 
One must note that replicating components leads to a higher reliability than replicating systems 
[47], [48]. To conclude this part, there are four important functions related to reliability evaluation, 
regardless of the level of ISMM structure: 1) the failure density function, which describes how the 
failure probability is spread over the chosen measurement unit and denoted, at control level for 
instance, by 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡). 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) is always non-negative and the total area beneath it is always equal to one 
as it is basically a probability distribution function, so 
 ∫ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑡 = 1∞0 ,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ( 4-55) 
2) Failure distribution function, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡), which is the cumulative distribution function of the failure 
density function 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) and given by the relation 
 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = − 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) ( 4-56) 
As mentioned earlier, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) represents the probability that control 𝑗 at layer or subsystem 𝑖𝑖 will fail 
before time 𝑡𝑡, and gives the area beneath the failure density function until time 𝑡𝑡, and equals 
 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑀𝑀 ≤ 𝑡𝑡) = � 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝜆𝜆
0
 ( 4-57) 
3) Reliability function 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡), which gives the area beneath the failure density function after time 𝑡𝑡, 
and equals 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑀𝑀 > 𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 1 −� 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝜆𝜆
0
= 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝 �−� 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝜆𝜆
0
� 
( 4-58) 
4) Hazard function 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡), sometimes called instantaneous failure rate, which is defined as the limit 
of the failure rate as the interval length approaches zero. It equals 
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𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = − 𝑑
𝑑𝑡𝑡
�ln𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)� ( 4-59) 
Another important parameter to these equations is the mean time to failure 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 (or, mean effort 
to failure when using the variable effort instead). It is the expected value of the continuous random 
variable 𝑀𝑀 and gives the area beneath the reliability function. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 is given by 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = � 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑡∞
0
= � 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑡∞
0
 ( 4-60) 
4.4.2 Analytical Example 
Time-independent reliabilities: Recall the case study and associated structure functions in 
Section  3.11. The reliability functions for ISMM subsystems, assuming the independence of random 
variables, can be formulated as follows. 
 𝑅𝑅1 = �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋1,1 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋1,2 = 0���1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋1,3 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋1,4 = 0��  
�1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋1,5 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋1,6 = 0���1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋1,7 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋1,8 = 0��  = �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1��1 − 𝑝1,2���1 − �1 − 𝑝1,3��1 − 𝑝1,4��  
�1 − �1 − 𝑝1,5��1 − 𝑝1,6���1 − �1 − 𝑝1,7��1 − 𝑝1,8��  = �1 − 𝑞1,1𝑞1,2��1 − 𝑞1,3𝑞1,4��1 − 𝑞1,5𝑞1,6��1 − 𝑞1,7𝑞1,8�. 
𝑅𝑅2 = �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,1 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,2 = 0���𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,3 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,4 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,5 = 1� +
𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,3 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,4 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,5 = 1� + 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,3 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,4 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,5 = 1� +
𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,3 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,4 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,5 = 0��𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋2,6 = 1�  = �1 − 𝑞2,1𝑞2,2��𝑝2,3𝑝2,4 + 𝑝2,3𝑝2,5 + 𝑝2,4𝑝2,5 − 2𝑝2,3𝑝2,4𝑝2,5�𝑝2,6.  
𝑅𝑅3 = �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,1 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,2 = 0���1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,3 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,4 = 0��  
�1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,5 = 0�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,6 = 0��𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,7 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,8 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,9 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋3,10 = 1�  = �1 − 𝑞3,1𝑞3,2��1 − 𝑞3,3𝑞3,4��1 − 𝑞3,5𝑞3,6�𝑝3,7𝑝3,8𝑝3,9𝑝3,10.  
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 𝑅𝑅4 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋4,1 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋4,2 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋4,3 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋4,4 = 1�  
 = 𝑝4,1𝑝4,2𝑝4,3𝑝4,4. 
𝑅𝑅5 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋5,1 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋5,2 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋5,3 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋5,4 = 1�𝑃𝑃�𝑋𝑋5,5 = 1�  = 𝑝5,1𝑝5,2𝑝5,3𝑝5,4𝑝5,5.  
Substituting these reliability functions into 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ∏ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟{∅(𝐱𝐢) = 1}𝑛𝑛=5𝑖𝑖=1 = ∏ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛=5𝑖𝑖=1  to find the 
probability of the event that the overall system security is working, i.e., the reliability of the ISMM-
based security system, 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑅𝑅1 × 𝑅𝑅2 × 𝑅𝑅3 × 𝑅𝑅4 × 𝑅𝑅5 = �1 − 𝑞1,1𝑞1,2��1 − 𝑞1,3𝑞1,4��1 − 𝑞1,5𝑞1,6��1 − 𝑞1,7𝑞1,8� 
�1 − 𝑞2,1𝑞2,2��𝑝2,3𝑝2,4 + 𝑝2,3𝑝2,5 + 𝑝2,4𝑝2,5 − 2𝑝2,3𝑝2,4𝑝2,5�𝑝2,6 
�1 − 𝑞3,1𝑞3,2��1 − 𝑞3,3𝑞3,4��1 − 𝑞3,5𝑞3,6�𝑝3,7𝑝3,8𝑝3,9𝑝3,10 
𝑝4,1𝑝4,2𝑝4,3𝑝4,4𝑝5,1𝑝5,2𝑝5,3𝑝5,4𝑝5,5 
Time-dependent reliabilities: We demonstrate the reliability based on time-dependent random 
variables where reliability values can be calculated across different mission times, assuming the unit 
time as the variable upon which the failure event is defined; i.e., 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑗 is a random variable that 
represents the time taken for a failure event for the jth control at the ith layer to occur. We build 
individual subsystem-level reliability functions as follows 
 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = �1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,2(𝑡𝑡))��1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,3(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,4(𝑡𝑡))� 
�1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,5(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,6(𝑡𝑡))��1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,7(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,8(𝑡𝑡))�  
𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) = �1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅2,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅2,2(𝑡𝑡))��𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡) +
𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡) − 2𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅2,6(𝑡𝑡)  
𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) = �1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,2(𝑡𝑡))��1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,3(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,4(𝑡𝑡))��1 −(1 − 𝑅𝑅3,5(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,6(𝑡𝑡))�𝑅𝑅3,7(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,8(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,9(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,10(𝑡𝑡)  
𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅4,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,2(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,4(𝑡𝑡)  
𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅5,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,2(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,5(𝑡𝑡)  
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 Accordingly, the probability that the overall system security is functioning in terms of the failure 
variable, time 𝑡𝑡, i.e., 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡), is calculated as 
 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡)  = �1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,2(𝑡𝑡))��1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,3(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,4(𝑡𝑡))��1 −(1 − 𝑅𝑅1,5(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,6(𝑡𝑡))��1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,7(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅1,8(𝑡𝑡))��1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅2,1(𝑡𝑡)) ×(1 − 𝑅𝑅2,2(𝑡𝑡))��𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡) −2𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅2,6(𝑡𝑡)�1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,1(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,2(𝑡𝑡))��1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,3(𝑡𝑡)) ×(1 − 𝑅𝑅3,4(𝑡𝑡))��1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,5(𝑡𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑅𝑅3,6(𝑡𝑡))�𝑅𝑅3,7(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,8(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,9(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,10(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑅𝑅4,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,2(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,4(𝑡𝑡) 𝑅𝑅5,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,2(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,5(𝑡𝑡) 
4.4.3 Numerical Example 
Time-independent reliabilities: To demonstrate numerically ISMM-based reliability and consequent 
maturity analysis, we assume the fixed probabilities of failure of controls 𝑃𝑃�X𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 0� = 𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
demonstrated on each RBD below. 
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Figure  4-2: Example of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 static reliabilities 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 can be treated as a series-parallel structure, as demonstrated in section  3.8. Recall that  
𝑅𝑅1 = �1 − 𝑞1,1𝑞1,2��1 − 𝑞1,3𝑞1,4��1 − 𝑞1,5𝑞1,6��1 − 𝑞1,7𝑞1,8� 
Substituting the 𝑞1,𝑗 values in Figure  4-2 leads to 
𝑅𝑅1 = [1 − 0.07 × 0.055][1 − 0.034 × 0.032][1 − 0.029 × 0.025][1 − 0.019 × 0.017] = 0.99402 
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 0.031 0.0290.0290.018 0.035 wirelessclientsapplication sw 2-out-of-3web servers
0.02
 
Figure  4-3: Example of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 static reliabilities 
 
Consequently, the reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 is written by 
𝑅𝑅2 = �1 − 𝑞2,1𝑞2,2��𝑝2,3𝑝2,4 + 𝑝2,3𝑝2,5 + 𝑝2,4𝑝2,5 − 2𝑝2,3𝑝2,4𝑝2,5�𝑝2,6 
Substituting the 𝑞2,𝑗 values demonstrated in Figure  4-3 leads to 
𝑅𝑅2 = [1 − 0.02 × 0.018][0.969 × 0.971 + 0.969 × 0.965 + 0.971 × 0.965
− 2 × 0.969 × 0.971 × 0.965]0.971 = 0.96780 
 
0.033 0.029 0.025 0.0280.0210.023
0.011
0.012
0.017
0.013externalfirewalls adminworkstations database platforms
malware defences internalfirewall network IPS/IDS
 
Figure  4-4: Example of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 static reliabilities 
 
The reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 is written by 
𝑅𝑅3 = �1 − 𝑞3,1𝑞3,2��1 − 𝑞3,3𝑞3,4��1 − 𝑞3,5𝑞3,6�𝑝3,7𝑝3,8𝑝3,9𝑝3,10 
Substituting the 𝑞3,𝑗 values in Figure  4-4 leads to 
𝑅𝑅3 = [1 − 0.021 × 0.023][1 − 0.011 × 0.012][1 − 0.017 × 0.013]0.967× 0.971 × 0.975 × 0.972 = 0.88911 
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 0.02 0.023 0.0180.019 training policies & procedures personnelsecuritysocialengineering  
Figure  4-5: Example of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 static reliabilities 
 
Similarly, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 is written by 
𝑅𝑅4 = 𝑝4,1𝑝4,2𝑝4,3𝑝4,4 
Substituting the 𝑞4,𝑗 values in Figure  4-5 leads to 
𝑅𝑅4 = 0.981 × 0.98 × 0.977 × 0.982 = 0.92236 
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Figure  4-6: Example of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 static reliabilities 
 
and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 is written by 
𝑅𝑅5 = 𝑝5,1𝑝5,2𝑝5,3𝑝5,4𝑝5,5 
Substituting the 𝑞5,𝑗 values in Figure  4-6 leads to 
𝑅𝑅5 = 0.97 × 0.972 × 0.969 × 0.971 × 0.965 = 0.85607 
For the overall system, i.e., 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, the corresponding reliability is written by 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛=5
𝑖𝑖=1
 
= �1 − 𝑞1,1𝑞1,2��1 − 𝑞1,3𝑞1,4��1 − 𝑞1,5𝑞1,6��1 − 𝑞1,7𝑞1,8� 
�1 − 𝑞2,1𝑞2,2��𝑝2,3𝑝2,4 + 𝑝2,3𝑝2,5 + 𝑝2,4𝑝2,5 − 2𝑝2,3𝑝2,4𝑝2,5�𝑝2,6 
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 �1 − 𝑞3,1𝑞3,2��1 − 𝑞3,3𝑞3,4��1 − 𝑞3,5𝑞3,6�𝑝3,7𝑝3,8𝑝3,9𝑝3,10          𝑝4,1𝑝4,2𝑝4,3𝑝4,4𝑝5,1𝑝5,2𝑝5,3𝑝5,4𝑝5,5 
Substituting the 𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑗 values for all subsystems leads to 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0.99402 × 0.96780 × 0.88911 × 0.92236 × 0.85607 = 0.67538 
 
Figure  4-7: ISMM-based reliability analysis for time-independent reliabilities 
 
Maturity analysis: Recall that we use reliability as the performance measure defining the maturity 
measure, thus maturity is a function of the reliability measure of individual subsystems, i.e., 
ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ℳ𝑅. This measure can be found graphically, as presented earlier in Figure  4-7, or 
analytically, as shown here. Recall the maturity function equations in ( 3-14), ( 3-15), and ( 3-16). The 
maturity test can be established using the acceptability function as 
𝐼�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)� = 𝐼(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖),𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 
Applying this leads to constructing the following tests, 
𝐼(𝑅𝑅1 ≥ 𝑟𝑟1) = 𝐼(𝑅𝑅2 ≥ 𝑟𝑟2) = 1 
𝐼(𝑅𝑅3 ≥ 𝑟𝑟3) = 0 
𝐼(𝑅𝑅4 ≥ 𝑟𝑟4) = 𝐼(𝑅𝑅5 ≥ 𝑟𝑟5) = 1 
0.99402 0.96780 
0.88911 0.92236 0.85607 
0.67538 
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  As a result, 
ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ℳ𝑅 = �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑆𝑆) 𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡. � 𝐼�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)�𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
� = 1� = 2 
Observe that the maturity remains equal to 2 due to the test 𝐼(𝑅𝑅3(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟3), regardless of 𝐼(𝑅𝑅4(1) ≥
𝑟𝑟4) and 𝐼(𝑅𝑅5(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟5), thus preserving the precedence of controls with respect to their intended 
strengths and failure boundaries of the system. The maturity deficiency, however, in 𝑅𝑅3 can simply be 
found by 𝑟𝑟3 − 𝑅𝑅3. 
Another important observation is the distinction between reliability analysis and maturity analysis. 
When calculating the reliability measure, the permutations of the values of individual subsystems’ 
reliabilities 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆, a total of 5! permutations, always lead to the same computed system reliability 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. In contrast, such permutations lead to different groups or classes of computed maturity, in the 
range [0 … 5], distributed according to their minimum bounds 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆 and corresponding reliabilities 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖′𝑆𝑆. The sample permutations in Table  4-2, using the minimum bounds in Table  4-1, demonstrate 
this feature. 
 
Table  4-1: ISMM-based reliability minimum bounds 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅1 𝑅𝑅2 𝑅𝑅3 𝑅𝑅4 𝑅𝑅5 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.80 
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 Table  4-2: Comparison between reliability and maturity measures6 
Permutation no. 𝑅𝑅1 𝑅𝑅2 𝑅𝑅3 𝑅𝑅4 𝑅𝑅5 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
1 0.99402 0.96780 0.88911 0.92236 0.85607 0.67538 2 
2 0.96780 0.99402 0.88911 0.92236 0.85607 0.67538 0 
3 0.99402 0.88911 0.96780 0.92236 0.85607 0.67538 1 
4 0.99402 0.96780 0.92236 0.88911 0.85607 0.67538 5 
5 0.99402 0.96780 0.88911 0.85607 0.92236 0.67538 2 
…      … … 5! 0.99402 0.96780 0.92236 0.85607 0.88911 0.67538 3 
 
 
Time-dependent reliabilities: To simplify calculations in this part we assume that control failures 
exhibit the exponential model, i.e., a constant failure rate, nonrepairable controls until subsystem-
level (and therefore, system-level too) failure, and independent controls, where redundant controls are 
active7 [47], [115]. For each subsystem, we show the reliability formulation of both cases: identical 
redundant controls and dissimilar redundant controls. We continue the analysis, however, considering 
the identical case to reduce mathematical computations. Recall that the exponential model implies the 
following functions. 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑖,𝑗𝜆𝜆 ,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 1𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟏𝟏 analysis. Substituting the exponential model into the analytical formulations in 
Section  4.4.2, we obtain in the case of dissimilar controls (redundant controls are not identical), 
6 Reliabilities in red indicate the changes from the original subsystems’ reliabilities. 
7 Active redundancy (or parallel, hot structure) means redundant control(s) and operating control(s) are 
subjected to the same load with the same failure rate. 
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 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅1,1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅1,2(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅1,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅1,2(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅1,3(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅1,4(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅1,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅1,4(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅1,5(𝑡𝑡)+ 𝑅𝑅1,6(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅1,5(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅1,6(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅1,7(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅1,8(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅1,7(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅1,8(𝑡𝑡)�= �𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,1𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,2𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,2�𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,3𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,4𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,4�𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,5𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,6𝜆𝜆
− 𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,6�𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,7𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,8𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,7+𝜆𝜆1,8�𝜆𝜆� 
Observe that the above equation yields 3 × 3 × 3 × 3 terms. For independent identical redundancy, 
yielding 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 terms, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = �2𝑅𝑅1,1(𝑡𝑡) − �𝑅𝑅1,1(𝑡𝑡)�2� �2𝑅𝑅1,3(𝑡𝑡)− �𝑅𝑅1,3(𝑡𝑡)�2� �2𝑅𝑅1,5(𝑡𝑡) − �𝑅𝑅1,5(𝑡𝑡)�2� �2𝑅𝑅1,7(𝑡𝑡)
− �𝑅𝑅1,7(𝑡𝑡)�2� = �2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,1𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆1,1𝜆𝜆��2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,3𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆1,3𝜆𝜆��2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,5𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆1,5𝜆𝜆��2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,7𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆1,7𝜆𝜆� = 16𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,7)𝜆𝜆 − 8𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,5+2𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 − 8𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,3+2𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆+ 4𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,3+2𝜆𝜆1,5+2𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 − 8𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,1+2𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 + 4𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,1+2𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,5+2𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆+ 4𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,1+2𝜆𝜆1,3+2𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 − 2𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆1,1+2𝜆𝜆1,3+2𝜆𝜆1,5+2𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 − 8𝑒𝑒−�2𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆+ 4𝑒𝑒−�2𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,5+2𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 + 4𝑒𝑒−�2𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,3+2𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 − 2𝑒𝑒−�2𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,3+2𝜆𝜆1,5+2𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆+ 4𝑒𝑒−�2𝜆𝜆1,1+2𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 − 2𝑒𝑒−�2𝜆𝜆1,1+2𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,5+2𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆 − 2𝑒𝑒−�2𝜆𝜆1,1+2𝜆𝜆1,3+2𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,7�𝜆𝜆+ 𝑒𝑒−(2𝜆𝜆1,1+2𝜆𝜆1,3+2𝜆𝜆1,5+2𝜆𝜆1,7)𝜆𝜆 
Integrating the complete expression of 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) from zero to infinity, we obtain the corresponding 
mean time to failure as follows. 
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 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹1= 16
𝜆𝜆1,1 + 𝜆𝜆1,3 + 𝜆𝜆1,5 + 𝜆𝜆1,7 − 8𝜆𝜆1,1 + 𝜆𝜆1,3 + 𝜆𝜆1,5 + 2𝜆𝜆1,7 − 8𝜆𝜆1,1 + 𝜆𝜆1,3 + 2𝜆𝜆1,5 + 𝜆𝜆1,7+ 4
𝜆𝜆1,1 + 𝜆𝜆1,3 + 2𝜆𝜆1,5 + 2𝜆𝜆1,7 − 8𝜆𝜆1,1 + 2𝜆𝜆1,3 + 𝜆𝜆1,5 + 𝜆𝜆1,7 + 4𝜆𝜆1,1 + 2𝜆𝜆1,3 + 𝜆𝜆1,5 + 2𝜆𝜆1,7+ 4
𝜆𝜆1,1 + 2𝜆𝜆1,3 + 2𝜆𝜆1,5 + 𝜆𝜆1,7 − 2𝜆𝜆1,1 + 2𝜆𝜆1,3 + 2𝜆𝜆1,5 + 2𝜆𝜆1,7
−
82𝜆𝜆1,1 + 𝜆𝜆1,3 + 𝜆𝜆1,5 + 𝜆𝜆1,7 + 42𝜆𝜆1,1 + 𝜆𝜆1,3 + 𝜆𝜆1,5 + 2𝜆𝜆1,7 + 42𝜆𝜆1,1 + 𝜆𝜆1,3 + 2𝜆𝜆1,5 + 𝜆𝜆1,7
−
22𝜆𝜆1,1 + 𝜆𝜆1,3 + 2𝜆𝜆1,5 + 2𝜆𝜆1,7 + 42𝜆𝜆1,1 + 2𝜆𝜆1,3 + 𝜆𝜆1,5 + 𝜆𝜆1,7
−
22𝜆𝜆1,1 + 2𝜆𝜆1,3 + 𝜆𝜆1,5 + 2𝜆𝜆1,7 − 22𝜆𝜆1,1 + 2𝜆𝜆1,3 + 2𝜆𝜆1,5 + 𝜆𝜆1,7+ 12𝜆𝜆1,1 + 2𝜆𝜆1,3 + 2𝜆𝜆1,5 + 2𝜆𝜆1,7 
 
Table  4-3: Exponential model failure rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 
Control 𝐶𝐶1,𝑗 Failure rate 𝜆𝜆1,𝑗 (𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘−1) 
𝐶𝐶1,1 0.09 
𝐶𝐶1,2 0.09 
𝐶𝐶1,3 0.08 
𝐶𝐶1,4 0.08 
𝐶𝐶1,5 0.10 
𝐶𝐶1,6 0.10 
𝐶𝐶1,7 0.075 
𝐶𝐶1,8 0.075 
 
Consider that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 exhibits the failure rates of individual controls in Table  4-3. Figure  4-8 
demonstrates the corresponding performance of the four series 1-out-of-2 structures individually, 
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 named 𝑆𝑆1,1,𝑆𝑆1,2,𝑆𝑆1,3, and 𝑆𝑆1,4, respectively, and the corresponding overall 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 reliability 
𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡). Observe that all performance curves, including the mean time to failure 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹1 point, fall after 
the predetermined mission time (𝑡𝑡 = 1) and above the minimum reliability bound 𝑟𝑟1 at this layer. As 
a result, the reliability performance of security controls at this layer meets the requirement set for the 
maturity measure. Note that subsystem reliability, i.e., 𝑅𝑅1 in this case, will always represent the 
largest exponential decay among the rest of its series structures, as is consistent with the reliability 
observations described in section  4.4.1. 
The numerical value of the reliability can be easily calculated once the mission time 𝑡𝑡 is known. 
For instance, for a mission time of one week, i.e., 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 
𝑅𝑅1(1) = 0.9727 
and the mean time to failure, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹1 = 6.7308 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆 
In the case of the mission time set for one day, i.e., 𝑡𝑡 = 1
7
, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅1 �
17� = 0.9994 
For a longer mission time, perhaps 30 days, i.e., 𝑡𝑡 = 30
7
, 
𝑅𝑅1 �
307 � = 0.6675 
However, if we want to limit the reliability to a minimum of some value, say three nines, meaning 
𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999, the corresponding mission time, as shown in  
Figure  4-8, must be limited to 𝑡𝑡 = 0.18 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆 ≈ 1.26 𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 30.2 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 = 1814 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆. 
This result can also be verified analytically by computing 𝑅𝑅1(0.18). 
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Figure  4-8: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 
 
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟐𝟐 analysis. For the case of dissimilar redundancy in 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅2,1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅2,2(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅2,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,2(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡)+ 𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡) − 2𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅2,6(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆2,1𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆2,2𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆2,1+𝜆𝜆2,2�𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,4)𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,5)𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆2,4+𝜆𝜆2,5)𝜆𝜆
− 2𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,4+𝜆𝜆2,5�𝜆𝜆�𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆2,6𝜆𝜆 
and when the identical redundancy is considered, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) = �2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆2,1𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆2,1𝜆𝜆��3𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆2,3𝜆𝜆 − 2𝑒𝑒−3𝜆𝜆2,3𝜆𝜆�𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆2,6𝜆𝜆= 6𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆2,1+2𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,6)𝜆𝜆 − 4𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆2,1+3𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,6)𝜆𝜆 − 3𝑒𝑒−(2𝜆𝜆2,1+2𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,6)𝜆𝜆+ 2𝑒𝑒−(2𝜆𝜆2,1+3𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,6)𝜆𝜆 
Integrating the complete expression of 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) to obtain the corresponding 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹2 yields 
𝑡𝑡 
6.7308 
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𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑆𝑆1,1: 1-out-of-2, 𝜆𝜆1,1=𝜆𝜆1,2=0.09 
𝑆𝑆1,3: 1-out-of-2, 𝜆𝜆1,5=𝜆𝜆1,6=0.10 
𝑆𝑆1,4: 1-out-of-2, 𝜆𝜆1,7=𝜆𝜆1,8=0.075 
𝑆𝑆1,2: 1-out-of-2, 𝜆𝜆1,3=𝜆𝜆1,4=0.08  
𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹1 
𝑟𝑟1 
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 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹2= 6
𝜆𝜆2,1 + 2𝜆𝜆2,3 + 𝜆𝜆2,6 − 4𝜆𝜆2,1 + 3𝜆𝜆2,3 + 𝜆𝜆2,6 − 32𝜆𝜆2,1 + 2𝜆𝜆2,3 + 𝜆𝜆2,6+ 22𝜆𝜆2,1 + 3𝜆𝜆2,3 + 𝜆𝜆2,6 
 
Table  4-4: Exponential model failure rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 
Control 𝐶𝐶2,𝑗 Failure rate 𝜆𝜆2,𝑗 (𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘−1) 
𝐶𝐶2,1 0.075 
𝐶𝐶2,2 0.075 
𝐶𝐶2,3 0.08 
𝐶𝐶2,4 0.08 
𝐶𝐶2,5 0.08 
𝐶𝐶2,6 0.05 
 
Assuming that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 exhibits the failure rates of the individual controls in Table  4-4, the 
corresponding performance is demonstrated in Figure  4-9. The chart depicts the different structures 
making up 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 in a sequence of a series arrangement, namely, the 1-out-of-2 structure, 
called 𝑆𝑆2,1; the 2-out-of-3 structure, called 𝑆𝑆2,2; and the one-item structure, called 𝑆𝑆2,3, and the 
corresponding overall 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 reliability 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡). Similar to the case in 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1, all 
performance curves, including the mean time to failure 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹2 point, fall after the predetermined 
mission time and above the minimum reliability bound at this layer 𝑟𝑟2. As a result, the reliability 
performance of security controls at this layer meets the requirement set for the maturity measure. 
The numerical value of the reliability for the mission time of one week, 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 
𝑅𝑅2(1) = 0.93034 
The mean time to failure, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹2 = 6.3058 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆 
126 
 To evaluate the reliability when the mission time is set for one day, t = 1
7
, 
𝑅𝑅2 �
17� = 0.99239 
And when the longer mission time is considered, i.e., 30 days, 𝑡𝑡 = 30
7
 
𝑅𝑅2 �
307 � = 0.59404 
Moreover, if we want to limit the reliability to a minimum of three nines, i.e., 𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999, the 
corresponding mission time, as shown in in Figure  4-9, must be limited to 𝑡𝑡 = 0.018 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘 ≈0.13 𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 = 3.12 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 = 187 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆. 
 
 
Figure  4-9: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 
 
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟑𝟑 analysis. For the case of dissimilar redundancy in 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅3,1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅3,2(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅3,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,2(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅3,3(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅3,4(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅3,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,4(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅3,5(𝑡𝑡)+ 𝑅𝑅3,6(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅3,5(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,6(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅3,7(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,8(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,9(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,10(𝑡𝑡) 
6.3058 
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𝑡𝑡 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑆𝑆2,2: 2-out-of-3, 𝜆𝜆2,3=𝜆𝜆2,4=𝜆𝜆2,5=0.08 
𝑆𝑆2,3: one-item, 𝜆𝜆2,6=0.05 
𝑆𝑆2,1: 1-out-of-2, 𝜆𝜆2,1=𝜆𝜆2,2=0.75 
𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) 
 
𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 
𝑟𝑟2 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹2 
127 
 = �𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,1𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,2𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,1+𝜆𝜆3,2)𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,3𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,4𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,3+𝜆𝜆3,4)𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,5𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,6𝜆𝜆
− 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,6)𝜆𝜆�𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,7𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,8𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,9𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,10𝜆𝜆 
and when the identical redundancy is considered, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) = �2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,1𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆3,1𝜆𝜆��2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,3𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆3,3𝜆𝜆��2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,5𝜆𝜆
− 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆3,5𝜆𝜆�𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,7𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,8𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,9𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,10𝜆𝜆= 8𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,1+𝜆𝜆3,3+𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,7+𝜆𝜆3,8+𝜆𝜆3,9+𝜆𝜆3,10)𝜆𝜆 − 4𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,1+𝜆𝜆3,3+2𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,7+𝜆𝜆3,8+𝜆𝜆3,9+𝜆𝜆3,10)𝜆𝜆
− 4𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,1+2𝜆𝜆3,3+𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,7+𝜆𝜆3,8+𝜆𝜆3,9+𝜆𝜆3,10)𝜆𝜆 + 2𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,1+2𝜆𝜆3,3+2𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,7+𝜆𝜆3,8+𝜆𝜆3,9+𝜆𝜆3,10)𝜆𝜆
− 4𝑒𝑒−(2𝜆𝜆3,1+𝜆𝜆3,3+𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,7+𝜆𝜆3,8+𝜆𝜆3,9+𝜆𝜆3,10)𝜆𝜆 + 2𝑒𝑒−(2𝜆𝜆3,1+𝜆𝜆3,3+2𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,7+𝜆𝜆3,8+𝜆𝜆3,9+𝜆𝜆3,10)𝜆𝜆+ 2𝑒𝑒−(2𝜆𝜆3,1+2𝜆𝜆3,3+𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,7+𝜆𝜆3,8+𝜆𝜆3,9+𝜆𝜆3,10)𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−(2𝜆𝜆3,1+2𝜆𝜆3,3+2𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,7+𝜆𝜆3,8+𝜆𝜆3,9+𝜆𝜆3,10)𝜆𝜆 
Integrating the complete expression of 𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) to obtain the corresponding 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹3 yields 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹3= 8
𝜆𝜆3,1 + 𝜆𝜆3,3 + 𝜆𝜆3,5 + 𝜆𝜆3,7 + 𝜆𝜆3,8 + 𝜆𝜆3,9 + 𝜆𝜆3,10
−
4
𝜆𝜆3,1 + 𝜆𝜆3,3 + 2𝜆𝜆3,5 + 𝜆𝜆3,7 + 𝜆𝜆3,8 + 𝜆𝜆3,9 + 𝜆𝜆3,10
−
4
𝜆𝜆3,1 + 2𝜆𝜆3,3 + 𝜆𝜆3,5 + 𝜆𝜆3,7 + 𝜆𝜆3,8 + 𝜆𝜆3,9 + 𝜆𝜆3,10+ 2
𝜆𝜆3,1 + 2𝜆𝜆3,3 + 2𝜆𝜆3,5 + 𝜆𝜆3,7 + 𝜆𝜆3,8 + 𝜆𝜆3,9 + 𝜆𝜆3,10
−
42𝜆𝜆3,1 + 𝜆𝜆3,3 + 𝜆𝜆3,5 + 𝜆𝜆3,7 + 𝜆𝜆3,8 + 𝜆𝜆3,9 + 𝜆𝜆3,10+ 22𝜆𝜆3,1 + 𝜆𝜆3,3 + 2𝜆𝜆3,5 + 𝜆𝜆3,7 + 𝜆𝜆3,8 + 𝜆𝜆3,9 + 𝜆𝜆3,10+ 22𝜆𝜆3,1 + 2𝜆𝜆3,3 + 𝜆𝜆3,5 + 𝜆𝜆3,7 + 𝜆𝜆3,8 + 𝜆𝜆3,9 + 𝜆𝜆3,10
−
12𝜆𝜆3,1 + 2𝜆𝜆3,3 + 2𝜆𝜆3,5 + 𝜆𝜆3,7 + 𝜆𝜆3,8 + 𝜆𝜆3,9 + 𝜆𝜆3,10 
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 Table  4-5: Exponential model failure rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 
Control 𝐶𝐶3,𝑗 Failure rate 𝜆𝜆3,𝑗 (𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘−1) 
𝐶𝐶3,1 0.08 
𝐶𝐶3,2 0.08 
𝐶𝐶3,3 0.09 
𝐶𝐶3,4 0.09 
𝐶𝐶3,5 0.07 
𝐶𝐶3,6 0.07 
𝐶𝐶3,7 0.07 
𝐶𝐶3,8 0.045 
𝐶𝐶3,9 0.05 
𝐶𝐶3,10 0.04 
 
Assuming that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 exhibits the failure rates of the individual controls in Table  4-5, the 
corresponding reliability performance of controls is depicted in Figure  4-10. Note that the first 
redundant configuration is called 𝑆𝑆3,1, the second is 𝑆𝑆3,2, and so on for the remaining structures 
making up the series arrangement individually. Although the reliabilities of individual structures fall 
after the predetermined mission time and above the minimum reliability bound, overall subsystem 
reliability crosses such boundaries, causing this subsystem to fail its maturity test.  
The numerical value of the reliability for a mission time of one week, 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 
𝑅𝑅3(1) = 0.80016 
The mean time to failure, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹3 = 3.5742 
When the mission time is set for one day, 𝑡𝑡 = 1
7
, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅3 �
17� = 0.97076 
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 And in the case of the longer mission time of 30 days, 𝑡𝑡 = 30
7
, 
𝑅𝑅3 �
307 � = 0.31849 
Also, if we want to limit the reliability to a minimum of 𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999, the corresponding mission 
time, as shown in Figure  4-10,  must be limited to 𝑡𝑡 = 0.005 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆 ≈ 0.035 𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 0.84 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 =50 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆. 
 
 
Figure  4-10: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 
  
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟒𝟒 analysis. Recall that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 is a pure series subsystem, i.e., no redundancy, 
leading to 
𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅4,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,2(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,4(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆4,1𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆4,2𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆4,3𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆4,4𝜆𝜆 = 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆4,1+𝜆𝜆4,2+𝜆𝜆4,3+𝜆𝜆4,4)𝜆𝜆 
3.5742 
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𝑡𝑡 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑆𝑆3,2: 1-out-of-2, 𝜆𝜆3,3=𝜆𝜆3,4=0.09 
𝑆𝑆3,4: one-item, 𝜆𝜆3,7=0.07 
𝑆𝑆3,6: one-item, 𝜆𝜆3,9=0.05 
𝑆𝑆3,7: one-item, 𝜆𝜆3,10=0.04 
𝑆𝑆3,3: 1-out-of-2, 𝜆𝜆3,5=𝜆𝜆3,6=0.07 𝑆𝑆3,1: 1-out-of-2, 𝜆𝜆3,1=𝜆𝜆3,2=0.08 
𝑆𝑆3,5: one-item, 𝜆𝜆3,8=0.045 
 
𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 
𝑟𝑟3 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹3 
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 Integrating the complete expression of 𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡) to obtain the corresponding 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹4 yields 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹4 = 1𝜆𝜆4,1 + 𝜆𝜆4,2 + 𝜆𝜆4,3 + 𝜆𝜆4,4 
 
Table  4-6: Exponential model failure rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 
Control 𝐶𝐶4,𝑗 Failure rate 𝜆𝜆4,𝑗 (𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘−1) 
𝐶𝐶4,1 0.11 
𝐶𝐶4,2 0.08 
𝐶𝐶4,3 0.05 
𝐶𝐶4,4 0.07 
 
Assuming that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 exhibits the failure rates of the individual controls presented in 
Table  4-6, the corresponding performance is depicted in Figure  4-11. Observe that the overall 
reliability of the corresponding subsystem fails to meet the maturity requirement. The numerical 
value, however, of the reliability for a mission time of one year, 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 
𝑅𝑅4(1) = 0.73345 
The mean time to failure, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹4 = 3.2258 
If the mission time is set for one day, 𝑡𝑡 = 1
7
, 
𝑅𝑅4 �
17� = 0.95669 
For the longer mission time of 30 days, = 30
7
 , 
𝑅𝑅4 �
307 � = 0.26486 
Also, if we want to limit the reliability to the minimum of three nines, i.e., 𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999, the 
corresponding mission time must be limited to 
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 𝑡𝑡 = −(ln (𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡)))
𝜆𝜆4
= −(ln 0.999)
𝜆𝜆4
,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝜆𝜆4 = � 𝜆𝜆4,𝑗 = 0.31 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘−1𝑛𝑛4=4
𝑗=1
 
= 0.0032 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆 ≈ 0.0224 𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 0.54 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 = 32 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 
This equation is applicable here because of the property that the series arrangement of an 
exponential model leads to an exponential model as well. The result can be verified both analytically 
by calculating 𝑅𝑅4(0.0032) and graphically as in Figure  4-11. 
 
 
Figure  4-11: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 
 
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟓𝟓 analysis. Similarly, when 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 is considered, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅5,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,2(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,5(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,1𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,2𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,3𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,4𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,5𝜆𝜆= 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆5,1+𝜆𝜆5,2+𝜆𝜆5,3+𝜆𝜆5,4+𝜆𝜆5,5)𝜆𝜆 
Integrating the complete expression of 𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡) to obtain the corresponding 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹5 yields 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹5 = 1𝜆𝜆5,1 + 𝜆𝜆5,2 + 𝜆𝜆5,3 + 𝜆𝜆5,4 + 𝜆𝜆5,5 
3.2258 
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one-item: 𝜆𝜆4,4=0.07 
one-item: 𝜆𝜆4,2=0.08  
𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆
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𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹4 
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 Table  4-7: Exponential model failure rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 
Control 𝐶𝐶5,𝑗 Failure rate 𝜆𝜆5,𝑗 (𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘−1) 
𝐶𝐶5,1 0.07 
𝐶𝐶5,2 0.1 
𝐶𝐶5,3 0.08 
𝐶𝐶5,4 0.085 
𝐶𝐶5,5 0.09 
 
Assuming that 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 exhibits the failure rates of the individual controls in Table  4-7, the 
corresponding performance of the pure series arrangement structure is shown in Figure  4-12, which 
clearly fails to meet the maturity test. The numerical value of the reliability, however, for the set 
mission time of one week, 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 
𝑅𝑅5(1) = 0.65377 
The mean time to failure, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹5 = 2.3529 
If the mission time is set for one day, 𝑡𝑡 = 1
7
, 
𝑅𝑅5 �
17� = 0.94109 
For the longer mission time of 30 days, 𝑡𝑡 = 30
7
, 
𝑅𝑅5 �
307 � = 0.16179 
Also, if we want to limit the reliability to the minimum of three nines, i.e., 𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999, the 
corresponding mission time must be limited to 
𝑡𝑡 = −(ln (𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡)))
𝜆𝜆5
= −(ln 0.999)
𝜆𝜆5
,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝜆𝜆5 = � 𝜆𝜆5,𝑗 = 0.425 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘−1𝑛𝑛5=5
𝑗=1
 
= 0.0024 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆 ≈ 0.0168 𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 0.40 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 = 24 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 
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Figure  4-12: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 
 
𝑺𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑴 analysis. The reliability of the overall system security 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) is calculated as 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑅𝑅1,1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅1,2(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅1,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅1,2(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅1,3(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅1,4(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑅𝑅1,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅1,4(𝑡𝑡)� 
�𝑅𝑅1,5(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅1,6(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅1,5(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅1,6(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅1,7(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅1,8(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑅𝑅1,7(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅1,8(𝑡𝑡)� 
�𝑅𝑅2,1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅2,2(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑅𝑅2,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,2(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡)+ 𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡) − 2𝑅𝑅2,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅2,5(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅2,6(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅3,1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅3,2(𝑡𝑡)
− 𝑅𝑅3,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,2(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅3,3(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅3,4(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅3,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,4(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅3,5(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑅𝑅3,6(𝑡𝑡)
− 𝑅𝑅3,5(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,6(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅3,7(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,8(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,9(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅3,10(𝑡𝑡)              𝑅𝑅4,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,2(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅4,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,2(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,3(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,4(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅5,5(𝑡𝑡) 
Substituting the exponential model, 
2.3529 
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𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹5 
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 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)= �𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,1𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,2𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆1,1+𝜆𝜆1,2)𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,3𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,4𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆1,3+𝜆𝜆1,4)𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,5𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,6𝜆𝜆
− 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆1,5+𝜆𝜆1,6)𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,7𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,8𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆1,7+𝜆𝜆1,8)𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆2,1𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆2,2𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆2,1+𝜆𝜆2,2�𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,4)𝜆𝜆+ 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,5)𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆2,4+𝜆𝜆2,5)𝜆𝜆 − 2𝑒𝑒−�𝜆𝜆2,3+𝜆𝜆2,4+𝜆𝜆2,5�𝜆𝜆�𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆2,6𝜆𝜆�𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,1𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,2𝜆𝜆
− 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,1+𝜆𝜆3,2)𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,3𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,4𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,3+𝜆𝜆3,4)𝜆𝜆��𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,5𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,6𝜆𝜆
− 𝑒𝑒−(𝜆𝜆3,5+𝜆𝜆3,6)𝜆𝜆�𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,7𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,8𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,9𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆3,10𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆4,1𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆4,2𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆4,3𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆4,4𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,1𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,2𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,3𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,4𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆5,5𝜆𝜆 
The numerical value of the reliability for the mission time of one week, 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 
𝑅𝑅ISMM(1) = 0.34720 
The mean time to failure, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0.9134 
If the mission time is set for one day, 𝑡𝑡 = 1
7
, 
𝑅𝑅ISMM �
17� = 0.86682 
And for the longer mission time, 30 days, 𝑡𝑡 = 30
7
 
𝑅𝑅ISMM �
307 � = 0.00541 
Also, if we want to limit the reliability to a minimum of some value, say 𝑅𝑅ISMM(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999, the 
corresponding mission time, as shown in Figure  4-13, must be limited to 𝑡𝑡 = 0.0012 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆 ≈0.0084 𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 0.202 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 = 12 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆. 
Observe that this shortened mission time figure (i.e., 𝑡𝑡 = 12 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 in this example) represents 
an important design parameter necessary to reach the system reliability goal of three nines, without 
any changes in system structures (logical arrangements) or failure model. The alternative approach to 
reaching this target reliability is to increase the reliability of individual controls (by means of more 
economical investment), thus decreasing their failure probabilities while sustaining current mission 
time (i.e., 𝑡𝑡 = 1 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘). 
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Figure  4-13: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
 
Another important remark is the realization that the increase in reliability function caused by 
redundancy is very important for short missions, that is, when 𝑡𝑡 ≪ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹, as stated in [115]. For 
instance, the redundancy in 𝑅𝑅1 and 𝑅𝑅2 led to meeting their minimum maturity bounds 𝑟𝑟1 and 𝑟𝑟2, 
respectively, before mission time 𝑡𝑡 = 1. Further, the fast exponential decay in 𝑅𝑅4 and 𝑅𝑅5 is due to 
their arrangement being a pure series. The redundancy, however, in 𝑅𝑅3 was surpassed by its 
remaining number of series one-item controls, which caused its exponential decay to go faster than 𝑅𝑅1 
and 𝑅𝑅2 but still slower than 𝑅𝑅4 and 𝑅𝑅5. 
Maturity analysis: The maturity measure can be found graphically, as presented in Figure  4-13, or 
analytically, as shown here. Recall the maturity function equations in ( 3-14), ( 3-15), and ( 3-16). The 
maturity test can be established using the acceptability function as 
𝐼�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡))� = 𝐼(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖),𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5;𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡 = 1,  
leading to the following tests, 
𝐼(𝑅𝑅1(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟1) = 𝐼(𝑅𝑅2(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟2) = 1 
𝐼(𝑅𝑅3(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟3) = 𝐼(𝑅𝑅4(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟4) = 𝐼(𝑅𝑅5(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟5) = 0 
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  As a result, 
ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ℳ𝑅 = �max(𝑆𝑆) 𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡. � 𝐼�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(1) ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(1))�𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
� = 1� = 2 
Moreover, we can use the graphical representation in Figure  4-13 to find the maximum mission time 
that satisfies current maturity conditions, logical arrangements, and the failure model. This value can 
be found graphically by making the minimum decrease of the mission time point (sliding the vertical 
mission time line to the left) such that 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5. This procedure leads to a point 
that intersects the mission time line with the reliability 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) curve and its minimum bound 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 line of 
at least one subsystem. Applying this procedure leads to the intersection point for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 at 
𝑡𝑡 = 0.48. Thus, we conclude that the new mission time ?̂?𝑡 = 0.48 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆 ≈ 3.36 𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 80 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆, 
as shown in Figure  4-14, satisfies the condition 
ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ℳ𝑅 = �max(𝑆𝑆) 𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡. � 𝐼�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(?̂?𝑡) ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(?̂?𝑡))�𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
� = 1� = 5 
 
 
Figure  4-14: Redesigning mission time 𝑡𝑡 to advance maturity 
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 4.5 Summary 
This chapter has shown how reliability analysis methods can be useful and extended to analyse 
security systems. Using the case study in Section  3.11, we have particularly demonstrated the 
extensions of the minimal path method, the minimal cut method, and reliability analysis based on 
both random events and random variables. We have also shown how to establish the maturity 
adequacy function and maturity analysis using the reliability measure. The analysis have shown the 
importance and use of logical arrangements of security controls, failure statistics, and designated 
mission times as design parameters to address the dependability of security systems. 
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 Chapter 5 
ISMM-based Multi-state System Evaluation Using the Universal 
Generating Function 
5.1 Introduction 
The issue of approaching the evaluation problem of a security system using methods extended from 
conventional reliability has been addressed earlier in  Chapter 4. Such an extension allows one to 
particularly study performance of the security system using reliability and availability measures, and 
build maturity analysis accordingly. While these measures are useful to security studies as they reflect 
operational capabilities about the system of interest, a natural extension is addressing the evaluation 
problem of multistate security systems using multiple performance measures. The concept of MSS 
systems and its mathematical formulation, described in [116], [117], [124], [125], [126], and UGF 
method, described in [113], [118], [119], [128], [129], provide a suitable combination that can be 
extended into an ISMM-based modelling approach to address this research extension.  
In this chapter, we show how to model and analyze a multistate security system using multiple 
performance measures. Observe that we consider only the case of MSS systems with the assumption 
of independent elements, or controls in this case. While the definitions presented here provide the 
necessary grounds for modelling dependent systems, the detailed application of the UGF method on 
MSS systems with dependent elements can be found in [116], [164]. Complicated solution methods, 
such as heuristics and approximation techniques explained in [102], [113], [116], [117], [125], are 
readily applicable to this work when exact solutions become difficult or intractable analytically. 
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section  5.2 introduces the definition and 
formulation of a multi-layer MSS system model based on the ISMM model. Section  5.3 demonstrates 
how the UGF method can be used to study various performance measures of the introduced multi-
layer MSS system, not necessarily restricted to reliability and availability measures. Then, this 
extension is demonstrated analytically and numerically in Section  5.4 and Section  5.5, respectively. 
For mutually validating both the reliability-theoretic and MSS UGF-based methods, in addition to 
simplifying and unifying the analysis provided, however, the demonstration is based on reliability and 
maturity analysis, using the same case study presented in Section  3.11. 
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 5.2 Multi-layer MSS Model 
Extending MSS system representation into an ISMM-based modelling approach is motivated by the 
analysis tools and benefits that can be facilitated by the combined use of the MSS method and ISMM 
model and their properties; in particular, the established bounds of a security system using ISMM 
model, its precedence of layers, vectors and structures, control interrelationships, and associated 
quantifier functions using MSS-based performance measures. This combination leads to building 
what we call Multi-layer MSS model, or MLMSS for short. The resulting combination allows one to 
use MSS representation to model a security system when its controls and consequent subsystems can 
take an arbitrary finite number of different states of performance rates, ranging from perfect 
functioning on one side to complete failure on the other side. 
Recall that ISMM-based system 𝑪 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑪𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑴 consists basically of five ordered layers, denoted by 
𝑪𝒊𝒊, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5, with a finite set of controls 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 at each layer, each of which may, in turn, consist of 
another smaller-level abstraction of set of components. In an analogy to MSS definitions introduced 
in [124], [125], [126], assume that control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 can have 𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗 different, mutually exclusive states that 
encode the discrete scale of a particular performance measure, from complete failure to perfect 
functioning. At control level, this can be represented by the set 
 𝒈𝒊𝒊,𝒋 = �𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,2, … ,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝐾𝑖,𝑗�, ( 5-1) 
 with related probability of performance for each state, 
 𝒑𝒊𝒊,𝒋 = �𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1,  𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,2, … ,𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝐾𝑖,𝑗�, ( 5-2) 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑙 is the performance rate with associated probability 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑙 for control 𝑖𝑖 at layer 𝑗 in the state 
𝑙, 𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗}, and 𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗 is the number of different performance rates for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗. 
Consequently, in the stochastic domain, the performance rate at any instance can be represented by 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡);  0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑀, i.e., a random variable taking values from 𝒈𝒊𝒊,𝒋, so 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒈𝒊𝒊,𝒋 with a probability 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒑𝒊𝒊,𝒋, where ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑙(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝑖,𝑗𝑙=1 = 1, which represents a stochastic process for the time interval [0,𝑀𝑀] of the MSS operation time. 
At subsystem level, layeri or 𝑪𝒊𝒊 performance space can be represented by the set 
 𝒈𝒊𝒊 = �𝑔𝑖𝑖,1,𝑔𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝑖�, ( 5-3) 
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  with related probability of performance for each state, 
 𝒑𝒊𝒊 = �𝑝𝑖𝑖,1,  𝑝𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝑖�, ( 5-4) 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑙 is the performance rate with associated probability 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙 for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 (or 𝑪𝒊𝒊) in the state 
𝑙, 𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝐾𝑖𝑖}. Thus 𝑪𝒊𝒊 takes 𝐾𝑖𝑖 different states defined by the states of its individual controls 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐾𝑖𝑖 = ∏ 𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑗=1 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,5}, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖}, and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is the total number of controls at 𝑪𝒊𝒊. 
Also, for the stochastic representation let the performance rate at any instance for 𝑪𝒊𝒊 be represented 
by 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡);  0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑀, i.e., a random variable taking values from 𝒈𝒊𝒊, so 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒈𝒊𝒊 with a probability 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒑𝒊𝒊 where ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝑖𝑙=1 = 1. 
As a result, the performance space at system level 𝑪 is defined by the set of its individual 
subsystems’ performances, denoted by the set 
 𝒈 = {𝑔1,𝑔2, … ,𝑔𝐾}, ( 5-5) 
with related probability of performance for each state, 
 𝒑 = {𝑝1,  𝑝2, … ,𝑝𝐾}, ( 5-6) 
where 𝑔𝑙 is the performance rate with associated probability 𝑝𝑙 for system 𝑪 in the state 𝑙, 𝑙 ∈{1,2, … ,𝐾}. Note that 𝐾 in this case represents the different states determined by the states of its 
individual subsystems 𝑪𝒊𝒊, so,𝐾 = ∏ 𝐾𝑖𝑖5𝑖𝑖=1 . Consequently, the MLMSS performance rate 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) of an 
ISMM-based system at any instance 𝑡𝑡 is a random variable too, taking values from 𝒈, so 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒈 
with a probability 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝒑 where ∑ 𝑝𝑙(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝑙=1 = 1. 
Let 𝑳𝒊𝒊
𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊 = �𝑔𝑖𝑖,1,1,𝑔𝑖𝑖,1,2, … ,𝑔𝑖𝑖,1,𝐾𝑖,1� × �𝑔𝑖𝑖,2,1,𝑔𝑖𝑖,2,2, … ,𝑔𝑖𝑖,2,𝐾𝑖,2� × … × {𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖,1,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖,2, … ,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖,𝐾𝑖,𝑛𝑖}, 
which is the space for all possible combinations of performance rates for all controls at layer 𝑪𝒊𝒊. Also, 
let 𝑴𝒊𝒊 = {𝑔𝑖𝑖,1,𝑔𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝑖}, which is the space of all possible values of performance rates for layer 
𝑪𝒊𝒊. Then we can define the structure function 
 ∅�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡),𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡)� :𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊 → 𝑴𝒊𝒊 ( 5-7) 
which performs a mapping function to a higher order space, that is, mapping the space of the controls’ 
performance rates into the space of the subsystem’s performance rates. As a result, the subsystem 
output performance distribution (OPDi) can be defined by the two finite vectors 𝒈𝒊𝒊 and 𝒑𝒊𝒊 and the 
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 system structure function ∅�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,1(𝑡𝑡),𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�, where 𝒑𝒊𝒊 = �𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙(𝑡𝑡)� = P�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑙� ; 𝑙 ∈{1, … ,𝐾𝑖𝑖}. 
Similarly for system level representation, let 𝑳𝒏𝒏 = �𝑔1,1,𝑔1,2, … ,𝑔1,𝐾1� × �𝑔2,1,𝑔2,2, … ,𝑔2,𝐾2� ×… × {𝑔𝑛𝑛,1,𝑔𝑛𝑛,2, … ,𝑔𝑛𝑛,𝐾𝑛}, where 𝑛𝑛 = 5, which basically represents the space of all possible 
combinations of performance rates for all system 𝑪 layers. Also, let 𝑴 = {𝑔1,𝑔2, … ,𝑔𝐾}, which is the 
space of all possible values of the performance rates of system 𝑪. Then we can write the structure 
function 
 ∅�𝐺𝐺1(𝑡𝑡),𝐺𝐺2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)�:𝑳𝒏𝒏 = 𝑳𝟓𝟓 → 𝑴 ( 5-8) 
which performs a mapping function of the space of the subsystems’ performance rates into the space 
of the entire system’s performance rates. As a result, the MLMSS output performance distribution 
(ODP) can be defined by the two finite vectors 𝒈 and 𝒑 and the system structure function 
∅�𝐺𝐺1(𝑡𝑡),𝐺𝐺2(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)�, where 𝒑 = {𝑝𝑙(𝑡𝑡)} = P{𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑔𝑙} ; 𝑙 ∈ {1, … ,𝐾}. 
5.3 Universal Generating Function in Analysis of Multi-layer MSS System 
Following the introduction of the MLMSS method using the ISMM model, we introduce the 
mathematical representation necessary for extending the UGF method so that both representation and 
analysis of MLMSS security systems can be achieved. We first demonstrate this extension at control 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 level, then subsystem 𝑪𝒊𝒊 level, and finally the consequent system 𝑪 level representation. 
Recall that MLMSS representation of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 of 𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗 different and mutually exclusive 
performance states is defined by the set 𝒈𝒊𝒊,𝒋 = �𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,2, … ,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝐾𝑖,𝑗� with related probability of 
performance for each state 𝒑𝒊𝒊,𝒋 = �𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1,  𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,2, … ,𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝐾𝑖,𝑗�, where layer index 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5, control 
index 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, and performance state index 𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 1, … ,𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗. The UGF method employs the use 
of both z-transform of discrete random variables and composition operators, where the resulting 
function is called u-function. Let 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗 be a discrete random variable that represents the state of the 
performance of interest for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗; the corresponding z-transform function as defined in [116], 
[117], [129] can be extended as follows. 
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  𝜓𝑋𝑖,𝑗(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑧𝑧𝑋𝑖,𝑗] = � 𝑝𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗𝐾𝑖,𝑗
𝑘𝑖,𝑗=1  ( 5-9) 
The coefficients of the terms represent the probabilistic value of some object or state encoded by 
the exponent of the terms for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗, which in turn, can take arbitrary real values in this case for 
all values of 𝑧𝑧. It is notable that the extended definition of z-transform here inherits the essential 
properties of generating functions explained earlier in Section  2.3.2. Particularly, to find the 
expectation of a random variable, say 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗, that represents the performance state for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗, we 
write 
 𝜓𝑋𝑖,𝑗′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1 = � � 𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗𝑝𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗−1𝐾𝑖,𝑗
𝑘𝑖,𝑗=1 �𝑧=1
= 𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗� ( 5-10) 
And the z-transform of the summation of independent discrete random variables, say the set of 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗′ 𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5, and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, representing the performance states of layeri, or 𝑪𝒊𝒊 subsystem, is 
the product of individual z-transforms of the random variables as follows. 
 𝜓∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑖𝑗=1 (𝑧𝑧) = �𝜓𝑋𝑖,𝑗(𝑧𝑧)𝑛𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 ( 5-11) 
Furthermore, u-function is extended to represent ISMM-based complex MSS systems where more 
composition operators, other than the addition of exponents in polynomials, can be defined to 
accommodate a wider range of performance measures and interactions among controls. This function 
can similarly represent a control, subsystem, or system as a polynomial 𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) of a group of smaller 
components using simple algebraic operations over their individual u-functions 𝑆𝑆(𝑧𝑧)′𝑆𝑆. At the control 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 level, individual 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑧𝑧) takes the following form 
 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑧𝑧) = � 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗𝐾𝑖,𝑗
𝑘𝑖,𝑗=1  ( 5-12) 
The exponent of the terms encodes a state or object of interest for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 with associated 
probabilities encoded by the coefficient of the terms. For two controls, say 𝐶𝐶1,1,𝐶𝐶1,2 ∈ 𝑪𝟏𝟏, the 
corresponding 𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) function takes the following form 
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𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆1,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,2(𝑧𝑧)� 
= Ω𝜔  � � 𝑝1,1,𝑘1,1  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1𝐾1,1
𝑘1,1=1 , � 𝑝1,2,𝑘1,2  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2
𝐾1,2
𝑘1,2=1 � 
= � � (𝑝1,1,𝑘1,1𝑝1,2,𝑘1,2  𝑧𝑧𝜔�𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2�)𝐾1,2
𝑘1,2=1
𝐾1,1
𝑘1,1=1  
( 5-13) 
Note that 𝜔(. ) function represents the composition operator that reflects the MLMSS performance 
measure of interest and is strictly defined by the corresponding relationship between these two 
controls. For instance, the 𝜔(. ) function when used for binary reliability of ISMM-based system can 
be defined to equal the maximum of the control states when connected in parallel and the minimum 
when connected in series, denoted by 𝜔𝑝(. ) and 𝜔𝑠𝑠(. ), respectively. Then, the reliability of the two 
controls is found by computing the expected value of the variable, say arbitrarily 𝑋𝑋1,3, which has the 
p.m.f. represented by 𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧), i.e., 𝑈𝑈′(𝑧𝑧)|𝑧=1 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋1,3�. Thus 𝜔(. ) in this scenario can be defined as 
follows. 
 𝜔𝑝�𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2� = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 (𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2) ( 5-14) 
and 
 𝜔𝑠𝑠�𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2� = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2� ( 5-15) 
where 𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {1,2},𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}, and the u-function of individual controls takes the following form 
 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1 𝑧𝑧0 + (1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1) 𝑧𝑧1 ( 5-16) 
To address the k-out-of-n binary structure, the reliability can be directly computed in the case of 
identical and independent controls using the binomial distribution equation in ( 2-33). However, when 
controls are not identical, the probabilities of the possible realizations of the structure where the 
number of functioning components is at least k must be summed up using the k-out-of-n algorithm 
presented earlier in Section  2.3.2. 
At subsystem Ci level, recall that MLMSS representation is defined by gi = �gi,1, gi,2, … , gi,Ki� with 
related probability of performance for each state pi = �pi,1,  pi,2, … , pi,Ki�. The corresponding Ui(z) 
function for subsystem Ci is written in the following general form: 
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 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,2(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑧𝑧)� 
= Ω𝜔  � � 𝑝𝑖𝑖,1,𝑘𝑖,1  𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,1,𝑘𝑖,1𝐾𝑖,1
𝑘𝑖,1=1 , � 𝑝𝑖𝑖,2,𝑘𝑖,2  𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,2,𝑘𝑖,2
𝐾𝑖,2
𝑘𝑖,2=1 , … , � 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖,𝑘𝑖,𝑛𝑖  𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,𝑛𝑖,𝑘𝑖,𝑛𝑖
𝐾𝑖,𝑛𝑖
𝑘𝑖,𝑛𝑖=1 � 
= � � … � (𝑝𝑖𝑖,1,𝑘𝑖,1  𝑝𝑖𝑖,2,𝑘𝑖,2𝐾𝑖,𝑛𝑖
𝑘𝑖,𝑛𝑖=1 …𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖,𝑘𝑖,𝑛𝑖  𝑧𝑧𝜔�𝑔𝑖,1,𝑘𝑖,1 ,𝑔𝑖,2,𝑘𝑖,2 ,…,𝑔𝑖,𝑛𝑖,𝑘𝑖,𝑛𝑖�)
𝐾𝑖,2
𝑘𝑖,2=1
𝐾𝑖,1
𝑘𝑖,1=1  
( 5-17) 
When 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧) represents the p.m.f. of the r.v. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 for subsystem 𝑪𝒊𝒊 or layer𝑖𝑖, we obtain 
 𝑈𝑈𝑥𝑖
′ (𝑧𝑧)�
𝑧=1
= 𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑥𝑖(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖] ( 5-18) 
At system 𝑪 level, recall that MLMSS representation is defined by 𝒈 = {𝑔1,𝑔2, … ,𝑔𝑘} with related 
probability of performance for each state 𝒑 = {𝑝1,𝑝2, … ,𝑝𝑘}. The corresponding 𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) function takes 
the following general form: 
 
𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑧𝑧)� 
= Ω𝜔  �� 𝑝1,𝑘1  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,𝑘1𝐾1
𝑘1=1
, � 𝑝2,𝑘2  𝑧𝑧𝑔2,𝑘2𝐾2
𝑘2=1
, … , � 𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑛  𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑛,𝑘𝑛𝐾𝑛
𝑘𝑛=1
� 
= � � … � (𝑝1,𝑘1 𝑝2,𝑘2𝐾𝑛
𝑘𝑛=1
… 𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑛  𝑧𝑧𝜔�𝑔1,𝑘1 ,𝑔2,𝑘2 ,…,𝑔𝑛,𝑘𝑛�)𝐾2
𝑘2=1
𝐾1
𝑘1=1
 
( 5-19) 
where 𝑛𝑛 = 5. Similarly, when 𝑈𝑈(𝑧𝑧) represents the p.m.f. of the r.v. 𝑋𝑋 for system level 𝑪, we obtain 
 𝑈𝑈𝑥′ (𝑧𝑧)|𝑧=1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑥(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋] ( 5-20) 
It is notable that the reduction techniques to minimise computational cost used in the original 
definitions and representations of UGF are applicable in this extension. Particularly, 1) collecting like 
terms, and 2) recursive procedures when enumerating controls states. So, if a u-function, perhaps for a 
particular control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 representing the distribution of 𝑟𝑟. 𝑣.𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗, contains the terms 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑎  𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑎 and 
𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑏 𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑏 where 𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑎 = 𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑏, the two terms, using the essential property of regular polynomials, 
can be combined into one term as follows. 
 (𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑎 + 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑏) 𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑎 ( 5-21) 
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 Moreover, the u-function of higher-level abstraction, e.g., system, or subsystem, can be obtained 
recursively, with no sense to the order, using the u-functions of its constituting subordinate objects. 
Fortunately, such recursive determination of the u-functions is already enabled by the associative and 
commutative properties of the composition operator based on the definition in Section  3.9. Recall that 
ISMM quantifier functions by definition requires these properties to hold in the first place. This leads 
to the following relationship to hold, for subsystem 𝑪𝒊𝒊 as an example, 
 
Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙+1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑧𝑧)�= Ω𝜔 �Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙(𝑧𝑧)� ,  Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙+1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑧𝑧)�� ( 5-22) 
and 
 
Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙+1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑧𝑧)�= Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,1(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙+1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛𝑖(𝑧𝑧)� ( 5-23) 
5.4 Analytical Example 
Similar to the reliability-theoretic evaluation in  Chapter 4, we perform reliability and maturity 
analysis, presenting both analytical and numerical solutions to the case study in Section  3.11. The 
analysis is based on the same assumption of binary states of security controls, although these methods 
address multi-state systems. Observe that while UGF might not be the most effective method for 
analyzing binary systems in particular, due to the advances in their theory, solution procedures are the 
same when considering reliability for fixed mission times, time-dependent reliability, and steady-state 
availability; and the overall approach remains universal, covering the wide range of system types 
[116]. 
At control level, control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 with 𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗 different and mutually exclusive performance states is 
defined by the set 𝒈𝒊𝒊,𝒋 = �𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,2� and related probability of performance for each state 𝒑𝒊𝒊,𝒋 =
�𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1,  𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,2�. For binary systems, we represent the u-function of individual control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 by 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑧𝑧) = � 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗𝐾𝑖,𝑗
𝑘𝑖,𝑗=1 = 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1 𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1�𝑧𝑧1,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,5}, 𝑗
∈ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖},𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {1,2},𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,1 = 0,𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,2 = 1 
146 
 with the 𝜔(. ) function in the case of a parallel arrangement, 
𝜔𝑝�𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2� = max (𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2), 
and in the case of a series arrangement, 
𝜔𝑠𝑠�𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2� = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2�. 
Mapping the case study in in Section  3.11 into the ISMM context using the UGF method leads to 
building the system structure depicted in Figure  5-1. 
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Figure  5-1: Mapping security controls on ISMM model using UGF method 
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 𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟏𝟏 formulation. The corresponding u-function of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 is formulated as follows. 
𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆1,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,5(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,6(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,8(𝑧𝑧)� 
= Ω𝜔[ � 𝑝1,1,𝑘1,1  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,1,𝑘1,12
𝑘1,1=1 , � 𝑝1,2,𝑘1,2  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2
2
𝑘1,2=1 , � 𝑝1,3,𝑘1,3  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,3,𝑘1,3
2
𝑘1,3=1 , 
� 𝑝1,4,𝑘1,4  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,4,𝑘1,42
𝑘1,4=1 , � 𝑝1,5,𝑘1,5     
2
𝑘1,5=1 , � 𝑝1,6,𝑘1,6  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,6,𝑘1,6
2
𝑘1,6=1  
� 𝑝1,7,𝑘1,7  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,7,𝑘1,72
𝑘1,7=1 , � 𝑝1,8,𝑘1,8  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,8,𝑘𝑖,8
2
𝑘1,8=1 ] 
The next step is to solve this equation. The direct evaluation approach of the function U1(z) 
requires 2n1 = 28 = 256 evaluations to solve the model. However, employing the recursive feature 
of u-function reduces such cost. To do so, we evaluate and collect like terms of intermediate results 
recursively, as depicted in Figure  5-2, according to the following steps. 
1. 𝑈𝑈1,9(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆1,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,2(𝑧𝑧)� 
2. 𝑈𝑈1,10(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆1,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,4(𝑧𝑧)� 
3. 𝑈𝑈1,11(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆1,5(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,6(𝑧𝑧)� 
4. 𝑈𝑈1,12(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆1,7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,8(𝑧𝑧)� 
5. 𝑈𝑈1,13(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆1,9(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,10(𝑧𝑧)� 
6. 𝑈𝑈1,14(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆1,13(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,11(𝑧𝑧)� 
7. 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆1,14(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,12(𝑧𝑧)� 
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Figure  5-2: Order of evaluation for the function 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) 
 
These steps are further expanded as follows. 
𝑈𝑈1,9(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆1,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,2(𝑧𝑧)� = Ω𝜔𝑝 � � 𝑝1,1,𝑘1,1  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,1,𝑘1,12
𝑘1,1=1 , � 𝑝1,2,𝑘1,2  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2
2
𝑘1,2=1 � = � � 𝑝1,1,𝑘1,1𝑝1,2,𝑘1,22
𝑘1,2=1
2
𝑘1,1=1  𝑧𝑧max�𝑔1,1,𝑘1,1 ,𝑔1,2,𝑘1,2� = 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧max�𝑔1,1,1,𝑔1,2,1� + 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,2𝑧𝑧max�𝑔1,1,1,𝑔1,2,2� + 𝑝1,1,2𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧max�𝑔1,1,2,𝑔1,2,1�+ 𝑝1,1,2𝑝1,2,2𝑧𝑧max�𝑔1,1,2,𝑔1,2,2� = 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧max(0,0) + 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,2𝑧𝑧max(0,1) + 𝑝1,1,2𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧max(1,0) + 𝑝1,1,2𝑝1,2,2𝑧𝑧max(1,1) = 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,2 + 𝑝1,1,2𝑝1,2,1 + 𝑝1,1,2𝑝1,2,2�𝑧𝑧1 = 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + (𝑝1,1,2 + 𝑝1,2,2 − 𝑝1,1,2𝑝1,2,2)𝑧𝑧1 = 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1�𝑧𝑧1. 
Similarly, 
 U1,10(z) = Ωωp �u1,3(z), u1,4(z)� = p1,3,1p1,4,1z0 + (1 − p1,3,1p1,4,1)z1.  U1,11(z) = Ωωp �u1,5(z), u1,6(z)� = p1,5,1p1,6,1z0 + (1 − p1,5,1p1,6,1)z1.  U1,12(z) = Ωωp �u1,7(z), u1,8(z)� = p1,7,1p1,8,1z0 + (1 − p1,7,1p1,8,1)z1.  
149 
 After that we evaluate the first two functions 𝑈𝑈1,9(𝑧𝑧) and 𝑈𝑈1,10(𝑧𝑧), collect like terms, and then 
evaluate the result with the next one, and so on until we have combined all the controls in 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1, as follows. 
𝑈𝑈1,13(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆1,9(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,10(𝑧𝑧)�= Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1�𝑧𝑧1,𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧1�= 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1𝑧𝑧min(0,0) + 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1�1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧min(0,1)+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1�𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1𝑧𝑧min (1,0) + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧min(1,1)= �𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1 + 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1�1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1�𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧0+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧1= �𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1 + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1�𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧1= �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈1,14(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆1,13(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,11(𝑧𝑧)�= Ω𝜔𝑠 ��1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��𝑧𝑧0+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧1,𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1𝑧𝑧0 + (1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1)𝑧𝑧1�= �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1𝑧𝑧min (0,0)+ �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1���1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1�𝑧𝑧min(0,1)+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1𝑧𝑧min (1,0)+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1�𝑧𝑧min(1,1)= ��1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1+ �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1���1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1�+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1� 𝑧𝑧0+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1�𝑧𝑧1= �𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1 + �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1���1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��𝑧𝑧0+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1�𝑧𝑧1= �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��𝑧𝑧0+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1�𝑧𝑧1. 
Finally, the u-function for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 can be found by 
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 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆1,14(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,12(𝑧𝑧)�= Ω𝜔𝑠��1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��𝑧𝑧0+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1�𝑧𝑧1,𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1𝑧𝑧0+ �1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1�𝑧𝑧1�= ��1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1+ �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1���1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1�+ �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1�𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1� 𝑧𝑧0+ ��1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��𝑧𝑧1= �𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1+ �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1���1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��𝑧𝑧0+ ��1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��𝑧𝑧1= �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��𝑧𝑧0+ ��1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��𝑧𝑧1. 
which can be rewritten in its compact form, 
𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝1,1𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝1,2𝑧𝑧1 
It is notable that this technique reduces the number of evaluations of the final term 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) to seven 
equations with four evaluations each, i.e.,  7 × 4 = 28 evaluations. Recall that the mean performance 
of the p.m.f. 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) in this case represents the reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1, i.e., 
𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑈𝑈𝑔1′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑔1(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝐺𝐺1] 
This leads to 
𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑝1,2 = �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1� 
Observe that this is the same results found earlier in Section  4.4.2.  
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟐𝟐 formulation. The 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) function takes the following form 
𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆2,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,5(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,6(𝑧𝑧)� 
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 = Ω𝜔[ � 𝑝2,1,𝑘2,1  𝑧𝑧𝑔2,1,𝑘2,12
𝑘2,1=1 , � 𝑝2,2,𝑘2,2  𝑧𝑧𝑔2,2,𝑘2,2
2
𝑘2,2=1 , � 𝑝2,3,𝑘2,3  𝑧𝑧𝑔2,3,𝑘2,3
2
𝑘2,3=1 , 
� 𝑝2,4,𝑘2,4  𝑧𝑧𝑔2,4,𝑘2,42
𝑘2,4=1 , � 𝑝2,5,𝑘2,5  𝑧𝑧𝑔2,5,𝑘2,5
2
𝑘2,5=1 , � 𝑝2,6,𝑘2,6  𝑧𝑧𝑔2,6,𝑘2,6
2
𝑘2,6=1 ]. 
Next, we solve 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧). To avoid confusion of computation, we first build the recursive procedures 
with like terms collected for the 2-out-of-3 web servers structure using the k-out-of-n algorithm 
outlined in Section  2.3.2, followed by the procedures for the remaining controls, according to the 
order presented in Figure  5-3.  
 
u2,1 u2,2 u2,6 u2,3 u2,4 u2,5
U2,10 U2,9U2,11
U2  
Figure  5-3: Order of evaluation for the function 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) 
 
Applying the k-out-of-n algorithm leads to the following steps: 
1. Assign 𝑅𝑅2 |3 = 0, denoting the reliability of the 2-out-of-3 structure  
2. Then, find 
𝑈𝑈2,7(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔+ �𝑆𝑆2,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,4(𝑧𝑧)� = Ω𝜔+�𝑝2,3,1𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑧𝑧1,𝑝2,4,1𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝2,4,2𝑧𝑧1� = 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,1𝑧𝑧0 + (𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1)𝑧𝑧1 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2𝑧𝑧2 
3. Remove 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2𝑧𝑧2 and assign 𝑅𝑅2|3 = 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2, leading to 
𝑈𝑈2,7(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,1𝑧𝑧0 + (𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1)𝑧𝑧1 
4. Further, find 
𝑈𝑈2,8(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔+ �𝑆𝑆2,7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,5(𝑧𝑧)� 
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 = Ω𝜔+�𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,1𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1�𝑧𝑧1,𝑝2,5,1𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝2,5,2𝑧𝑧1� = 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,1𝑧𝑧0+ �𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,1 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,1�𝑧𝑧1 +(𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2)𝑧𝑧2 
5. Remove (𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2), and assign 𝑅𝑅2|3 = 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 +
𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2 
6. Write the resulted reliability of the 2-out-of-3 structure, i.e., 𝑅𝑅2|3, into the u-function form, 
i.e., the binary state 𝑈𝑈2,9(𝑧𝑧), as follows 
𝑈𝑈2,9(𝑧𝑧)= �1 − �𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�� 𝑧𝑧0+ �𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑧𝑧1 
For the remaining controls of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 structure, 
𝑈𝑈2,10(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆2,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,2(𝑧𝑧)� = 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + (1 − 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1)𝑧𝑧1 
𝑈𝑈2,11(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆2,10(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,6(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1�𝑝2,6,2�𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1�𝑝2,6,2𝑧𝑧1 
and then the overall 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 is written by 
𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆2,11(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,9(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�𝑧𝑧0 +�1 − 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2𝑧𝑧1 
which can be written in its compact form, 
𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝2,1𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝2,2𝑧𝑧1 
Observe that 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 = 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,1 . This technique, however, reduces 
the number of evaluations of the final term 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) to five equations with four evaluations each, i.e., 5 × 4 = 20 evaluations as opposed to 26 = 64 evaluations. To find the reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2, 
we obtain 
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 𝑅𝑅2 = 𝑈𝑈𝑔2′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑔2(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝐺𝐺2] = 𝑝2,2= �1 − 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2 
𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟑𝟑 formulation. We first obtain the corresponding 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧), 
𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧)= Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆3,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,5(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,6(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,8(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,9(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,10(𝑧𝑧)� 
= Ω𝜔 � � 𝑝3,1,𝑘3,1  𝑧𝑧𝑔3,1,𝑘3,12
𝑘3,1=1 , � 𝑝3,2,𝑘3,2  𝑧𝑧𝑔3,2,𝑘3,2
2
𝑘3,2=1 , … , � 𝑝3,10,𝑘3,10  𝑧𝑧𝑔3,10,𝑘3,10
2
𝑘3,10=1 � 
 
u3,1 u3,2 u3,3 u3,4 u3,5 u3,6 u3,7 u3,8 u3,9 u3,10
U3,12U3,11 U3,13U3,14 U3,15
U3
U3,16 U3,17 U3,18
 
Figure  5-4: Order of evaluation for the function 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) 
 
We then solve 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) following the evaluation order depicted in Figure  5-4. Similarly, we build the 
recursive procedures, collecting like terms, according to the following order, as follows 
𝑈𝑈3,11(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆3,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,2(𝑧𝑧)� = 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1�𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈3,12(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆3,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,4(𝑧𝑧)� = 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1�𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈3,13(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆3,5(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,6(𝑧𝑧)� = 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑧𝑧1. 
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 𝑈𝑈3,14(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆3,11(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,12(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��𝑧𝑧0 +�1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1�𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈3,15(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆3,14(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,13(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1��𝑧𝑧0 +�1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈3,16(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆3,15(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,7(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2�𝑧𝑧0 +�1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈3,17(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆3,16(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,8(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2�𝑧𝑧0 +�1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈3,18(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆3,17(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,9(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2�𝑧𝑧0 +�1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆3,18(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,10(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2�𝑧𝑧0 +�1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2𝑧𝑧1. 
When 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) represented using the short form, 
 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝3,1𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝3,2𝑧𝑧1 
Note that this technique reduces the number of evaluations of the final term 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) to nine equations 
with four evaluations each, i.e., 9 × 4 = 36 evaluations as opposed to 210 = 1024 evaluations. To 
find the reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅3 = 𝑈𝑈𝑔3′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1 = 𝑝3,2 = �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2 
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 𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟒𝟒 formulation. We obtain the corresponding  𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) as follows. 
𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆4,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,4(𝑧𝑧)� 
= Ω𝜔 � � 𝑝4,1,𝑘4,1  𝑧𝑧𝑔4,1,𝑘4,12
𝑘4,1=1 , … , � 𝑝4,4,𝑘4,4  𝑧𝑧𝑔4,4,𝑘4,4
2
𝑘4,4=1 � 
 
u4,1 u4,2 u4,3 u4,4
U4,5 U2,6
U4  
Figure  5-5: Order of evaluation for the function 𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) 
 
We then compute 𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) following the order of evaluation depicted in Figure  5-5 as follows. 
Building recursive procedures with like terms collected leads to, 
𝑈𝑈4,5(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆4,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,2(𝑧𝑧)� = (1 − 𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2)𝑧𝑧0 + (𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2)𝑧𝑧1 
𝑈𝑈4,6(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆4,5(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,3(𝑧𝑧)� = (1 − 𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2)𝑧𝑧0 + (𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2)𝑧𝑧1 
𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆4,6(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,4(𝑧𝑧)� = (1 − 𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2)𝑧𝑧0 + (𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2)𝑧𝑧1 
which can be represented using the short form, 
𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝4,1𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝4,2𝑧𝑧1 
This technique reduces the number of evaluations of the final term 𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) to three equations with 
four evaluations each, i.e., 3 × 4 = 12 evaluations as opposed to 24 = 16 evaluations. To find the 
reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅4 = 𝑈𝑈𝑔4′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1 = 𝑝4,2 = 𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2 
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 𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟓𝟓 formulation. The corresponding 𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) is obtained as follows. 
𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆5,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,5(𝑧𝑧)� 
= Ω𝜔 � � 𝑝5,1,𝑘5,1  𝑧𝑧𝑔5,1,𝑘5,12
𝑘5,1=1 , … , � 𝑝5,5,𝑘5,5  𝑧𝑧𝑔5,5,𝑘5,5
2
𝑘5,5=1 � 
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Figure  5-6: Order of evaluation for the function 𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) 
 
Similarly, we build the recursive procedures, collecting like terms, according to the evaluation 
order depicted in Figure  5-6 as follows. 
𝑈𝑈5,6(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆5,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,2(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − 𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2�𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2�𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈5,7(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆5,6(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,3(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − 𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2�𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2�𝑧𝑧1. 
𝑈𝑈5,8(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆5,7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,4(𝑧𝑧)� = (1 − 𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2)𝑧𝑧0 + (𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2)𝑧𝑧1 
𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆5,8(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,5(𝑧𝑧)�= �1 − 𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2�𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2�𝑧𝑧1. 
which can be represented using the short form, 
𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝5,1𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝5,2𝑧𝑧1 
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 This technique reduces the number of evaluations of the final term 𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) to four equations with 
four evaluations each, i.e., 4 × 4 = 16 evaluations as opposed to 25 = 32 evaluations. To find the 
reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5, we obtain 
𝑅𝑅5 = 𝑈𝑈𝑔5′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1 = 𝑝5,2 = 𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2 
𝑺𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑴 formulation. Finally the u-function of the overall security system 𝑈𝑈ISMM(𝑧𝑧) is 
obtained as follows. 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5(𝑧𝑧)� 
= Ω𝜔 �� 𝑝1,𝑘1  𝑧𝑧𝑔1,𝑘12
𝑘1=1
, … , � 𝑝5,𝑘5  𝑧𝑧𝑔5,𝑘52
𝑘5=1
� 
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Figure  5-7: Order of evaluation for the function 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧) 
 
Similarly, we build the recursive procedures combined with like terms collected according to the 
order depicted in Figure  5-7. In the short form, 𝑈𝑈6(𝑧𝑧) using subsystem-level representation, 
𝑈𝑈6(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧)� = (1 − 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2)𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑧𝑧1 
And in its long form using control-level representation, 
𝑈𝑈6(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧)� 
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 = �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�𝑧𝑧0+ ��1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�𝑧𝑧1 
To find 𝑈𝑈7(𝑧𝑧) in its short form, we write 
𝑈𝑈7(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆6(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3(𝑧𝑧)� = (1 − 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑝3,2)𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑝3,2𝑧𝑧1 
and using the long form, 
𝑈𝑈7(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆6(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�1
− 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2�𝑧𝑧0+ ��1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�1
− 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2�𝑧𝑧1 
To find 𝑈𝑈8(𝑧𝑧) in its short form, we write 
𝑈𝑈8(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4(𝑧𝑧)� = (1 − 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑝3,2𝑝4,2)𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑝3,2𝑝4,2𝑧𝑧1 
and using the long form, 
𝑈𝑈8(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4(𝑧𝑧)� 
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 = �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�1
− 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1
− 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2�𝑧𝑧0+ ��1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�1
− 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1
− 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2�𝑧𝑧1 
Finally, to find 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧) in its compact form, we write 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆8(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑝3,2𝑝4,2𝑝5,2�𝑧𝑧0 + 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑝3,2𝑝4,2𝑝5,2𝑧𝑧1 = 𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,1𝑧𝑧0 + (1 − 𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,1)𝑧𝑧1 
which can be written using the extended form as 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆8(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�1
− 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1
− 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2�𝑧𝑧0+ ��1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�1
− 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1
− 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2�𝑧𝑧1 
Observe that this technique reduces the number of evaluations of the final term 𝑈𝑈ISMM(𝑧𝑧) to four 
equations with four evaluations each, i.e., 4 × 4 = 16 evaluations as opposed to 25 = 32 evaluations. 
To find the reliability of the overall 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, we obtain 
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 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑈𝑈𝑔𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑀′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1= �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��1 − 𝑝1,5,1𝑝1,6,1��1 − 𝑝1,7,1𝑝1,8,1��1
− 𝑝2,1,1𝑝2,2,1��𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑝2,6,2�1
− 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�              𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2 
Above we have shown the derivations based on fixed probabilities. Observe that these equations 
can be used for evaluating reliability changes over time using the same relationships derived, by 
simply substituting 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗 with 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡). 
5.5 Numerical Example 
Time-independent reliabilities: To demonstrate analysis of this part, the same fixed probabilities of 
failure of controls, represented by 𝑃𝑃�X𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 0� = 𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑗 for all 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗′𝑆𝑆 in Section  4.4.3, are used to evaluate 
the corresponding u-functions of controls. We demonstrate how analysis of intermediate and final u-
functions can be performed systematically.  
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟏𝟏 analysis. Recall that the u-function representing 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 is written by 
𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆1,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,2(𝑧𝑧), … ,𝑆𝑆1,8(𝑧𝑧)� 
Substituting the failure probabilities of controls leads to, 
𝑆𝑆1,1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝1,1,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1�𝑧𝑧1 = 0.07𝑧𝑧0 + 0.93𝑧𝑧1 
𝑆𝑆1,2(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,2,1�𝑧𝑧1 = 0.055𝑧𝑧0 + 0.945𝑧𝑧1 
And so on for the remaining controls until the function, 
𝑆𝑆1,8(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝1,8,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,8,1�𝑧𝑧1 = 0.017𝑧𝑧0 + 0.983𝑧𝑧1 
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Figure  5-8: Intermediate u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 
 
Observe that this method facilitates a convenient way to study the performance of different 
intermediate permutations for a given structure of multiple items. This analysis is performed 
according to the arrangement and failure probabilities defined by lower-level u-functions. Various 
intermediate u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 are depicted in Figure  5-8. For instance, to evaluate the u-
function of the combined CCTV controls, 𝐶𝐶1,1 and 𝐶𝐶1,2, we find 
𝑈𝑈1,9(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑝 �𝑆𝑆1,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,2(𝑧𝑧)� = 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1�𝑧𝑧1 = (0.07 × 0.055)𝑧𝑧0 + [1 − (0.07 × 0.055)]𝑧𝑧1 = 0.00385𝑧𝑧0 + 0.99615𝑧𝑧1 
To evaluate the reliability of this structure we calculate 
𝑅𝑅1,9 = 𝑈𝑈𝑔1,9′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔1,9(1) = 0.99615 
Further, to evaluate the performance of the combined controls of CCTVs and locks, i.e.,  
𝐶𝐶1,1,𝐶𝐶1,2,𝐶𝐶1,3, and 𝐶𝐶1,4, modelled by 𝑈𝑈1,13(𝑧𝑧), we find 
𝑈𝑈1,13(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆1,9(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,10(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1��𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝1,1,1𝑝1,2,1��1 − 𝑝1,3,1𝑝1,4,1�𝑧𝑧1 = [1 − (1 − 0.07 × 0.055)(1 − 0.034 × 0.032)]𝑧𝑧0 +(1 − 0.07 × 0.055)(1 − 0.034 × 0.032)𝑧𝑧1 = 0.00493𝑧𝑧0 + 0.99507𝑧𝑧1 
leading to the reliability of this structure, 
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 𝑅𝑅1,13 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑔1,13(1) = 0.99507 
And so on for the remaining different combinations of controls. The overall performance of 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 can then be calculated by 
𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠 �𝑆𝑆1,14(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆1,12(𝑧𝑧)� = [1 − (1 − 0.07 × 0.055)(1 − 0.034 × 0.032)(1 − 0.029 × 0.025)(1 − 0.019 × 0.017)]𝑧𝑧0+ [(1 − 0.07 × 0.055)(1 − 0.034 × 0.032)(1 − 0.029 × 0.025)(1 − 0.019× 0.017)]𝑧𝑧1 = 0.00598𝑧𝑧0 + 0.99402𝑧𝑧1 
leading to finding the reliability by 
𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔1(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝐺𝐺1] = 0.99402 
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟐𝟐 analysis. Recall that the corresponding u-function is written by 
𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆2,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,5(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2,6(𝑧𝑧)�. Different intermediate aggregations 
of controls can be evaluated in a manner similar to the earlier analysis of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1. For instance, 
the performance distribution of the intermediate 2-out-of-3 structure representing the web servers 
controls, i.e., 𝐶𝐶2,3,𝐶𝐶2,4 and 𝐶𝐶2,5, is found by 
𝑈𝑈2,9(𝑧𝑧)= �1 − �𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�� 𝑧𝑧0+ �𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,2 + 𝑝2,3,1𝑝2,4,2𝑝2,5,2 + 𝑝2,3,2𝑝2,4,1𝑝2,5,2�𝑧𝑧1= �1 − (0.969 × 0.971 + 0.031 × 0.971 × 0.965 + 0.969 × 0.029 × 0.965)�𝑧𝑧0+ (0.969 × 0.971 + 0.031 × 0.971 × 0.965 + 0.969 × 0.029 × 0.965)𝑧𝑧1 = 0.00294𝑧𝑧0 + 0.99706𝑧𝑧1 
with reliability,  
𝑅𝑅2,9 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔2,8(1) = 0.99706 
The overall performance of the subsystem, 
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 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) = [1
− (1 − 0.02 × 0.018)(0.969 × 0.971 + 0.031 × 0.971 × 0.965 + 0.969 × 0.029× 0.965)0.971]𝑧𝑧0+ [(1 − 0.02 × 0.018)(0.969 × 0.971 + 0.031 × 0.971 × 0.965 + 0.969 × 0.029× 0.965)0.971]𝑧𝑧1 = 0.0322𝑧𝑧0 + 0.96780𝑧𝑧1 
leading to, 
𝑅𝑅2 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔2(1) = 0.96780 
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟑𝟑 analysis. Recall that the corresponding 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) is formulated by 
𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆3,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,5(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,6(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,8(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,9(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3,10(𝑧𝑧)�. As 
an example of an intermediate performance of the subsets of 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧), the performance of 𝑈𝑈3,11(𝑧𝑧), 
representing the external firewall controls 𝐶𝐶3,1 and 𝐶𝐶3,2, is obtained by 
𝑈𝑈3,11(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1𝑧𝑧0 + �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1�𝑧𝑧1 = (0.021 × 0.023)𝑧𝑧0 + (1 − 0.021 × 0.023)𝑧𝑧1 = 0.00048𝑧𝑧0 + 0.99952𝑧𝑧1 
leading to, 
𝑅𝑅3,11 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑔3,11(1) = 0.99952 
The resulting 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 performance distribution, however, can be found by 
𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) = �1 − �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2�𝑧𝑧0+ �1 − 𝑝3,1,1𝑝3,2,1��1 − 𝑝3,3,1𝑝3,4,1��1 − 𝑝3,5,1𝑝3,6,1�𝑝3,7,2𝑝3,8,2𝑝3,9,2𝑝3,10,2𝑧𝑧1 = [1 − (1 − 0.021 × 0.023)(1 − 0.011 × 0.012)(1 − 0.017 × 0.013)0.967 × 0.971× 0.975 × 0.972]𝑧𝑧0+ [(1 − 0.021 × 0.023)(1 − 0.011 × 0.012)(1 − 0.017 × 0.013)0.967 × 0.971× 0.975 × 0.972]𝑧𝑧1 = 0.11089𝑧𝑧0 + 0.88911𝑧𝑧1 
leading to, 
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 𝑅𝑅3 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔3(1) = 0.88911 
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟒𝟒 analysis. Recall that the corresponding 𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) is written by 
𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆4,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4,4(𝑧𝑧)�. To evaluate the intermediate 𝑈𝑈4,5(𝑧𝑧), representing 
the social engineering and training controls 𝐶𝐶4,1 and 𝐶𝐶4,2, respectively, we find 
𝑈𝑈4,5(𝑧𝑧) = �1 − 𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2�𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2�𝑧𝑧1 = (1 − 0.981 × 0.98)𝑧𝑧0 + (0.981 × 0.98)𝑧𝑧1 = 0.03862𝑧𝑧0 + 0.96138𝑧𝑧1 
leading to, 
𝑅𝑅4,5 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔4,5(1) = 0.96138 
The resulting 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 performance distribution, however, is found by 
𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) = �1 − 𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2�𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝4,1,2𝑝4,2,2𝑝4,3,2𝑝4,4,2�𝑧𝑧1 = (1 − 0.981 × 0.98 × 0.977 × 0.982)𝑧𝑧0 + (0.981 × 0.98 × 0.977 × 0.982)𝑧𝑧1 = 0.07764𝑧𝑧0 + 0.92236𝑧𝑧1 
leading to, 
𝑅𝑅4 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔4(1) = 0.92236 
𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝟓𝟓 analysis. Recall that the corresponding 𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) is written by 
𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔 �𝑆𝑆5,1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5,5(𝑧𝑧)�. To evaluate the intermediate 𝑈𝑈5,6(𝑧𝑧), 
representing the penetrating testing and risk assessment controls together, 𝐶𝐶5,1 and 𝐶𝐶5,2, respectively, 
we find 
𝑈𝑈5,6(𝑧𝑧) = (1 − 𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2)𝑧𝑧0 + (𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2)𝑧𝑧1 = (1 − 0.97 × 0.972)𝑧𝑧0 + (0.97 × 0.972)𝑧𝑧1 = 0.05716𝑧𝑧0 + 0.94284𝑧𝑧1 
leading to, 
𝑅𝑅5,6 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔5,6(1) = 0.94284 
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 The resulting 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 performance distribution, however, is found by 
𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) = �1 − 𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2�𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2�𝑧𝑧1 = �1 − 𝑝5,1,2𝑝5,2,2𝑝5,3,2𝑝5,4,2𝑝5,5,2�𝑧𝑧0 + (0.97 × 0.972 × 0.969 × 0.971 × 0.965)𝑧𝑧1 = 0.14393𝑧𝑧0 + 0.85607𝑧𝑧1 
leading to, 
𝑅𝑅5 = 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔5(1) = 0.85607 
𝑺𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑴 analysis. Finally, the u-function of the overall security system 𝑈𝑈ISMM(𝑧𝑧) is evaluated 
as follows. 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆5(𝑧𝑧)� = �1 − 𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑝3,2𝑝4,2𝑝5,2�𝑧𝑧0 + �𝑝1,2𝑝2,2𝑝3,2𝑝4,2𝑝5,2�𝑧𝑧1 = 0.32462𝑧𝑧0 + 0.67538𝑧𝑧1 
leading to its reliability, 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑈𝑈𝑔𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑀′ (𝑧𝑧)�𝑧=1 = 0.67538 
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Figure  5-9: Intermediate u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
 
Similarly, different subsystem-level permutations of the overall system structure can be established 
for evaluation, as depicted in Figure  5-9. For instance, in order to study the combined performance of 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2, we analyze 𝑈𝑈6(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆1(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆2(𝑧𝑧)�. The reliability of this 
configuration equals 𝑑
𝑑𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔6(1) = 0.96201. Similarly, we evaluate 𝑈𝑈7(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆6(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆3(𝑧𝑧)� for 
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 studying the performance of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2, and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 together, which leads to 
the reliability, 𝑑
𝑑𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔7(1) = 0.85533. The function 𝑈𝑈8(𝑧𝑧) = Ω𝜔𝑠�𝑆𝑆7(𝑧𝑧),𝑆𝑆4(𝑧𝑧)� is evaluated for 
studying 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 and below, which leads to the combined reliability, 
𝑑
𝑑𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔8(1) = 0.78893. 
Various u-function evaluations along with the corresponding maturity adequacy bounds are shown in 
Figure  5-10. 
 
  
Figure  5-10: ISMM-based reliability analysis for time-independent reliabilities using UGF method 
 
Maturity analysis: Because we are using the UGF method for reliability evaluation, where reliability 
is founded by the derivative of the u-function at 𝑧𝑧 = 1, i.e.,  𝑑
𝑑𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1), the maturity calculation should 
follow analytically and graphically to the same results and observations using the reliability-theoretic 
method found earlier in section  4.4.3 for this example. The maturity acceptability test based on u-
function representation, however, is written by 
𝐼�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)� = 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1) ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1)�� 
= 𝐼 � 𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖� ,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5 
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 Applying this leads to us constructing the following tests 
𝐼 �
𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔1(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟1� = 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑔2(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟2� = 1 
𝐼 �
𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔3(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟3� = 0 
𝐼 �
𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔4(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟4� = 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔5(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟5� = 1 
 As a result, 
ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ℳ𝑈𝐺𝐹 = �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑆𝑆) 𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡. � 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1) ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)�𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
� = 1� = 2 
Time-dependent reliabilities: In this part we demonstrate the same example exponential model 
under the same assumptions and failure rates used earlier in Section  4.4.3 for explaining the 
reliability-based approach. One can see that the u-function representation can be used directly to 
represent the performance of various selections of controls for a given subsystem and the system 
overall. The analytical derivations of 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) function lead to naturally building and computing six 
different transient u-functions, representing different structures before concluding the resulting 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) 
for overall performance of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1. These u-functions show the progressive buildup of the final 
u-function. Recall that the analysis of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 presented in Section  4.4.3 considered the structure 
as a series-parallel arrangement by four series 1-out-of-2 structures, named 𝑆𝑆1,1,𝑆𝑆1,2,𝑆𝑆1,3, and 𝑆𝑆1,4. 
Using the UGF method, these structures correspond to 𝑈𝑈1,9(𝑧𝑧),𝑈𝑈1,10(𝑧𝑧),𝑈𝑈1,11(𝑧𝑧), and 𝑈𝑈1,12(𝑧𝑧), 
respectively. The remaining intermediate u-functions, namely, 𝑈𝑈1,13(𝑧𝑧), and 𝑈𝑈1,14(𝑧𝑧), model the 
remaining steps of the structural growth towards building 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧). To show this, recall that the 
derivative of the 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) function at state 𝑧𝑧 = 1 leads to 
𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔1(1) = 𝑝1,2(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸[𝐺𝐺1] = �1 − 𝑝1,1,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑝1,2,1(𝑡𝑡)� �1 − 𝑝1,3,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑝1,4,1(𝑡𝑡)�                         �1 − 𝑝1,5,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑝1,6,1(𝑡𝑡)� �1 − 𝑝1,7,1(𝑡𝑡)𝑝1,8,1(𝑡𝑡)� 
Substituting the exponential model described in Section  4.4.3, 
𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = �2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,1𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆1,1𝜆𝜆��2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,3𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆1,3𝜆𝜆��2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,5𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆1,5𝜆𝜆��2𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆1,7𝜆𝜆 − 𝑒𝑒−2𝜆𝜆1,7𝜆𝜆� 
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 which is the same result found earlier using the reliability-based approach. Thus, the remaining 
analysis and calculations shall follow directly, such as the reliability for the mission time of one week 
𝑅𝑅1(1) = 0.9727, the mean time to failure 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹1 = 6.7308 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑆𝑆, the reliability for the mission 
time of one day 𝑅𝑅1(1/7) = 0.9994, the reliability for a mission time of 30 days 𝑅𝑅1(30/7) = 0.6675, 
and the reliability equals three nines, i.e., 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999 when the mission time 𝑡𝑡 = 30.2 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 
instead of 𝑡𝑡 = 1 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘. Moreover, this analysis can be carried out similarly on intermediate u-
functions. The reliability of intermediate structures and the overall 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 structure derived 
from their corresponding u-functions is depicted in Figure  5-11. Table  5-1 also outlines some 
reliability-specific analysis for such functions. 
 
     
Figure  5-11: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 using UGF method 
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 Table  5-1: Time-dependent reliability analysis of intermediate and final u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 
u-function 𝑅𝑅1(1)  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹1  𝑅𝑅1(1/7)  𝑅𝑅1(30/7)  𝑡𝑡;  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999  
𝑈𝑈1,9(𝑧𝑧)  0.9926 16.6667 0.9998 0.8976 0.35 
𝑈𝑈1,10(𝑧𝑧)  0.9941 18.75 0.9999 0.9157 0.4 
𝑈𝑈1,11(𝑧𝑧)  0.9909 15 0.9998 0.8785 0.32 
𝑈𝑈1,12(𝑧𝑧)  0.9948 20 0.9999 0.9244 0.42 
𝑈𝑈1,13(𝑧𝑧)  0.9867 10.7783 0.9997 0.8220 0.26 
𝑈𝑈1,14(𝑧𝑧)  0.9778 7.7650 0.9995 0.7221 0.2 
𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧)  0.9727 6.7308 0.9994 0.6675 0.18 
 
The reliability of intermediate structures and overall subsystem structure for 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4, and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 derived from their corresponding u-
functions are depicted in Figure  5-12, Figure  5-13, Figure  5-14, and Figure  5-15, respectively. 
Table  5-2, Table  5-3, Table  5-4, and Table  5-5 also outline some reliability-specific analysis for such 
functions. At system level, the evaluation of intermediate u-functions of subsystems is depicted in 
Figure  5-16, whereas the corresponding reliability-specific analysis is shown in Table  5-6.  
Observe how the progressive buildup of intermediate u-functions shows a faster decay when 
moving serially towards the resulting u-function. For instance, 𝑈𝑈3,15(𝑧𝑧) decays faster than 𝑈𝑈3,14(𝑧𝑧) 
but slower than 𝑈𝑈3,16(𝑧𝑧). Furthermore, the decay gap between 𝑈𝑈3,14(𝑧𝑧) and 𝑈𝑈3,15(𝑧𝑧) is smaller than 
the gap between 𝑈𝑈3,15(𝑧𝑧) and 𝑈𝑈3,16(𝑧𝑧). This gap is due to the effect of adding the single control 𝐶𝐶3,7 
represented by 𝑈𝑈3,7(𝑧𝑧) to the arrangement. This behaviour is also confirmed by observing the 
corresponding reliability calculations in the corresponding table, namely, 𝑅𝑅3(1),𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹3,𝑅𝑅3(1/7),𝑅𝑅3(30/7), and 𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999. For example at system level, the curve of 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) is bounded 
between the curves of 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) and 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧). The decay gap also between 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) and 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) is smaller than 
the gap between 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) and 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧), signifying the effect of the single controls at 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 
compared to the effect of the redundancy at 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆1 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2. 
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Figure  5-12: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 using UGF method 
 
Table  5-2: Time-dependent reliability analysis of intermediate and final u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2 
 
 
 
 
u-function 𝑅𝑅2(1)  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹2  𝑅𝑅2(1/7)  𝑅𝑅2(30/7)  𝑡𝑡;  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  𝑅𝑅2(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999  
𝑈𝑈2,9(𝑧𝑧)  0.9832 10.4167 0.9996 0.7962 0.22 
𝑈𝑈2,10(𝑧𝑧)  0.9948 20 0.9999 0.9244 0.41 
𝑈𝑈2,11(𝑧𝑧)  0.9463 11 0.9928 0.7461 0.02 
𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧)  0.9303 6.3058 0.9924 0.5940 0.018 
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Figure  5-13: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 using UGF method 
 
Table  5-3: Time-dependent reliability analysis of intermediate and final u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆3 
u-function 𝑅𝑅3(1)  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹3  𝑅𝑅3(1/7)  𝑅𝑅3(30/7)  𝑡𝑡;  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  𝑅𝑅3(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999  
𝑈𝑈3,11(𝑧𝑧)  0.9941 18.75 0.9999 0.9158 0.4 
𝑈𝑈3,12(𝑧𝑧)  0.9926 16.6667 0.9998 0.8976 0.35 
𝑈𝑈3,13(𝑧𝑧)  0.9954 21.4286 0.9999 0.9328 0.46 
𝑈𝑈3,14(𝑧𝑧)  0.9867 10.7783 0.9997 0.8220 0.26 
𝑈𝑈3,15(𝑧𝑧)  0.9822 8.7318 0.9996 0.7667 0.22 
𝑈𝑈3,16(𝑧𝑧)  0.9158 5.9754 0.9897 0.5680 0.013 
𝑈𝑈3,17(𝑧𝑧)  0.8755 4.9120 0.9833 0.4684 0.009 
𝑈𝑈3,18(𝑧𝑧)  0.8328 4.0751 0.9763 0.3780 0.006 
𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧)  0.8002 3.5742 0.9708 0.3185 0.005 
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Figure  5-14: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 using UGF method 
 
Table  5-4: Time-dependent reliability analysis of intermediate and final u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆4 
u-function 𝑅𝑅4(1)  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹4  𝑅𝑅4(1/7)  𝑅𝑅4(30/7)  𝑡𝑡;  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  𝑅𝑅4(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999  
𝑈𝑈4,5(𝑧𝑧)  0.8270 5.2632 0.9732 0.4430 0.005 
𝑈𝑈4,6(𝑧𝑧)  0.7866 4.1667 0.9663 0.3575 0.004 
𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧)  0.7334 3.2258 0.9567 0.2649 0.0032 
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Figure  5-15: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 using UGF method 
 
Table  5-5: Time-dependent reliability analysis of intermediate and final u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆5 
u-function 𝑅𝑅5(1)  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹5  𝑅𝑅5(1/7)  𝑅𝑅5(30/7)  𝑡𝑡;  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅5(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999 
𝑈𝑈5,6(𝑧𝑧)  0.8437 5.8824 0.9760 0.4826 0.006 
𝑈𝑈6,7(𝑧𝑧)  0.7788 4 0.9649 0.3425 0.004 
𝑈𝑈5,8(𝑧𝑧)  0.7153 2.9851 0.9533 0.2379 0.0029 
𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧)  0.6538 2.3529 0.9411 0.1618 0.0024 
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Figure  5-16: ISMM-based time-dependent reliability analysis for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 using UGF method 
 
Table  5-6: Time-dependent reliability analysis of intermediate and final u-functions for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
u-function 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(1)  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(1/7)  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(30/7)  𝑡𝑡;  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 0.999  
𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧)  0.9727 6.7308 0.9994 0.6675 0.18 
𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧)  0.9303 6.3058 0.9924 0.5940 0.018 
𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧)  0.8002 3.5742 0.9708 0.31849 0.005 
𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧)  0.7334 3.2258 0.9567 0.2649 0.0032 
𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧)  0.6538 2.3529 0.9412 0.1618 0.0024 
𝑈𝑈6(𝑧𝑧)  0.9049 4.0814 0.9918 0.3965 0.0195 
𝑈𝑈7(𝑧𝑧)  0.7241 2.2479 0.9628 0.1263 0.0039 
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 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
𝑡𝑡 
𝑟𝑟1 
 𝑈𝑈1(𝑧𝑧) 𝑈𝑈2(𝑧𝑧) 𝑈𝑈3(𝑧𝑧) 𝑈𝑈4(𝑧𝑧) 𝑈𝑈5(𝑧𝑧) 𝑈𝑈6(𝑧𝑧) 𝑈𝑈7(𝑧𝑧) 𝑈𝑈8(𝑧𝑧) 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧) 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 
𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺) 
𝑟𝑟4 
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 𝑈𝑈8(𝑧𝑧)  0.5311 1.414 0.9211 0.0334 0.0017 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧)  0.3472 0.9134 0.8668 0.0054 0.0012 
 
Maturity analysis: As mentioned earlier, the derivative of the u-function at 𝑧𝑧 = 1, i.e.,  𝑑
𝑑𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1), 
gives the corresponding reliability, which represents the performance measure for establishing the 
maturity function. Since we are using the same exponential model assumptions and failure rates, 
maturity calculation should follow analytically and graphically to the same results and observations 
found earlier of this example in section  4.4.3. The similarity in the analysis also includes optimizing 
the mission time 𝑡𝑡 to reach certain reliability and maturity goals. According to the u-function 
representation, the maturity acceptability test based in this setting, however, is written by 
𝐼�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)� = 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1) ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1)�� 
= 𝐼 � 𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖� ,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5;  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡 = 1 
Applying this procedure leads us to construct the following tests, 
𝐼 �
𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔1(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟1� = 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑔2(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟2� = 1 
𝐼 �
𝑑
𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈𝑔3(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟3� = 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔4(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟4� = 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈𝑔5(1) ≥ 𝑟𝑟5� = 0 
 As a result, 
ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ℳ𝑈𝐺𝐹 = �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑆𝑆) 𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡. �∏ 𝐼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1) ≥ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑 � 𝑑𝑑𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑖(1)��𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 � = 1� = 2  
5.6 Summary 
The advantage of extending reliability analysis methods to solve the evaluation problem of 
operational capabilities of security systems has been established in  Chapter 4. Such an extension 
allows one particularly to establish availability and reliability measures, and build accordingly 
quantitative maturity analysis. 
In this chapter, we have introduced another evaluation approach to address the evaluation problem 
of security systems more universally, i.e., in multistate settings using multiple performance measures. 
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 This approach is based on previous work of MSS systems and the UGF method. Using the same case 
study as in Section  3.11, we have demonstrated analytically and numerically how to establish 
structural evaluation of various permutations of intermediate u-functions towards the product u-
function in a systematic and progressive manner. Being based on the same model inputs, this 
demonstration has also shown that both the reliability-theoretic method and the MSS UGF-based 
method lead to the same results, mutually validating each other. This method, however, allows one to 
design and audit security systems considering multistate controls and using a wider range of 
performance measures. 
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 Chapter 6 
Risk Assessment Using Asset-Control Bayesian Networks 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed earlier, the development of system-level, quantitative security evaluation methods fills a 
gap in both research and industry. These methods can be used to build more-secure, reliable systems. 
The abstraction of a computing system into a set of assets and a set of controls represents a 
fundamental abstraction paradigm for this work. Previous chapters have approached the evaluation 
problem by modeling the relationships among the set of controls only. More specifically,  Chapter 3 
has shown how to build the logical arrangement of a security system into the ISMM model, capturing 
the relationships among its controls into RBDs, vectors, and structure functions. Then,  Chapter 4 has 
shown how to build on such system representation by extending minimal path and cut sets methods 
and reliability analysis from reliability theory, as a means to evaluating operational capabilities of a 
security system and establish its maturity analysis. To make the modeling and evaluation method 
universal in terms of performance measures and controls states,  Chapter 5 has extended the MSS 
UGF method into ISMM model, demonstrating both system representation and analysis aspects as 
well. 
This chapter approaches the evaluation problem by examining the relationship of both sets of a 
computing system together: assets and controls. To establish the system model, we employ BNs to 
capture and bound the failure dependency among such entities. We then show how to use this 
representation to develop a new risk assessment method. An illustrative case study addressing risk 
mitigation under the cloud paradigm is presented. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section  6.2 describes the overall approach of the 
proposed risk assessment method. Then, the necessary notation and definition of this part are 
introduced in Section  6.3. Section  6.4 describes the asset-control BN as the candidate system model. 
Section  6.5 then explains the risk assessment method, showing both node- and system-level analysis 
equations, followed by features of this model in Section  6.6. The illustrative case study is presented in 
Section  6.7, showing its system description, model representation, and risk assessment. This work is 
further supported by two mathematical proofs in Section  6.8. The first is related to a specific bound 
on the risk function, and the other is on the distinction property between high-frequency low-impact 
and low-frequency high-impact events. 
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 6.2 Approach 
Computing paradigms are evolving by nature, leading to new forms of capabilities and challenges. 
The new paradigm of cloud computing, as an example, has led to new forms of complexity, 
uncertainty, and associated risks in security and privacy. It requires threat and risk system-level 
models that can quantitatively incorporate a cloud's resources, its offered services, and associated 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) into the assessment process. Nevertheless, regardless of 
advancements in the computing field, a system's components can still be intrinsically abstracted into 
two main classes: assets and controls. The interaction between these two classes creates a certain 
dependency with respect to failure that defines the security posture of the system, including its risk 
manageability. This work employs this abstraction and demonstrates how Bayesian Networks (BNs) 
can model such failure dependency to develop a new approach for risk assessment. This approach 
tackles three main challenges in current risk models. The first involves security failure quantification 
using the impact of failure statistics as opposed to underlying failure mechanisms, reducing the 
complexity of the failure space. The second resolves the distinction problem between high-frequency 
low-impact events and low-frequency high-impact ones by employing the casual effect property 
defined by BN topology. The third facilitates various useful inferences and types of analysis using 
BN formalism.  
Traditional probabilistic risk assessment, however, employs both inductive and deductive 
approaches. Deductive methods are used to analyse underlying causes of an undesired event, whereas 
inductive methods are used to analyse the resulting effects and enumerate possible scenarios of 
undesired events [74]. The proposed modeling approach offers a new risk assessment method that 
bounds the relationships among undesired events using BNs. Being based on BNs, the method 
encompasses both inductive and deductive logic [142]. 
This work required the extension and integration of four studies, leading to the steps depicted in 
Figure  6-1: system-level abstraction into assets and controls, introduced in Section  3.4; the failure 
model from dependability theory, presented in Section  3.5; system model using Bayesian networks 
from graph theory, explained in Section  6.4; and risk assessment from security engineering, explained 
in section  6.5. The first three components of this approach have been published in [149], [150], [151] 
to introduce asset-control graph and evaluate failure dependency in access control models. 
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Figure  6-1: Approach of asset-control risk assessment 
 
6.3 Notation and Definitions 
Appendix B summarises the notation necessary to demonstrate this work. Recall the definitions of 
assets and controls in Section  3.3, and that this work is centered on analyzing the failure relationship 
among assets and controls when both are seen as the distinct abstracts of a computing system, as 
depicted in Figure  3-2. Furthermore, recall the failure definition in Section  3.5, which is the deviation 
from correct service, including both malicious and nonmalicious failures, with the level of abstraction 
based on the impact, not the underlying failure mechanisms. 
Asset tag: A label associated with each asset to represent certain attributes of interest to the 
analysis. In this work, the tag of asset 𝑖𝑖 is represented by 
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) = �𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)�, 
where the term 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)  ∈  ℜ+ is the asset value, represented in countable units, say monetary units. 
Impact factor 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) ∈ ℜ+ represents the extent of the damage of asset 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 in the case of failure, 
including tangible and intangible losses. 
Control tag: A label associated with each control to represent its attributes of interest. The tag of 
control 𝑖𝑖 is represented by 
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) = (𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ),𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ),𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )), 
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 where 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) ∈ ℜ+ is the control cost8, represented in the same unit as that used for asset value. The 
impact factor 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) ∈ ℜ+ is similar to the impact factor of assets, since controls are part of the 
total assets too. The control process goal is represented by 𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) ∈ {𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙, 
𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙,𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙}, and 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) ∈ {𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝,𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝 ,𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝}.  
As with existing risk management practices, the information contained in these tags can be 
compiled during the early phases of the risk management process of the system of interest [10], [11]. 
In [10] for instance, costs of controls are calculated based on estimates of annual implementation 
costs, including worker times, hardware equipment, software packages, administrative overhead, and 
awareness programs. 
6.4 Asset-control Bayesian Network 
The main idea of asset-control BN is to use graph theory to capture probabilistically the topology of 
the system configuration and associated failure dependency among its components. To show this, 
consider a system 𝑺 of 𝑛𝑛 components, i.e., 𝑺 = {𝑆𝑆1, 𝑆𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛}, where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is an asset or control, the 
mapping procedure into system model is established as follows. 
 𝑺
  𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑠 𝜆𝜆𝑜     
���������  𝑿,𝑮 = (𝑽,𝑬) ( 6-1) 
where, 
1. 𝑮 is a directed acyclic graph. 
2. Vertices 𝑽 = {𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑨,𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑆𝑆 𝑪}, represented by the set of random variables 𝑿 that 
makes up the nodes of the network. 
3. Edges 𝑬 = {𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆} are defined by the failure dependency among BN 
nodes where a directed link reflects the probable impact of failure of the initial vertex on 
the terminal vertex, i.e., of a control or asset on another control or asset. 
4. 𝑷 is conditional probability distribution over 𝑽, represented by the conditional probability 
tables (CPT). It basically quantifies the effect of the parents' failure on each node. 
The goal of this mapping method is to bind, qualitatively and quantitatively, the failure behaviour, 
i.e., dependency and impact, among assets and controls using BN topology and CPTs, respectively. 
8 Note that 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is control 𝑖𝑖. 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) is cost function of control 𝑖𝑖. 
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 Moreover, additional feature space pertaining to various attributes of assets and controls is attached to 
graph nodes. These attributes are called asset and control tags and are specific to the evaluation 
method in use, which is the risk assessment in this work. Example attributes of assets are asset value 
𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) and impact factor 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)); and example attributes of controls are cost 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), impact 
factor 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), process goal 𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), and control type 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖).  
The combined use of this BN-based modeling and the failure model makes a suitable match 
between the level of abstraction of failure and corresponding BN input parameter values. In 
particular, contrary to the intractable enumeration of all possible space of failure causes of system 
components (i.e., the full space of fault-error-failure chain), realisable failure effects are used in the 
model (i.e., failure statistics). In the Bayesian sense, these effects are modeled by BN random 
variables, which can be observed, hypothesized, or latent variables. As practiced in BN reasoning, 
initial failure prior probabilities of individual system components might come from historical data, 
operational field data, experiments, expert knowledge, and/or engineering estimates. Then, as new 
information arrives, nodes belief can be updated through their prior or posterior probabilities [165], 
making the subjective interpretation of probability in the Bayesian approach an attractive choice in 
the case of security [9].  
In this work, we restrict ourselves to explaining the proposed evaluation method, excluding the 
structure and parameter learning problems of BNs. However, BN capabilities, including learning and 
reasoning techniques, are readily adoptable by the proposed method; therefore, their limitations are 
inherited too. The interested reader is referred to [32], [165] for various exact and approximate 
algorithms in BN learning.  
Figure  6-2 depicts an example of a BN with 12 nodes of assets and controls. Controls {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,𝑋𝑋3} 
are root nodes. The parents of asset 𝑋𝑋6 are controls {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋4}. The children of asset 𝑋𝑋6 are assets {𝑋𝑋9,𝑋𝑋10}. The descendants of asset 𝑋𝑋6 are assets {𝑋𝑋9,𝑋𝑋10,𝑋𝑋12}. The nondescendants of asset 𝑋𝑋6 are 
assets {𝑋𝑋7,𝑋𝑋8,𝑋𝑋11} and controls {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,𝑋𝑋3,𝑋𝑋4,𝑋𝑋5}. The general flow of dependency relationships 
normally initiates from root controls protecting, and hence influencing, other control and/or asset 
nodes, which in turn, propagate through the remaining asset nodes, and eventually influence the 
system's threshold node. Note that it is not necessary that all controls influence all assets. Rather, the 
relationship is defined according to the protection/failure causal dependency; similarly, not all nodes, 
whether controls or assets, should influence the system node. 
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Figure  6-2: An example of an asset-control Bayesian network 
 
6.5 Risk Assessment Method Using Asset-Control BNs 
Risk is generally defined as the product of the likelihood of an event occurring and the impact that 
this event would have on an asset. The traditional method for measurement of computer-related risks 
is usually calculated by 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂 × 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸, 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚, ( 6-2) 
which involves finding the quantities of threats, vulnerabilities, and corresponding assets and impacts 
[10]. This method, however, has been criticized for several reasons, among them, and most 
importantly, 1) its heavy reliance on likelihood quantities that are subjective and very hard to measure 
[19], [30]; 2) its inability to distinguish between high-frequency low-impact events and low-
frequency high-impact ones9 [10]; and 3) its inability to predict threats or failures [30]. 
The proposed approach, however, offers a different method for assessing risk, using asset-control 
BN. The asset-control BN, as the system model, captures inductively the failure dependency 
9 While in many cases high-frequency low-impact events can be manageable as incremental costs, low-
frequency, high-impact events can be catastrophic [10]. 
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 relationship between assets and controls of a computing system. The risk assessment method then 
employs this representation to extract the likelihood and impact quantities necessary to establish 
quantitative risk assessment at both the component and system levels. Thus, this method provides two 
groups of equations addressing various aspects of risk: the first addresses risk calculations at the node 
level, and the second addresses risk calculations at the system level. Both groups employ the BN 
topology, CPTs, BN reasoning, and asset and control tags to quantify risks in question. 
Generally, each risk calculation in this method involves the multiplication of the 
quantities 𝑃𝑃(. ), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(. ), and 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(. ). The likelihood term 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂 in ( 6-2) is found by the probability 
𝑃𝑃(. ), which is derived from BN. The impact term 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 is found by 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(. ) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(. ), given by the 
asset and control tags. The quantities 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(. ) and 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(. ), however, can still be established using 
common techniques in current risk assessment methods. 
6.5.1 Node-level Equations 
The objective of this section is to show how one can compute node-level risk for three different forms 
of scenarios: 1) node risk, 2) node risk with evidence, and 3) node risk with exclusions. 
To demonstrate the first form, let 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) denote the annual loss expectancy of node, or 
component, 𝑖𝑖. Recall that failure behaviour for any node (including impacted nodes) is now bounded 
qualitatively and quantitatively by BN topology and CPT, respectively. Using this representation, we 
define 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) as the risk quantity resulting from the failure of node 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 and its consequent failures, 
and it is calculated by10 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛{𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖} = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑗/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑗∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋𝑖)  ( 6-3) 
where 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = � 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙. ( 6-4) 
and 
10 We use 𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = "𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒"} = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), where success state means failure event in this context. 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛�𝑋𝑋𝑗/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖� = �𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑗/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖� × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝�𝑋𝑋𝑗� × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙�𝑋𝑋𝑗�, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑋𝑋𝑗 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑗/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖� × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝�𝑋𝑋𝑗� × 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�𝑋𝑋𝑗�, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑋𝑋𝑗 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙. ( 6-5) 
The first term in ( 6-3), 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), represents the direct risk quantity from 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 failure, and is 
calculated by ( 6-4). The probability 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) is derived from the CPT, and the quantities 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) and 
𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) (or 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)) are given by the node tag. The second term, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛{𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖}, represents the 
consequent risk quantity from 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 failure, which is bounded by BN topology, and is calculated using 
( 6-5). Similarly, the conditional probability 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑗/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) is derived from the CPT, and the quantities 
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑗) and 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑗) (or 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)) are given by the corresponding node tag. Thus, risk is generally 
represented by the direct risk of the node in question plus the consequent risk from its descendants. 
The latter term is sometimes called descendant risk. 
The cases in ( 6-4) and ( 6-5) represent similar calculations, but 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(. ) is used to denote that the 
node in question is an asset, whereas 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(. ) is used to denote that the node is essentially a control. 
Henceforth, 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(. ) is used to represent both cases. 
The second form of queries involves inference of risk given some evidence of failure (or non-
failure) as follows. To find the annual loss expectancy of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 conditioned on particular evidence, say 
𝑋𝑋𝑗 's occurrence, we write 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑗) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑗) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛{𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑗} = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖/𝑥𝑥𝑗) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑘/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑗)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑘∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋𝑖)  
( 6-6) 
where 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑘/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑗) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑘) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑘) ( 6-7) 
The first term in ( 6-6), 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑗), can be computed using ( 6-5), and the second term, 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛{𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑗} is found using ( 6-7). This form allows us to calculate the risk when we have 
evidence about some node 𝑋𝑋𝑗, i.e., failure or non-failure, affecting the node in question, i.e., 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖. 
Therefore, the conditioning on 𝑋𝑋𝑗 starts at the top node and propagates downward along with 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 to the 
impacted nodes, i.e., its descendants, as well. For risk diagnosis, the inference is made from children 
to parents, and for risk prediction, the inference is made from parents to children. 
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 The third form involves exclusions as follows. To find the annual loss expectancy of node 𝑖𝑖, 
excluding a certain set of nodes 𝑿−𝑖𝑖, we write
11 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖\𝑿−𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛{𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)\𝑿−𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖} = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑗/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑋𝑗\𝑿−𝑖)∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋𝑖)  
( 6-8) 
Similarly, the first term in ( 6-8), 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), can be found using ( 6-4), and the second term, 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛{𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)\𝑿−𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖}, can be found using ( 6-5). This form of queries can be used to evaluate 
alternative design options and mitigation measures to control risk. For example, it can be used to 
measure the residual risk in the case of moving some applications or platforms into the cloud. 
Note that both conditioning and exclusion keys, represented in ( 6-6) and ( 6-8), respectively, can be 
combined into the same risk query. 
Furthermore, two remarkable bounds of the risk associated with the system threshold in the case of 
evidence of its failure, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠)12P, can be established with respect to its parents 𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠): 1) it is 
lower than any of its diagnosis-based risks, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠), i.e., 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) < 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠), 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠); ( 6-9) 
and, 2) it is higher than (or equal to) any of its prediction-based risks, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), i.e., 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). ( 6-10) 
The intuitions behind these two bounds make consistent arguments with their calculations. In ( 6-9), 
when the failure of a system’s threshold node is realised (i.e., is not a probabilistic figure anymore), 
its direct 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 is incurred. Thus, finding the likelihood of parents' risk given this evidence 
(i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠)) will include the probable conditional risk terms of those parent nodes in addition 
to the certain risk term of the system threshold. In ( 6-10), the risk associated with the probable system 
threshold failure in the evidence of failure of any of its parents is less than (or equal to) the risk 
associated with the system threshold certain failure (i.e., when 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) = 1). The equality in this bound 
occurs when 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 1. The mathematical proof for these two bounds is provided later in 
Section  6.8. 
11 We use backslash to denote the exclusion part of the argument of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(. ) function. 
12 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) is different than 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). The former represents system threshold risk in the evidence of 
system-level failure, i.e., 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) = 1, whereas the later represents system threshold risk when failure is probable. 
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 6.5.2 System-level Equations 
The objective of this section is to show how to compute system-level risk for three different tasks: 1) 
a system’s threshold risk, 2) a system's direct risk (i.e., risk of individual nodes alone, not including 
descendants’ risks), and 3) a system's total risk paths (i.e., both direct and descendant risk quantities). 
The first task is finding the risk of the system reaching its threshold failure point. This task is 
denoted as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) and defined by the calculated risk of the system's leaf node, i.e., 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) ( 6-11) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 in this case is the leaf node that represents the system threshold. Note that the probability 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), by definition of BN, absorbs the probabilities of nodes that have a risk path toward system-
level failures. 
The second task for a system is finding the total number of direct risk quantities of its individual 
nodes. This task is denoted as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑿) and defined by 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑿) = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖∈𝑿  = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋1) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋2) + ⋯+ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) ( 6-12) 
This equation sums up the risks associated with individual nodes of the system, not including their 
descendants' risks (i.e., consequent risks). 
The third task is finding the number of total risk paths of the system. This task is denoted as 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑿) and calculated by 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑿) = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖∈𝑿  = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2) + ⋯+ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) ( 6-13) 
This equation sums up the risks associated with individual nodes of the system, including their 
descendants' risks. 
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 Similarly to node-level queries, both conditioning and exclusion keys can be used in system-level 
queries. It is also remarkable that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(. ) is a monotonic increasing function of the values 
𝑃𝑃(. ), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(. ), and 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(. ), and is additive over its nodes. 
6.6 Features 
The proposed risk assessment offers a plausible method for assigning numeric values to the likelihood 
and impact of risk and to the costs and benefits of alternative configurations of the system. 
In light of the criticisms of traditional risk assessment methods mentioned earlier, we present three 
features of this approach. First, contrary to traditional risk models, this formalism extends our system 
abstraction and failure model, defined earlier, to BN representation. This combination makes the 
domain of 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) inclusive of malicious and nonmalicious incidents of the likelihood statistics of 
threats and vulnerabilities summarized into the links going to 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, with the cascaded effect of failure 
summarized in the links outgoing from 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖. In this formalism, BN topology is employed in defining 
failure and its cascaded impact, thereby bounding the qualitative part of the risk behavior. CPTs are 
employed in deriving associated likelihood and impact calculations, thus bounding the quantitative 
part of the risk behavior. As a result, this bounding technique addresses the difficulty associated with 
traditional risk assessment methods with respect to calculating likelihood quantities for each pair of a 
threat and an asset in the system individually, which are subjective and very hard to measure. It also 
incorporates the operational dynamics of controls in the analysis as more failure data feeds lead to 
updating BN prior and posterior probabilities. 
Second, in addition to calculating the direct risk quantity of a given node, say 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 (by computing 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)), consequent risk quantities are added as defined by BN topology (by computing 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛{𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖}). The addition of other risk terms as a result of the risk of the initial node 
addresses the distinction problem between high-frequency low-impact events and low-frequency 
high-impact ones. Further, it shows that the probabilities of failure and risk calculations associated 
with high-frequency low-impact events are lower than the corresponding figures in the opposite 
scenario. This property builds an agreement with the observation that, while in many cases high-
frequency low-impact events can be manageable as incremental costs, low-frequency high-impact 
events can be catastrophic [10]. The mathematical proof of this property is presented later in 
Section  6.8. 
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 Third, the adoption of BNs inherently facilitates consistent reasoning, inferences, and prediction of 
threats, failures, and associated risks. This facilitation comes naturally with existing, well-founded 
algorithms and tools for such BN primitives. 
6.7 Case Study 
In this section, we demonstrate the proposed risk assessment method using a common scenario 
influenced by the transition toward cloud services. However, we emphasize that the proposed 
concepts hold and the method is applicable to computing systems in general. 
First, we describe the scenario, and then demonstrate how to build the corresponding BN 
representation, followed by a brief demonstration of simple risk assessment exercises. We employed 
the Junction Tree inference algorithm using BN Toolbox (BNT) in MATLAB [166] to calculate BN 
inferences. 
6.7.1 System Description 
Consider the scenario in Figure  6-3. It basically represents a small web-based application where 
access control is implemented by an authentication server for computer security and by a biometric 
reader over a server farm for physical security. Assume that the failure relationship between assets 
and controls is summarized by the statement that the failure of either the authentication server 𝑆𝑆1 or 
the biometric reader 𝑆𝑆2 leads to failure of the web application 𝑆𝑆3, which in turn, might lead to failure 
of system operations overall. In this scenario 𝑺 = {𝑆𝑆1,𝑆𝑆2, 𝑆𝑆3}, and we call it Scenario 1. 
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Figure  6-3: Scenario 1: outline of asset and control entities13 
 
As an alternative design and a risk mitigation measure, the management wants to assess the risk 
transference option associated with moving the web-based application into the cloud. This option 
represents an application of the Software as a Service (SaaS) model of the cloud paradigm. With this 
risk mitigation measure, assume that there will be no need to keep the authentication server 𝑆𝑆1 or the 
biometric reader 𝑆𝑆2 anymore. To avoid confusion of notation, we add the subscript "𝑠𝑠" to the notation 
under the cloud configuration, so, in this scenario 𝑺𝒄 = {𝑆𝑆3𝑐}, and we call it Scenario 2. We also 
assume that all other parameters for these scenarios are fixed. This option is depicted in Figure  6-4. 
Note that we intentionally chose a small number of nodes to demonstrate the method and simplify the 
analysis of the web-based application's options. However, these nodes can be a subset of a larger set 
of nodes representing a complete computing environment, where the analysis will be more complex 
but should follow similarly. 
13 Note that squares denote component’s class, and circles encode asset-control failure relationships (i.e., the 
failure of either 𝑆𝑆1 or 𝑆𝑆2 leads to failure of 𝑆𝑆3). 
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Figure  6-4: Scenario 2: cloud SaaS model14 
 
6.7.2 Model Representation Using Asset-Control BN 
First, we consider building the BN of the original configuration depicted in Figure  6-3. The 
corresponding BN topology is mapped directly using the qualitative failure behavior assumption 
defined earlier. Doing so leads us to define the BN conditional independence statements among 
system components, as depicted in Figure  6-5. To demonstrate some quantitative assessment, assume 
binary failure events of components, represented by binary random variables, which are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive states of the probability of the failure space; assume the 
knowledge of the conditional probability tables (CPTs) as compiled in Table  6-1; and also assume the 
knowledge of tags information as compiled in Table  6-2. 
As a result, 𝑺 is modeled by 𝑿,𝑮 = (𝑽,𝑬), and 𝑷 as follows: 
1. 𝑮 is a directed acyclic graph. 
2. 𝑿 = {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,𝑋𝑋3,𝑋𝑋4}, Vertices 𝑽 = {𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑨,𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑆𝑆 𝑪}, where 
𝑨 = {𝑋𝑋3,𝑋𝑋4}, 𝑪 = {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2}. 
3. Edges 𝑬 = {𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆}, where 
14 The web-based application is moved into the cloud, including its protection cost and associated risks. Thus, 
𝑆𝑆1 and 𝑆𝑆2 are eliminated from the configuration. 
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 𝑬 = {(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋3), (𝑋𝑋2,𝑋𝑋3), (𝑋𝑋3,𝑋𝑋4)}.  
4. P is conditional probability distribution over V, represented by CPTs in Table  6-1. 
Note that the overall system 𝑋𝑋4 is a leaf node, a virtual one used to represent the collective failure 
of system components when these are considered as a whole. This representation can be useful to 
define the paths and threshold point that can lead to determining the system to be in a failure state. 
 
 
Figure  6-5: Scenario 1: BN representation15 
 
  
15 Note that 𝑋𝑋4 is added to model the failure threshold of the system. 
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 Table  6-1: Example data for conditional probability tables of the BN 
𝑋𝑋1      𝑋𝑋2    
Y N    Y N  
0.05 0.95    0.15 0.85  
        
𝑋𝑋3/𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋2      𝑋𝑋4/𝑋𝑋3    
  𝑋𝑋3    𝑋𝑋4  
𝑋𝑋1  𝑋𝑋2  Y N  𝑋𝑋3  Y N 
Y Y 0.40 0.60  Y 0.23 0.77 
Y N 0.10 0.90  N 0.08 0.92 
N Y 0.22 0.78     
N N 0.05 0.95     
 
Table  6-2: Scenario 1: example data for asset and control tags of the BN 
Node Description Type Tags: 
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) = (𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖))  
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) = �𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖),𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖),𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)�  
𝑋𝑋1 authentication server Control (12, 0.46,𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝)  
𝑋𝑋2 biometric reader Control (11, 0.50,𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙,𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝)  
𝑋𝑋3 web application Asset (30, 0.80)  
𝑋𝑋4 overall system Asset (55, 1.20)  
 
Alternatively, when the cloud solution is considered, the risks associated with the web application 
𝑆𝑆3, the authentication server 𝑆𝑆1, and the biometric reader 𝑆𝑆2 are understood to have been transferred 
to the cloud. Let 𝑋𝑋3𝑐 be a r.v. representing the state of failure of the aggregation of the web 
application and associated controls under the cloud, and 𝑋𝑋4𝑐 be a r.v. representing the new system 
threshold state of failure. The corresponding BN is depicted in Fig. 7, and 𝑺𝒄 is modeled by 𝑿𝒄,𝑮𝒄 =(𝑽𝒄,𝑬𝒄), and 𝑷𝒄 as follows: 
1. 𝑮𝒄 is a directed acyclic graph. 
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 2. 𝑽𝒄 = 𝑿𝒄 = {𝑋𝑋3𝑐,𝑋𝑋4𝑐}. 
3. 𝑬𝒄 = {(𝑋𝑋3𝑐 ,𝑋𝑋4𝑐)}. 
4. 𝑷𝒄 is CPT over 𝑽𝒄 
 
 
Figure  6-6: Scenario 2: BN representation16 
 
For consistency of the analysis, we further assume that 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔(𝑋𝑋4𝑐) = 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔(𝑋𝑋4) and 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋3𝑐) =
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋3), while the quantities 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋3𝑐), 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3𝑐), 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥4𝑐/𝑥𝑥3𝑐), 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥4𝑐/𝑥𝑥3𝑐), and 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥4𝑐) remain in 
question. These quantities represent key decision points when determining the feasibility of the 
alternative solution. They can be used as input figures for the Quality of Service (QoS) metrics and 
SLA protocols between the cloud provider and user. Therefore, we do not intend to assign 
hypothetical values for these variables; rather, we present them in the analysis as decision bounds 
with respect to the calculations performed on Scenario 1. 
6.7.3 Risk Assessment and Analysis 
We briefly explore some demonstration queries. We first demonstrate the calculations based on 
Scenario 1, followed by comparisons with ideal bounds for Scenario 2. The ideal region in this 
context is defined for cases in which the cloud configuration could outperform the original 
configuration operationally and economically, i.e., where failure probability and risk measures of 𝑋𝑋3𝑐 
equal or exceed the corresponding measures of the worst-case scenario among 𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, and 𝑋𝑋3. 
16 Note that 𝑋𝑋4𝑐 is added to model the new failure threshold of the system. 
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 Node-level analysis: Recall that the first form of node-level risk calculations is finding 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖). For 
Scenario 1, to calculate the risk (i.e., annual loss expectancy) associated with the failure of the 
biometric reader 𝑋𝑋2, we write
17 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋2) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑗/𝑋𝑋2)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑗∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋2)  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋2) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋2) +P(𝑥𝑥3/𝑥𝑥2) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋3) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋3) +P(𝑥𝑥4/𝑥𝑥2) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋4) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋4) = (0.15 × 0.50 × 11) +(0.229 × 0.80 × 30) +(0.114 × 1.20 × 55) = 14 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆. 
Based on this result, we can say that there is a probability of losing a prevention access control 
function implemented by the physical control 𝑋𝑋2 of 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) = 0.15. This probable event might cause 
damage of about 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2) = 14 units, whereby the control current direct investment, or cost, 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶2) = 11 units, designed to contribute to the protection of assets18 of a total value of 
𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙�𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋2)� = 30 + 55 = 85 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆. 
Applying the same calculations on the authentication server, we find that there is a probability of 
losing a prevention access control function implemented by the technical control 𝑋𝑋1 of 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) = 0.05. 
This probable event might cause damage of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1) = 10 units, whereby the control current direct 
cost 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶1) = 12 units, designed to contribute to the protection of the same assets of a total value of 85 units. 
In addition, the probability of failure of the web application 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3) = 0.08, with a probable damage 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3) = 17  units, whereby the asset direct value 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋3) = 30 units, impacting another asset of 
a total value of 55 units. 
17 Risk calculations are rounded. 
18 As controls can themselves be assets, we use “assets” to denote direct system assets, i.e., {𝑋𝑋3,𝑋𝑋4}, of a total 
value of 85 units, and we use “total assets” to denote all assets, including controls, i.e., {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,𝑋𝑋3,𝑋𝑋4}, of a 
total value of 108 units. 
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 The second form of node-level calculations is evidence-based risk. For example on risk diagnosis, 
in the case of evidence of failure of the system threshold 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, the probability that the cause was due to 
the biometric reader is found by 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2/𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) = 0.187, and the associated risk is calculated by 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2/X𝑠𝑠) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋2/X𝑠𝑠) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑘/𝑋𝑋2X𝑠𝑠)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑘∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋2)  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2/𝑥𝑥4) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋2) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋2) +P(𝑥𝑥3/𝑥𝑥2𝑥𝑥4) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋3) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋3) +P(𝑥𝑥4/𝑥𝑥2𝑥𝑥4) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋4) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋4) = (0.187 × 0.50 × 11) +(0.461 × 0.80 × 30) +(1 × 1.20 × 55) = 78 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆. 
In contrast, the probability that the system failure 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 was due to a failure initiated at the 
authentication server 𝑋𝑋1 is given by 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1/𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) = 0.055, with the accumulated risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) = 74 
units. However, the probability of failure of the web application 𝑋𝑋3 given the evidence of system 
failure is 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3/𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) = 0.20, with the associated risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) = 71 units. 
For example on risk prediction, in the case of evidence of failure of the biometric reader 𝑋𝑋2, the 
probability of system failure 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥2) = 0.114, and the associated risk is calculated by19 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/X2) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/X2) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑘/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠X2)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑘∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋𝑠)  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥2) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) + ALE𝑛𝑛{∅} = (0.114 × 1.20 × 55) + 0 = 8 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆. 
In contrast, the probability of system failure 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, given the evidence of failure of the authentication 
server 𝑋𝑋1, is given by 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥1) = 0.102, with the accumulated risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋1) = 7 units. 
Nonetheless, the probability of system failure given the evidence of failure of the web application 𝑋𝑋3 
is 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥3) = 0.23, with the associated risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋3) = 15 units. 
19 Note that the second term in the equation here equals 0 because the prediction is made about a leaf node; 
otherwise, the descendants will not be the empty set, and therefore, additional consequent risks will be incurred. 
196 
                                                     
 The third form of node-level calculations involves risk exclusions. To further analyze the risk 
associated with the biometric reader 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2) when eliminating the risks associated with the web 
application 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3) and the overall system failure 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋4) from the risk path of the biometric 
reader 𝑋𝑋2, we compute 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2\X3X4) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋2) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑗/X2)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑋𝑗\X3X4)∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋2)  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋2) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋2) + ALE𝑛𝑛{∅} = (0.15 × 0.50 × 11) + 0 = 1 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. 
This result suggests a significant decrease of the risk associated with the biometric reader 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2) 
by 92.86%, its diagnosis-based risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) by 98.72%, and its prediction-based risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/
𝑋𝑋2) by 87.50% if more protection (e.g., an alternative design) is implemented to eliminate only the 
risk associated with the web application 𝑋𝑋3 from the risk path of 𝑋𝑋2, as 𝑋𝑋3 already cuts off the link 
(i.e., consequent risk) to 𝑋𝑋4. 
Similarly, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1\𝑋𝑋3𝑋𝑋4) = 0.30 unit, which shows a decrease of the risk associated with the 
authentication server 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1) by 97%, its diagnosis-based risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) by 99%, and its 
prediction-based risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋1) by 95.71% if only the web application's risk is eliminated. In 
addition, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3\𝑋𝑋4) = 2 units, which shows a decrease of the risk associated with the web 
application 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3) by 88.24%, its diagnosis-based risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) by 97.18%, and its 
prediction-based risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋3) by 86.67% if the web application's consequent risk is eliminated. 
To evaluate the bounds of the realised risk of system threshold when it fails 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠), proofed 
in the next section, we compute the quantity 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/X𝑠𝑠) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥4/𝑥𝑥4) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋4) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋4) = 1 × 1.20 × 55 = 66 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆. 
As shown, the bounds of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/X𝑠𝑠) hold with respect to its parents for both diagnosis-based 
risks, i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1/X𝑠𝑠),𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2/X𝑠𝑠), and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3/X𝑠𝑠); and prediction-based risks, i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/X1),𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/X2), and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/X3). 
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 With respect to maintaining the security controls locally (Scenario 1), these results suggest that the 
biometric reader has a higher probability of cause of failure to the system and a higher magnitude of 
risk, thus significance, compared to the authentication server. However, it also shows that the 
consequent risk quantities of both controls and the web application, due to their interdependency with 
system failure, represent the biggest contribution to system risk overall. 
To evaluate the plausibility of Scenario 2, the above results are summarized in Table  6-3 with the 
corresponding ideal region under the cloud configuration. These statistics show the anticipated ideal 
bounds of the probability of failure 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3𝑐), investment 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋3𝑐), and associated risk quantity 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3𝑐), as well as diagnosis-, prediction-, and exclusion-based probabilities and risks. 
 
Table  6-3: Node-level risk analysis: original vs. cloud configuration20 
 measure original configuration cloud configuration  
𝑋𝑋3𝑐 ideal bound  𝑋𝑋1  𝑋𝑋2  𝑋𝑋3  
node risk 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  12  11  30  𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋3𝑐) ≤ (12 + 11 + 30)  
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  0.05  0.15  0.08  𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3𝑐) ≤ 0.05  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  10  14  17  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3𝑐) ≤ 10  
diagnosis-based node risk 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖/𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠)  0.055  0.187  0.20  𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3𝑐/𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑐) ≤ 0.055  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠)  74  78 71 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3𝑐/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑐) ≤ 71 
prediction-based node risk 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  0.102  0.114  0.23  𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑐/𝑥𝑥3𝑐) ≤ 0.102  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  7  8  15  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑐/𝑋𝑋3𝑐) ≤ 7  
exclusion-based node risk 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  0.05  0.15  0.08  𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥3𝑐) ≤ 0.05  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖\𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖))  0.30  1  2  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3𝑐\𝑋𝑋4𝑐) ≤ 0.30  
 
System-level analysis: The analysis can be further augmented by performing some comparisons to 
system-level risk statistics. Recall that the first task is finding 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠), which represents the risk of a 
system reaching its threshold failure point. For Scenario 1, this task is defined at node 𝑋𝑋4 and 
computed by21 
20 Note that the column of cloud configuration shows the region of values as opposed to specific values, 
indicating where the cloud configuration could outperform the original one considering the cloud’s best-case 
scenario. 
21 In the context of this case study, 𝑋𝑋4 and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 are used interchangeably, as well as 𝑋𝑋4𝑐 and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑐. 
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 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋4) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥4) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋4) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋4) = 0.092 × 1.20 × 55 = 6 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆. 
The second task of system-level calculations is finding the system's direct risk, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑿), which 
can be found as follows 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝐗) = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖∈𝑿  = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X1) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X2) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X3) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X4) = 9 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆. 
The third task is finding the system's total risk paths (i.e., direct and consequent risk quantities), 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑿), which can be found as follows 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑿) = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖∈𝑿  = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋3) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋4) = 47 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆. 
Additionally, some ratio statistics can be added to the analysis. For example, to find the ratio of risk 
contribution of the biometric reader to the overall anticipated risk of the system, for a system’s direct 
risk, we compute 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X2)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝐗) = 19 = 11.11%, 
and for overall system risk paths, we write 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(X2)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝐗) = 1447 = 29.79%. 
The ratio of risk contribution of the authentication server to the overall anticipated risk of the 
system, for system direct risk, we compute 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X1)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝐗) = 0.309 = 3.33%, 
and for overall system risk paths, we write 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(X1)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝐗) = 1047 = 21.28%. 
Similarly, the ratio of risk contribution of the web application to the overall anticipated risk of the 
system, for system direct risk, we compute 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X3)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝐗) = 29 = 22.22%, 
and for overall system risk paths, we write 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(X3)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝐗) = 1747 = 36.17%. 
Adding up these risk quantities to see how much risk is being transferred to the cloud, for system 
direct risk, leads to 
∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X𝑖𝑖)𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝐗) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X1) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X2) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(X3)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝐗)  = 1 + 0.30 + 29  = 36.70%, 
and for total risk paths, we find 
∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(X𝑖𝑖)𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝐗) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(X1) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(X2) + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(X3)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝐗)  = 14 + 10 + 1747  = 87%. 
To find the ratio of the total investment of system protection over the value of its total assets, we 
compute 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐂)
𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝐗) = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�𝐶𝐶𝑗�𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑗∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖  = 23108 = 21.30%, 
which provides the system 𝑺 with a protection level up to the probability of failure: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) = 0.0918. 
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 Table  6-4 summarises some of the above statistics at system level, indicating the cloud's ideal 
region of bounds based on the calculated risk transference quantities. 
 
Table  6-4: System-level risk analysis: original vs. cloud configuration22 
 measure original configuration 
𝑿  
cloud configuration 
𝑿𝑐 ideal bound 
investment (total assets) ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖   108  ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖𝑐 ≤ 108  
protection (controls) ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑗)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑗   23  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑐)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑗𝑐 ≤ 23  
controls to total assets ratio 
∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑠𝜆𝜆(𝐶𝑗)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑗
∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑖)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖   23108 = 21.30%  ∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑠𝜆𝜆(𝐶𝑗𝑐)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑗𝑐∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑖𝑐)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑖𝑐 ≤ 21.30%  
threshold failure probability 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠)  0.0918  𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑐) ≤ 0.0918  
threshold risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠)  6  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑐) ≤ 6  
direct risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑿)  9  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑿𝒄) ≤ 9  
total risk paths 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑿)  47  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑿𝒄) ≤ 47  
transferable investment ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑠   12 + 11 + 30 = 53  𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋3𝑐) ≤ 53  
direct risk ratio: 
transferable to overall nodes 
∑ 𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑛(𝑋𝑖)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑛(𝑿)   36.70%  𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑛(𝑋3𝑐)𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑛(𝑿𝒄) ≤ 36.70%  
total risk paths ratio: 
transferable to overall nodes 
∑ 𝐴𝐿𝐸(𝑋𝑖)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝐿𝐸(𝑿)   87%  𝐴𝐿𝐸(𝑋3𝑐)𝐴𝐿𝐸(𝑿𝒄) ≤ 87%  
 
Figure  6-7 illustrates how the inferred 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) value and risk function 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) behave across the 
range of probability values for each of 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) individually, when all other parameters are 
fixed. Given the current case study inputs, the slopes of both 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) when 𝑋𝑋2 is 
considered—0.03 and 1.75, respectively—are higher than the corresponding slopes when 𝑋𝑋1 is 
considered: 0.01, 0.69. In addition, the y-intercept values of both 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) when 𝑋𝑋2 is 
considered—0.08 and 5.80, respectively—are smaller than their values when 𝑋𝑋1 is considered: 0.09, 6.03. Thus, the effect of the operational capabilities of the biometric reader 𝑋𝑋2 is more 
significant than the authentication server 𝑋𝑋1 with respect to both system-level metrics 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) and 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). 
22 Note that the column of cloud configuration shows the region of values as opposed to specific values, 
indicating where the cloud configuration could outperform the original one considering the cloud’s best-case 
scenario. 
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Figure  6-7: Evaluation of 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) over the range of probability values for both 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) and 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) individually23 
 
As a result, the investment in control 𝑋𝑋2 leads to increasing system-level security (by lowering 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) more and faster), decreasing risk (by lowering 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) more and faster), and therefore, 
increasing economical return more than the investment in control 𝑋𝑋1. Furthermore, the figure shows 
consistency and prediction features in the model using 𝑃𝑃(. ) and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(. ) functions. Figure  6-8 and 
Figure  6-9 further support such observations when the full range of 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) values are 
considered together. 
 
 
23 Current case study values are marked showing corresponding values on 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) axes. The graph 
shows that 𝑋𝑋2 is more significant than 𝑋𝑋1 with respect to both 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). 
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Figure  6-8: Evaluation of 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) over the range of probability values of both 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) 
together24 
 
Figure  6-9: Evaluation of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) over the range of probability values of both 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2) 
together25 
24 The graph shows how 𝑋𝑋2 increases/decreases 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) more and faster than 𝑋𝑋1 does. It also shows the 
consistency of such functions. 
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 6.8 Mathematical Proofs 
Two proofs are presented in this part. The first is for the property of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) bounds, and the 
second is for the distinction property of high-frequency low-impact from low-frequency high-impact 
events. 
6.8.1 Proof of 𝑨𝑳𝑬(𝑿𝑺/𝑿𝒔) Bounds 
We want to prove the relationship: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) ≤ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) < 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠), 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠),𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) ∉ {∅} 
The first part: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑘/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑘∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋𝑠)  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) +𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛{∅}, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒 
≤ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) = 1 × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠).  
Note that the equality occurs when 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 1. 
The second part: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑘/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑘∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋𝑖)  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖/𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) +⋯ , 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 +𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠), 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) > 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠/𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). 
Thus, the relationship holds ∎ 
25 The graph shows how 𝑋𝑋2 increases/decreases 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) more and faster than 𝑋𝑋1 does. It also shows the 
consistency of such functions. 
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 6.8.2 Proof of 𝑨𝑳𝑬(. ) Distinguishing High-frequency Low-impact from Low-frequency 
High-impact Events 
We want to show that for all 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑿,𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) ∉ {∅}, the function 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) returns two different yet 
consistent risk values for the cases: high 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), low 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖); and low 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), high 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖). To show 
that, let the subscripts 𝑙,ℎ denote low value and high value, respectively, taken by 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) and 
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖). This means 𝑙 is close to 0 and ℎ is close to 1. We prove the distinction property in the 
worst-case scenario, which occurs when 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 1 and 𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝ℎ(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 1.  
For high-frequency low-impact events, we write 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) as follows 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑗/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑗∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋𝑖)  = 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) +𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚), 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 +𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑘) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑘), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑘 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑒 
Note that in high-frequency low-impact events, consequent probabilities take low values 
representing low impact. Thus, 𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) and 𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) are considered. 
Similarly, for low-frequency high-impact events, denoted as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸� (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), we write 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸� (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸� 𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸� 𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑗/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑗∈𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑋𝑖)  = 𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝ℎ(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) +𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚), 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 +𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑘) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑘), 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑘 
Subtracting both risk terms leads to 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸� (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = [𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝ℎ(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)] +[𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚) − 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚)] +[𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑘) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑘) − 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑘) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑘)] = 0 +[𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) − 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)] × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚) +[𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) − 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)] × 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑘) × 𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝑋𝑋𝑘) 
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 Setting the result to 0 to check for equality conditions, where all the terms 𝑃𝑃(. ), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(. ),𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(. ) 
take positive values, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸� (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 0 only when 
𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 0.5 
and 
𝑃𝑃𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 0.5 
Thus, the distinction property holds ∎ 
The proof not only shows the distinction between high-frequency low-impact events and low-
frequency high-impact events, but it further reflects the behaviours of these two scenarios. For any 
given node, the curves of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖),𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠), and 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) in the case of low-frequency high-impact 
events are higher than those of high-frequency low-impact ones. This property coincides with the 
observation that, while in many cases high-frequency low-impact events can be manageable as 
incremental costs, low-frequency high-impact events can be catastrophic, as reported in [10]. 
Figure  6-10, Figure  6-11, and Figure  6-12 demonstrate this property on 𝑋𝑋1 in the original 
configuration of the case study presented earlier. 
 
 
Figure  6-10: Evaluation of distinction property proof based on 𝑋𝑋1,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1) scenario 
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1from low frequency, high impact to high frequency, low impact, 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) 
from high frequency, low impact to low frequency, high impact, 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1) 
𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸
(𝑋𝑋 1) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1),  𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1)  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋1),  𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1)   
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Figure  6-11: Evaluation of distinction property proof based on 𝑋𝑋1,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) scenario 
 
 
Figure  6-12: Evaluation of distinction property proof based on 𝑋𝑋1,𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠) scenario 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠),  𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1)   
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(𝑥𝑥 𝑠𝑠) 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠),  𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1)  
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠),  𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1)   
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 6.9 Summary 
The advantages of employing the logical structure of controls to solve the evaluation problem of 
operational capabilities of security systems have been established in the previous chapters. More 
specifically, system-level representation has been established in  Chapter 3 using the ISMM model 
and representation methods from reliability theory; the extension of evaluation methods from 
reliability theory has also been demonstrated  Chapter 4; and the extension of multi-state systems 
evaluation using the UGF method has been shown in  Chapter 5. Such extensions allow one to 
particularly establish various performance measures, such as availability and reliability measures, and 
to build accordingly quantitative maturity analysis. 
In this chapter, we have shown how the abstraction of a computing system into assets and controls 
can be further used to establish a different evaluation method in security studies. Building on this 
abstraction and the failure model explained earlier, this chapter contributes to existing work in risk 
assessment by considering the fact that computing paradigms are evolving by nature. We have first 
shown how to establish the system model of assets and controls using Bayesian networks, forming 
what we have called asset-control BN. Then we have explained and demonstrated the proposed risk 
assessment approach, addressing major challenges found in traditional risk assessment methods. 
Particularly, we have addressed the challenge of security failure quantification by using the impact of 
failure statistics as opposed to underlying failure mechanisms, reducing the complexity of the failure 
space. We have also illustrated how the model facilitates various useful inferences and types of 
analysis using BNs primitives. Finally, we have provided two proofs: 1) a specific bound property of 
the risk function; and 2) a resolution of the distinction problem between high-frequency low-impact 
events and low-frequency high-impact ones, by employing the casual effect property defined by BN 
topology. 
The analysis and examples given illustrate that the use of the proposed risk assessment is 
considerably more practical and reliable than common risk assessment methods, especially when 
underlying failure mechanisms, whether due to malicious attacks or accidental events, are 
unattainable. Thus, for many scenarios, this method can be a promising approach.  
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 Chapter 7 
Contributions and Future Work 
In this chapter we summarise the overall contribution of this document and present some open 
problems that can be used as basis for advancing this research direction. 
7.1 Summary 
This work addresses the problem of system-level security quantification. Across the various security 
domains, this problem is hard, as the “physics” of the amount of security is ambiguous, the 
operational state is defined by two confronting parties, the problem is about multiple conceptual 
boundaries across multiple abstraction levels, computing paradigms are evolving by nature, protecting 
and breaking systems is a cross-disciplinary mechanism, security is achieved by comparable security 
strength and breakable by the weakest link, the human factor is unavoidable, and no universally 
accepted abstraction of a computing system or failure model is available, to say the least.  
To tackle these issues, we have examined the problem at its abstraction level with comparison to 
related, well-founded engineering disciplines. We have realised that the following components are 
essential to arriving at a consistent evaluation methodology: a unified abstraction of computing 
systems, a standardized failure model, bounding system model(s), performance measure(s), and 
evaluation technique(s). We have also found that the effect of security controls and the impact of their 
failures in a computing system can be captured in a structural way, by which these modeling 
components can be established. Subsequently, we have shown how the logical network and failure 
statistics of individual system components, in addition to design bounds, can be used as the main 
input to carry out various quantitative analysis tasks. The proposed evaluation methods, however, are 
independent from their corresponding system models, facilitating a wider range of evaluation 
techniques. In what follows, we summarise the contribution of each chapter individually. 
In  Chapter 3, we have first addressed the problem of a unified paradigm of security modeling, 
particularly establishing computing system abstraction and a failure model. This has led to abstracting 
any computing system into the two sets of assets and controls, bounding what defines a computing 
system, and the definition of failure based on its impact consequent to malicious and/or nonmalicious 
causes, reducing the complexity of the failure space. These components have been consistently used 
as the foundation for the evaluation methods throughout this work. 
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 Then, we have addressed the issue of developing a bounding system model for evaluating security 
systems as a separate entity. To do so, we have reconstructed the ISMM model to map the structural 
arrangement among the set of controls with respect to failure so that quantitative evaluation, including 
maturity, can be established. We have shown that various concepts and representation and analysis 
techniques can be extended from dependability evaluation. In particular, we have extended the use of 
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs), state vectors, and structure functions to bound and build the 
logical network of a security system. To evaluate these ideas and forthcoming evaluation methods, we 
have built a case study applying such extensions. 
 Chapter 4 has followed with the analysis techniques from reliability engineering. We have shown 
the mathematical formulation of minimal path sets, minimal cut sets, and reliability analysis based on 
both random events and random variables. The minimal sets allow one to examine the critical 
controls that affect the operational state of security, whereas reliability analysis can be used to 
calculate reliability and maturity measures of the security system. We have demonstrated different 
redundancy configurations and failure rates of controls, along with different ways to find the mean 
time to failure (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹) and the mission time (𝑡𝑡) that increases reliability and maturity values, at 
subsystem and system levels. Such analysis can be used to build more reliable security systems. 
 Chapter 5 has addressed the issue of security quantification when multi-state security systems, 
beyond binary systems, with multiple performance measures, beyond reliability and availability, are 
considered. It has been recognised that Multi-State Systems (MSS) representation and the Universal 
Generating Function (UGF) provide a suitable methodology to resolve the issue. Building on the 
same modeling paradigm, we have shown the formulation necessary to establish these methods on the 
ISMM model, establishing the multi-layer MSS (MLMSS) model. In a parallel analysis to the 
previous chapter, we have also demonstrated the reliability and maturity analysis. Moreover, we have 
shown how to perform structural evaluation of various permutations of intermediate u-functions 
towards the product u-function in a systematic and progressive manner. 
 Chapter 6 has addressed the problem of security quantification when both sets of a computing 
system, i.e., assets and controls, are considered. Alternatively to the ISMM system model, which only 
considers the set of controls, and building on the same modeling paradigm, we have adopted a graph-
theoretic approach to model the relationships among both sets. We have proposed asset-control BNs 
as the bounding system model to capture the failure interdependency among such entities. In this 
representation, besides failure analysis of individual nodes, we have found that this model facilitates 
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 the study of failure consequences and estimated damage using BNs properties, rendering it a useful 
model for risk assessment applications. Consequently, we have proposed a new risk assessment 
method and have shown its mathematical formulation with a brief example demonstration. Various 
diagnosis and prediction inferences have been demonstrated, addressing several aspects of security 
and its economics, at both node and system levels. We have also provided proof of certain bounds on 
risk function, and proof that the method resolves the distinction problem between high-frequency 
low-impact events and low-frequency high-impact ones by employing the casual effect property 
defined by BN topology. 
The proposed evaluation methods can be applied to both systems under design and existing 
systems, and can be used by both security engineers and dependability engineers. For systems under 
design, they can be used to engineer security and dependability requirements, including the 
development of alternative design options and the analysis of potential threat and failure models. For 
existing systems, they can be employed to provide various operational measures of security and 
dependability, and to audit, monitor, and predict security behavior. They can also be used to identify 
and evaluate alternative countermeasures and enhancement upgrades. Overall evaluations can be 
performed at component-, subsystem-, and system levels, addressing key aspects from both security-
related analysis and dependability-related analysis. 
Nevertheless, while this research has exploited the security modeling paradigm and provided 
various evaluation methods, some limitations exist. For instance, a classical limitation occurs when 
the number of controls in a given system grows, rendering the corresponding mathematical problem 
intractable. This difficulty arises due to the exponential growth of the number of variables involved in 
building the system model. Fortunately, various approximation methods can be used to overcome 
such a limitation in a way analogous to that of reliability engineering. One might also notice the 
limitation in validating this type of work due to the unavailability of representative datasets, as 
explained earlier in Section  2.1.5. 
7.2 Future Work 
In the following sections, we briefly describe some of the potential research directions for the core 
components of this research.  
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 7.2.1 The ISMM Model 
Side note #1. In this work, ISMM structures play a major role to establish the system model as they 
bound the structural relationships among the set of controls. We have only considered simple 
structures to introduce the extended evaluation methods. Being based on reliability block diagrams, 
these structures will eventually restrict any representation to mixed combinations of series and 
parallel connections. One direction in this regard is to extend this representation to complex 
structures, such as bridge, star, and delta [47], [105], to represent more-complex relationships of 
controls. Furthermore, another direction of research is to extend graph-theoretic structures to model 
much more-complex relationships. This extension can be approached using reliability graphs, non-
series-parallel block diagrams, which can be found in [33] or Bayesian networks, which can be found 
in [96], [97]. 
Side note #2. Recall that the general form of the maturity function in Section  3.10 is ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =
ℱ(ℳ1,ℳ2, … ,ℳ𝑙), a function defined over various performance measures. Each measure ℳ𝑘 
involves the evaluation of the two sets M𝑖𝑖𝑘 and 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑�M𝑖𝑖𝑘�, representing a certain performance 
and demand, respectively. These two sets can be formulated using the MSS UGF method, 
particularly, using the demand function 𝐹𝐹�𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡),𝑊(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) −𝑊(𝑡𝑡) and the corresponding u-
function form, where 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑊(𝑡𝑡) represent performance and demand functions, respectively. The 
interested researcher is referred to [116], [117] for further details on these functions. 
Side note #3. The use of importance analysis in multi-component systems can be very useful. For 
instance, the Birnbaum Importance measure [102], [105], [167] in reliability evaluation represents the 
rate at which a system’s reliability increases when the reliability of a particular component increases. 
Analytically, it is defined by 𝐼𝑘 = 𝜕𝑅𝑠(𝜆𝜆)𝜕𝑅𝑘(𝜆𝜆), where 𝐼𝑘 is the reliability importance of the kth component, 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑅𝑅𝑘(𝑡𝑡) are system reliability and component 𝑘 reliability at time 𝑡𝑡, respectively. These kinds 
of measures merit further study in this work and current studies in security evaluation in general. 
Side note #4. For decades, maturity models have been qualitative in nature. The most prominent ones 
are those developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University. Three 
examples from the SEI are the Software CMM (SW-CMM), the Systems Engineering CMM (SE-
CMM), and the CMM Integration (CMMI). In addition, the Systems Security Engineering Capability 
Maturity Model CMM (SSE-CMM) developed by The International Systems Security Engineering 
Association (ISSEA, established in 1999), which has been accepted by the International Organization 
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 for Standardization (ISO) as ISO/IEC 21827 standard. However, while these CMMs have been useful 
in their applications, they have remained of a qualitative nature, only reflecting how the process is 
implemented, disallowing them from providing quantitative, operational measurement of the delivery 
itself. As such, the context of the ISMM model, including its quantifying semantics, demonstrated in 
this work has a research potential for adoption by those qualitative maturity models. 
Side note #5. The main focus of ISMM structures has been on security controls, without a concrete 
consideration of privacy, which is sometimes addressed distinctly. One possible research direction is 
to exploit this avenue. 
7.2.2 Reliability-theoretic ISMM-based Analysis 
Side note #1. A natural extension to the demonstrated reliability-based analysis is to introduce the 
availability measure and repairable systems in the security context. These aspects have a great 
potential to address the maintainability of security systems. Recall that availability is defined by 
𝑢𝑝 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑒
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 = 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐹+𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑅, requiring more statistical information about the recovery of failing 
controls. As such, that this of analysis normally requires models based on stochastic processes such as 
Markov and semi-Markov [47], [80], [168]. 
Side note #2. There are various techniques to evaluate the reliability of complex systems that can be 
extended to this work. Examples include Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). 
FTA is considered a popular deductive method (top-down) to evaluate reliability of complex systems 
[105] with respect to the failure space [74]. This method is designed to use simple logical 
relationships (i.e., AND, OR, XOR, PRIORITY AND, INHIBIT, DELAY) to represent the structure 
of different relationships among lower-level events and ultimately faults or failures of the top event 
whereby probabilistic analysis is performed [47], [168]. Thus, FTA can be useful for examining 
failure scenarios [75], [76]. Alternatively, event trees are constructed using the complete event space 
of all possible events representing components in a system. Event trees are built based on an inductive 
approach (bottom-up), and thus can be useful to study the holistic view of systems [47], [168].   
Side note #3. Many useful optimization applications in reliability engineering can be useful to this 
study, including the economics of security. Such formulations and solution techniques can be 
extended to address various optimization objectives in this work, such as redundancy, cost, maturity, 
and reliability. The following resources can be consulted for more details in optimization: [47], [118], 
[169]  
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 7.2.3 ISMM-based MSS Evaluation Using UGF 
Side note #1. k-out-of-n systems receive special attention in various system-evaluation applications. 
These systems exist in many forms with different models. In the general case, a k-out-of-n system 
functions (fails) if and only if at least 𝑘 of its components function (fail). A special case is the 
Consecutive k-out-of-n system, which adds the restriction of working (failing) components being in 
consecutive order. In this thesis, however, we have introduced the concept of precedence to the 
ISMM work to distinguish it from the simple ordering of security layers. Building on this property, a 
new case of k-out-of-n systems, perhaps the Precedence k-out-of-n system, can be established. This 
model should reflect the special feature of security systems where the protection (failure) occurs 
when a set of controls in certain precedence functions (fails), not necessarily in consecutive order of 
the controls. To this end, precedence needs to be defined by some rules added to the set of 𝑘. Details 
on several k-out-of-n models, however, can be found in [116], [118], [132]. 
Side note #2. In this work we have addressed the case of MSS systems with independent controls. 
Similar to reliability-based analysis, a natural direction is to extend the modeling of dependent 
components, the availability measure, and repairable systems too [116], [117]. 
Side note #3. The MSS UGF technique facilitates various optimization problems as it allows a fast 
evaluation of the system performance distribution. Optimization using genetic algorithms, which is 
based on evolutionary searching of a solution space, represents a particular match to this setting. 
More techniques, however, can be found in [116], [117], [118], [119]. 
7.2.4 Asset-control Graphs 
Side note #1. Above, we have not considered how to build the BN graphs by applying structure and 
parameter learning algorithms. Existing literature on BNs offers well-founded learning methods and 
algorithms that can be constructively extended to this work. The interested researcher is referred to 
[32], [142], [165]. 
Side note #2. In this work, we have only addressed the case when there are no cycles between asset 
and control nodes in the graph. While this simplifying assumption brings the great benefits of BN 
inference algorithms and associated analysis, it remains a limitation on the mutual relationships 
between system nodes. As a direction of research to overcome this limitation, we think allowing 
cycles and directed and undirected graphs, whereby more system configurations and asset-control 
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 behaviours can be modeled, merits further extensions. Details on various graph classes can be found 
in [170], [171]. 
Side node #3. In uncertain environments such as security, reasoning over time becomes of great 
benefit to better analysing the changing world. To facilitate such study, Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
(DBNs) can be used, and can be found in [32], [142], [165]. In this setting, asset and control variables 
are related to each other over adjacent time steps. 
Side node #4. The proposed asset-control BNs formalism allows us to map qualitatively and 
quantitatively the dependency and impact of security failures among assets and controls using BN 
topology and CPTs. This representation provides a system bounding that can be useful in formulating 
various optimization problems. For example, for a given expenditure of money units and a set of 
configuration alternatives with a set of asset-control dependency options, how much of a decrease in a 
particular risk term, perhaps system risk 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠), can be achieved? What is the minimum protection 
cost required to reach an acceptable, predefined level of risk? How much should be set to align the 
incentives to protecting a system with the “suffer [143]” when it fails? Other queries might also 
involve identifying latent failures and associated risks and their paths, for example, finding the most 
(least) probable path of system threshold failure, affected nodes, associated risks, and their 
probabilities. In general, such an analysis can be useful in engineering a system's configuration, given 
some risk and economic constraints, whereby the analysis can be performed at the individual 
component level, system level, or a subset of its components. Various optimization resources, such as 
[172], [173], can be consulted for these researchable problems. 
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Appendix A: Notation for ISMM-based Analysis  
  
ℳ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  ISMM overall maturity value 
ℳ𝑘  system maturity value based on measure type 𝑘 
ℳ𝑅  system maturity value based on reliability measure M𝑖𝑖𝑘  the value of measure 𝑘 at layer 𝑖𝑖 
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑑�M𝑖𝑖𝑘�  adequacy or maturity minimum bound for measure 𝑘 at layer 𝑖𝑖 
ℱ  maturity adequacy function 
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  the total number of security controls at 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 or 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗  security control 𝑗 at layer 𝑖𝑖, 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 1, … ,5;   𝑗 = 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑆𝑆 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖 
𝑪𝒊𝒊  �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗  , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5; 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖�, set of controls for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝑪  {𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5}, set of subsystems of the system 
∅(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊)  structure function of the vector 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊 for structure or 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒌  the kth minimal path set for  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
∝𝑖𝑖,𝑗 (𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊)  minimal path set function for the set 𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒋 
𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒌  the kth minimal cut set for  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊)  minimal cut set function for the set 𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒋 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗  reliability of control 𝑗 at layer 𝑖𝑖 
𝑨𝟏𝟏  the minimal path set for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
𝑪𝒊𝒊  the ith minimal cut set for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗  the event of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 is working X𝑖𝑖,𝑗  a random variable representing the state of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗, working if X𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 1 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗  reliability of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  reliability of the overall security system 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  adequacy or maturity minimum bound for reliability measure at layer 𝑖𝑖. That is, 
the minimum reliability bound necessary for layer 𝑖𝑖 to meet the reliability 
criterion set for the maturity qualification of layer 𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)  reliability of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 as a function over time 
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 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  reliability of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as a function over time 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)  reliability of the overall security system as a function over time 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)  failure density function for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  failure density function for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)  failure distribution control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  failure distribution 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗  constant failure rate for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)  hazard function for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗  mean time to failure for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
MSS multi-state system 
MLMSS multi-layer multi-state system 
UGF universal generating function 
ODP output performance distribution 
𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑙  performance rate with associated probability 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑙 for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 in the state 𝑙, 
𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗} 
𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗  number of different performance rates for control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝒈𝒊𝒊,𝒋  set of performance rates for control  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝒑𝒊𝒊,𝒋  set of probabilities of performance rates for control  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡)  performance rate in the stochastic domain with associated probability 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡𝑡) for 
control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗 
𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑙  performance rate with associated probability 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙 for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 (or 𝑪𝒊𝒊) in the 
state 𝑙, 𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝐾𝑖𝑖} 
𝐾𝑖𝑖  number of different performance rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 (or 𝑪𝒊𝒊) 
𝒈𝒊𝒊  set of performance rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝒑𝒊𝒊  set of probabilities of performance rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  performance rate in the stochastic domain with associated probability 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) for 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 (or 𝑪𝒊𝒊) 
𝑔𝑙  performance rate with associated probability 𝑝𝑙 for the system 𝑪 in the state 
𝑙, 𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝐾} 
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 𝑘  number of different performance rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (or 𝑪)  
𝒈  set of performance rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (or 𝑪) 
𝒑  set of probabilities of performance rates for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (or 𝑪) 
𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡)  performance rate in the stochastic domain with associated probability 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) for 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (or 𝑪) 
𝑳𝒊𝒊
𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊   space for all possible combinations of performance rates for all controls at layer 
𝑪𝒊𝒊 
𝑴𝒊𝒊  space of all possible values of performance rates for layer 𝑪𝒊𝒊 
𝑳𝒏𝒏  space of all possible combinations of performance rates for all system 𝑪 layers 
𝑴  space of all possible values of the performance rates of the system 𝑪 
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𝑺  {𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖: 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡}, set of system components 
𝑨  {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖: 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡}, set of assets 
𝑪  {𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖:𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙}, set of controls 
𝑽  {𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑨,𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑆𝑆 𝑪}  
𝑬  {𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ 𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆}  
𝑮  (𝑽,𝑬), Graph 𝑮 of 𝑽 nodes and 𝑬 edges 
𝑷  probability distribution over 𝑽 for failure dependency 
𝑿  {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛}, system random variables 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  r.v. representing the state of failure of node 𝑖𝑖 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖}, probability of failure of node 𝑖𝑖 
𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  set of parents of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 in 𝑮 
𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  set of descendants of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 in 𝑮 
𝑿−𝒊𝒊  set of nodes excluding node 𝑖𝑖 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸  Annualized Loss Expectancy 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸  Single Loss Expectancy 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂  Annual Rate of Occurrence 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  Annualized loss expectancy of node 𝑖𝑖 alone 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑗 )  Annualized loss expectancy of node 𝑖𝑖 alone, given evidence of 𝑋𝑋𝑗 occurrence 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  Annualized loss expectancy of node 𝑖𝑖, including the set of its descendants 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑗 )  Annualized loss expectancy of node 𝑖𝑖, including the set of its descendants, given 
evidence of 𝑋𝑋𝑗 occurrence 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖\𝑿−𝑖𝑖)  Annualized loss expectancy of node 𝑖𝑖, including the set of its descendants, 
excluding the set 𝑿−𝑖𝑖 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠)  Annualized loss expectancy of system threshold node 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛(𝑿)  Annualized loss expectancy of system 𝑿 nodes alone (excluding their 
descendants) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸(𝑿)  Annualized loss expectancy of system 𝑿 nodes, including the set of their 
descendants 
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 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)  (𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)), attributes of asset 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)  value of asset 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)  impact factor of asset 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)  availability of asset 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)  (𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖),𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖),𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)), attributes of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)  cost of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)  impact factor of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)  security process goal of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)  type of control 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
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